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> How exactly the spy agencies want to crack Tor remains vague. > Precisely how the BND plans to „chop“ Tor is unfortunately redacted in the document we obtain
by mirimir 9y ago
> How exactly the spy agencies want to crack Tor remains vague.
> Precisely how the BND plans to „chop“ Tor is unfortunately redacted in the document we obtained. But as before, the spy agency refers to public research. To implement the attack, it is likely that the spies runs their own servers in the Tor network. M.S. points to passive snooping servers, which are presumably operated by the NSA, and emphasizes the „protection of the anonymity“ of the spy agencies.
And indeed, there are no specifics.
Tor Project acknowledges that Tor is vulnerable to global adversaries. With enough intercepts, they can correlate traffic at various relays, and connected users and servers. There's nothing magic about onion services. It's just that there are seven relays between users and servers, rather than just the normal three for Tor.
But hey, it provides better anonymity than any alternative. Other than meeting in remote locations, anyway. And you can add VPNs to the mix. I always use Tor through nested VPN chains. That adds misdirection. But perhaps most importantly, it adds latency and jitter, which mitigate traffic correlation attacks.
Edit: As a fun science project, you can play with traffic correlation between you and your private onion service. You use unlisted private bridges as entry guards, both locally and for the onion service. So it's only your traffic that gets analyzed. And you don't need sophisticated software. Wireshark and a spreadsheet are enough. So you have packet captures from your local machine, and from the VPS running the onion service. Using Wireshark, you export bitrate in millisecond bins. Then in the spreadsheet, you have two columns, one with each bitrate series. Just create a third column for the product. Each sheet will hold 1E6 lines, or 1000 seconds. Excel works best, because it uses multiple cores. R would be better, because you could crunch segments in parallel.
- microcolonel 9y agoYou can also set up fragile directional radio links pretty cheap with off the shelf devices from Ubiquiti. If set up carefully, they can be basically impossible to follow if they are not aligned when they are observed by the adversary; and at least a little difficult even when they are. You can also use a tamper detecting opaque enclosure to (visually) hide the orientation. We are in the middle of a golden age for surveillance, and a golden age for the avoidance of surveillance.
- zdkl 9y agoGot a link to the hardware and a project like that?
- microcolonel 9y ago> the hardware A couple of these products function on unlicensed bands, which is what you'd need. The latency is very low and close to constant regardless of the length of the haul, which means that it could be difficult to tell that your packets even originated from a location other than your exit. https://www.ubnt.com/products/#airfiber https://www.ubnt.com/products/#airfiber > a project Not sure if anyone has documented doing this, seems like it would defeat the purpose for anyone with a practical need for it. Maybe I'll need to be the one to show it. The hard part is probably tamper alarming the enclosure, the rest is just standard setup for the equipment and maybe some site security concerns. For example, considering what to do when the station goes down, since coming to fix it would be a good way to be discovered if your adversary is monitoring it.
- zdkl 9y ago> Not sure if anyone has documented doing this, seems like it would defeat the purpose for anyone with a practical need for it. Indeed! I was hoping for a collection of methods, maybe some form of best practices regarding anti-tampering. Thanks for the links to the APs, fun rabbithole to fall down in.
- mirimir 9y agoGet some Ubiquiti Bullet M[0] and parabolic dishes[1]. The Bullet comes with decent software. Setting up linked networks is pretty trivial. 0) https://dl.ubnt.com/datasheets/bulletm/bm_ds_web.pdf https://dl.ubnt.com/datasheets/bulletm/bm_ds_web.pdf 1) https://www.amazon.com/Antenna-World-G2424-Directional-Parabolic/dp/B00NQGVMSE https://www.amazon.com/Antenna-World-G2424-Directional-Parab...
- mirimir 9y agoYes, Ubiquiti rules! You can get 25 km links with equipment cost under $500, including dishes and towers.
- etplayer 9y agoHow do I chain VPNs together where I'm not giving my Tor requests to any of the computers between mine and the Tor network? I use a server at the moment to tunnel but French law requires them to store my history for a year after I've left their service.
- mirimir 9y agoBasically, you're doing multiple NATing, through VPNs. You can use physical routers or VMs, such as pfSense. You have a router that routes a VPN to a LAN. On that LAN, there's another router, that routes another VPN to another LAN. And so on, as deep as you like. So in the end, your ISP gets packets {with encrypted packets [with encrypted packets (with encrypted packets as payloads) as payloads] as payloads} etc. See https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides/advanced-privacy-and-anonymity-part-1 https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides/advanced-privacy-and-ano...
- belorn 9y agoI have never seen any study that can do traffic correlation of encrypted traffic for real world data. The combination of parallel connections (Firefox has 6), multiple tabs, ajax calls and background polls, all makes the real world very hard to separate the data to any sensible detection rate. What I have seen is people being able to detect data when each high level request can be cleanly separated.
- dannyw 9y agoTor Hidden Services tend to be run with NoScript set to disable, so there's no ajax nor background polls.
- cat199 9y agothis is a security agency - what makes you think you would have seen it? multiple intercept locations + timing information + flow size captures + crawling data from destination sites + a big honking graph database would probably get someone with deep pockets fairly far as far as fingerprinting.. from here, select various targets and add more traditional methods and you've got yourself a pretty good 'lets see whats going on with the key players' sort of tool..
- belorn 9y agoI have seen statements both Snowden and Schneier that say that security and in particular encryption works but the attacker only need a single point of failure and security agencies generally bypass rather than break security measures. But we are talking about a specific attack vector here: Correlation attacks. flow size captures and destination site fingerprints are great if the traffic can be isolated. Imagine a actually fingerprint. A computer will transform the image into specific dot values, and from there create a unique value. Now imagine you put 100 different fingerprints with the exact same outer finger shape on top of each other. No method will be able to say with confidence if a specific fingerprint is in it, regardless deep pockets and honking databases. But there are a few catches. Reduce the number of simultaneous signals and the problem goes down. If you can introduce additional traffic into the signal, you can often isolate the traffic you are interested in. While we can never know with certainty what the big agencies can do, the general advice I have heard is to not send a single message through the tor network and always do it as a part of multiple simultaneous messages (both for sender and receiver).
- eighthnate 9y ago> With enough intercepts, they can correlate traffic at various relays, and connected users and servers. Exactly. If enough ISPs cooperate and share traffic data, then you can correlate traffic. Especially if it is a low traffic. The more traffic, then more difficult it becomes but even then it is still doable. > And you can add VPNs to the mix. As long as the VPNs themselves are legal ( china has started to ban them ) and they aren't compromised or they aren't government created VPNs to secretly track you or the VPNs themselves are honest. Nothing prevent the VPNs from collecting your traffic data and selling it to governments.
- mirimir 9y agoISPs don't need to cooperate. The NSA just hacks into them. We know that from Snowden documents. You can't trust anyone. But with nested chaining -- whether it's Tor relays or VPN servers -- you can distribute trust. And the more stuff you nest, the more adversaries need to compromise.
- zamber 9y ago> Wireshark and a spreadsheet are enough. So you have packet captures from your local machine, and from the VPS running the onion service. Using Wireshark, you export bitrate in millisecond bins. Then in the spreadsheet, you have two columns, one with each bitrate series. Just create a third column for the product. Each sheet will hold 1E6 lines, or 1000 seconds. Excel works best, because it uses multiple cores. R would be better, because you could crunch segments in parallel. Wireshark alone is enough http://blog.davidvassallo.me/2010/03/22/measuring-bandwidth-using-wireshark/ http://blog.davidvassallo.me/2010/03/22/measuring-bandwidth-... If you would want to really see if there are differences in bandwidth for 2 pcap files you would have to graph it cumulatively. I may have something to do that in Python.
- mirimir 9y agoSure. That shows throughput. And you can compare captures visually. But to do correlation, you need something more quantitative. The old school way is sampling and multiplication. But fancier stuff is possible now. You can look at additional measures, not just amplitude. Packet type, for example. Or components of TCP conversations. But Tor-specific parameters are buried in encrypted payloads, so amplitude is decent enough.
- zamber 9y ago> You can look at additional measures, not just amplitude. Packet type, for example. Or components of TCP conversations Yes, I did that too. Had to analyze traffic to QA a VPN app. > But Tor-specific parameters are buried in encrypted payloads, so amplitude is decent enough. Indeed it is. It's even possible to do traffic shape fingerprinting on that.