3 ms·
The issue is that an attacker could buy a domain, serve content from it with the cache-control: immutable response, and then later someone else buys the domain,
by AgentME 9y ago
The issue is that an attacker could buy a domain, serve content from it with the cache-control: immutable response, and then later someone else buys the domain, puts their own content on it, but a lot of their users (who had accessed the domain when it was owned by the attacker) have a lot of the attacker's immutable content permanently cached.
Even if the second owner follows the advice of setting expiration dates appropriately, nothing helps them.
- taeric 9y agoThat ignores attacks on dns and certificate authorities. I could readily see a fun novel about a nation state or isp using this trick to seed malicious code to a lot of public sites. Imagine setting it for index.html on any site with a source that merely bootstraps to the intended site. Along with the malicious code.
- mseebach 9y agoIn an attack where DNS and CAs are compromised, immutable caching is going to be be least of our problems, frankly.
- taeric 9y agoHasn't this happened? Several times? I'm not trying to say it is everyday. But it is easier than you think. Browsers are removing bad authorities. Which is good. There are a lot of them, though. Which is a larger attack surface than many folks acknowledge.