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The gist of the longer translated article is BND believes the majority of Tor relays are run by spy agencies, aka a global adversary that can watch most of the

The gist of the longer translated article is BND believes the majority of Tor relays are run by spy agencies, aka a global adversary that can watch most of the traffic. So you connect to the NSA run bridge that routes you to the GCHQ/NSA/CSIS/ASIO run farm of internal relays.

KGIII 9y ago
If I understand correctly, and I may not, that still only matters if you're leaving the network. If you use Tor to browse the regular web, a country-level adversary can unmask you. If you remain on the network, and don't do silly things like use scripting, you should be okay. Should be...
- gpm 9y ago
  If they control all the nodes from your computer to the secret service you are connecting to, they can trivially deanonymize you. Staying in the network doesn't protect you. Also the case if they are missing a few nodes in the middle, as long as they control the entrance, exit, and never miss two in a row.
kpcyrd 9y ago
> So you connect to the NSA run bridge that routes you to the GCHQ/NSA/CSIS/ASIO run farm of internal relays. This isn't possible. Your tor daemon fetches the consensus from a directory server and picks the relays and exits itself. The directory server can't tamper with that consensus because its signed by the directory authorities, a small set of servers that are necessary because of this attack.
- jacquesm 9y ago
  You are right in principle but if the vast majority of the nodes are run by adversaries then to all intents and purposes it might as well be true because that directory of relays and exits contains such a large percentage of adversaries your chances of hitting one of the 'good guys' are nil.
  - hackermailman 9y ago
    Part of their reasoning for this warning is BND claims vast majority of relays are in 5 Eyes Alliance countries, and BND claims they told the 5 Eyes Alliance a few years ago they should just run relays themselves until the odds are favored a Tor user ends up using spy agency relays.
    - yborg 9y ago
      I've always assumed that once Tor was sufficiently popular that the majority of nodes would end up being attackers. NSA gets whatever money it wants, there must be entire server farms running Tor nodes for them. What has always surprised me is that someone hasn't tried to install Tor nodes into compromised IoT devices, etc. If a virus is installing millions of nodes in the wild, that might be enough to keep the network majority non-attacker. As it stands, NSA or China, or whoever just ends up buying the whole network.
      - kuschku 9y ago
        You just need to take Raspberry Pi Zero’s, install TOR nodes on them, and drop them anywhere with free WiFi and a working charger – so you can hide them in streetlights near starbucks, etc. That would be enough to get thousands of nodes. (And probably a bit less illegal, although still not legal)
      - oneweekwonder 9y ago
        > What has always surprised me is that someone hasn't tried to install Tor nodes into compromised IoT devices, etc. If you had the skill to compromise the devices with a tor node. Won't you use that node in your own private "tor" network, instead of sharing it with the wild?

KGIII 9y ago

If I understand correctly, and I may not, that still only matters if you're leaving the network. If you use Tor to browse the regular web, a country-level adversary can unmask you. If you remain on the network, and don't do silly things like use scripting, you should be okay. Should be...

gpm 9y ago
If they control all the nodes from your computer to the secret service you are connecting to, they can trivially deanonymize you. Staying in the network doesn't protect you. Also the case if they are missing a few nodes in the middle, as long as they control the entrance, exit, and never miss two in a row.

kpcyrd 9y ago

> So you connect to the NSA run bridge that routes you to the GCHQ/NSA/CSIS/ASIO run farm of internal relays. This isn't possible. Your tor daemon fetches the consensus from a directory server and picks the relays and exits itself. The directory server can't tamper with that consensus because its signed by the directory authorities, a small set of servers that are necessary because of this attack.

jacquesm 9y ago
You are right in principle but if the vast majority of the nodes are run by adversaries then to all intents and purposes it might as well be true because that directory of relays and exits contains such a large percentage of adversaries your chances of hitting one of the 'good guys' are nil.
- hackermailman 9y ago
  Part of their reasoning for this warning is BND claims vast majority of relays are in 5 Eyes Alliance countries, and BND claims they told the 5 Eyes Alliance a few years ago they should just run relays themselves until the odds are favored a Tor user ends up using spy agency relays.
  - yborg 9y ago
    I've always assumed that once Tor was sufficiently popular that the majority of nodes would end up being attackers. NSA gets whatever money it wants, there must be entire server farms running Tor nodes for them. What has always surprised me is that someone hasn't tried to install Tor nodes into compromised IoT devices, etc. If a virus is installing millions of nodes in the wild, that might be enough to keep the network majority non-attacker. As it stands, NSA or China, or whoever just ends up buying the whole network.
    - kuschku 9y ago
      You just need to take Raspberry Pi Zero’s, install TOR nodes on them, and drop them anywhere with free WiFi and a working charger – so you can hide them in streetlights near starbucks, etc. That would be enough to get thousands of nodes. (And probably a bit less illegal, although still not legal)
    - oneweekwonder 9y ago
      > What has always surprised me is that someone hasn't tried to install Tor nodes into compromised IoT devices, etc. If you had the skill to compromise the devices with a tor node. Won't you use that node in your own private "tor" network, instead of sharing it with the wild?