3 ms·
Conscious thought is far more liable to interpretation than the apparently encrypted nature of unconsciousness, whose contents I'd estimate would elicit great s
by pizza 9y ago
Conscious thought is far more liable to interpretation than the apparently encrypted nature of unconsciousness, whose contents I'd estimate would elicit great surprisal in me if I could simply magically gain full access. If it was capable of a meaningful representation, and if I could consciously analyze unconsciousness in a way without disturbing the structure of my unconsciousness because of a kind of self-referential paradox, then the relative entropy of learning "no, actually this is a more accurate view of my mind" is something I'd expect to contain a lot of information that could possibly lead to a new approach of me being me.
Some might say "even if you knew what was inside, it would simply be meaningless - in fact, the only part of your unconsciousness that you could understand would end up being exactly the same as your conscious experience". Wittgenstein gave the answer "it would lack any sort of meaningfulness to you whatsoever" to the question "what would we understand if we could listen to a lion speak?" It's not unreasonable to assume that a memdump of unconsciousness would actually provide little insight into itself. If interpretation of unconsciousness is impossible internally because it has a kind of illegible presentation from inside your mind, then there might not be a guarantee you would be able to recast into an internal and understandable grammar just as result of seeing it appear outside of your head.
Maybe consciousness and unconsciousness are the ends of a spectrum that measures something like "the degree of sparsity of error-correction (ie. error-correcting codes) necessary for providing the illusion of singular focus while recovering information from billions of sources". Maybe there is a compressive sensing-like sampling method that allows neurons to recognize a cat through pretty short chains of neurons because of an object recognition approach that greatly reduces the amount of computation necessary for the sparsity of that signal..?
Hell, maybe consciousness is even way trippier than that, and emerges from neural approximations of dynamically reconfigurable circuits that verify zero-knowledge proofs..
Problem is that none of these explain where and why what is felt feels what it does, though!