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> Machines detect wavelengths of light. That's not what a color experience is. Photons aren't literally colored red or green. That's just how we see objects whe

> Machines detect wavelengths of light. That's not what a color experience is. Photons aren't literally colored red or green. That's just how we see objects when the cones in our eyes are excited, sending electrical signals to our visual cortex. Right. We detect certain wavelengths, which activate certain receptors, which send out certain signals, which cause certain neurons to fire. The "color experience" is the neurons firing and how that interacts with other neuronal activity. I'm not seeing where the need for qualia is, or what's particularly hard about this.

goatlover 9y ago
So you've adopted an identity view of consciousness, where having a red experience is identical to the neuronal activity which results from our eyes detecting light at a certain wavelength. This is one way to go which possibly solves the problem. But it's not without difficulty. One is that it's hard to see (pun unintended) how the explanation for neuronal activity is the same thing as having a red experience. Second problem is that it makes the physical system of brain activity special. Searle might be down with that, but it won't help machine detectors have a red experience. Or maybe even aliens, if they're made of something other than meat. It's also hard to see what makes neuronal activity any more special than the cells in your toes or molecules in a rock. Why can't a rock have a red experience when interacting with light at that wavelength?
- Chathamization 9y ago
  > One is that it's hard to see (pun unintended) how the explanation for neuronal activity is the same thing as having a red experience. I guess I don't understand why that's hard to see. It seems pretty straightforward to me. We know that neuronal activity is necessary for the experience, we know that it coincides with the experience, and we know that changing how neurons operate can effect the experience. It doesn't seem like a stretch to say that they are the experience. > Second problem is that it makes the physical system of brain activity special...It's also hard to see what makes neuronal activity any more special than the cells in your toes or molecules in a rock. Why can't a rock have a red experience when interacting with light at that wavelength? If we're defining "red experience" as the neuronal activity that humans have when they see red, your wondering why a rock can't have that? I mean, because it's a rock that doesn't have a single neuron, let alone a human brain? But beyond that - are there people that actually argue that brain activity isn't special? You're not going to have a "red experience" if you have no brain activity.
  - goatlover 9y ago
    > If we're defining "red experience" as the neuronal activity that humans have when they see red, your wondering why a rock can't have that? I mean, because it's a rock that doesn't have a single neuron, let alone a human brain? Because brains are made up of ordinary matter, just like rocks. If it's the behavior of neurons that's special, then consciousness is no longer identical with neurons, it's identical with any physical system that functions the same way. And then you have the possibility of very counterintuitive arrangements, like a billion Chinese instantiating a blue experience, or a meteor shower simulating experiences. > We know that neuronal activity is necessary for the experience, we know that it coincides with the experience, and we know that changing how neurons operate can affect the experience. It doesn't seem like a stretch to say that they are the experience. But what is it about neurons that make them experiential? And only some neurons, because a lot of neuronal activity is not conscious.
    - Chathamization 9y ago
      > If it's the behavior of neurons that's special, then consciousness is no longer identical with neurons, it's identical with any physical system that functions the same way. Sure, I don't think brain uploads are impossible. If we were having this conversation in 100 years, I might be saying that "red experience" is the result of neuronal/circuit activity. But functions the same way is the relevant part - a rock does not function the same way. I don't think either of us expect a human to act the same way if their brain is replaced by a rock. On some level, we both know that the brain is fundamentally different from a rock. > And then you have the possibility of very counterintuitive arrangements, like a billion Chinese instantiating a blue experience, or a meteor shower simulating experiences. I think we can both agree that a computer is merely a physical object. That doesn't mean that surfing the web or playing a video game on "a billion Chinese"/"a meteor shower" is any less counterintuitive. Imagining any incredibly complex system being completely simulated by random physical phenomena is bizarre. And the human brain is much, much more complex than a laptop. Really, go read up on it - 86 billion neurons, 100 trillion synapses, neurons firing 200 times a second. Consider the work it takes to simulate one second of brain activity (with far fewer neurons and synapses than a human brain)[1]: > The simulation involved 1.73 billion virtual nerve cells connected by 10.4 trillion synapses and was run on Japan's K computer, which was ranked the fastest in the world in 2011. > It took the Fujitsu-built K about 40 minutes to complete a simulation of one second of neuronal network activity in real time, according to Japanese research institute RIKEN, which runs the machine. > The simulation harnessed the power of 82,944 processors on the K computer, which is now ranked fourth on the biannual international Top500 supercomputer standings (China's Tianhe-2 is the fastest now). You're far more likely to see the dust in the air randomly play Casablanca for you from start to finish than you are for meteor showers to randomly start simulating the human brain. The human brain is complex. Really, really, really complex. So complex that weird emergent stuff like "red experience" happens. People have a hard time conceptualizing things when they become so vast; that's understandable. But there's no need to invent invisible qualia simply because we have a hard time understanding things on this scale. [1] https://www.cnet.com/news/fujitsu-supercomputer-simulates-1-second-of-brain-activity/ https://www.cnet.com/news/fujitsu-supercomputer-simulates-1-...
carapace 9y ago
The "need" for qualia? goatlover has explained it well: Subjective awareness exists. "Qualia" is a name for the content of awareness. We know awareness exists because we have it (or are it.) We literally know nothing except as qualia. The content of awareness is obviously mediated by our nervous system, but the subjective experience of "redness" is a mystery. (To take a simple example.) Why is red red? ------- edit: Chathamization what do you mean when you say "qualia"?
- Chathamization 9y ago
  > Subjective awareness exists. "Qualia" is a name for the content of awareness. Well, as I said in an earlier post, I'm talking about the existence of qualia "beyond being a vague description for emergent properties arising from our cells." People have a sense of self, sure, and people experience things. But usually the people who bring up "qualia" seem to think that our sense of self can't be explained as simply being neuronal activity. For instance, "redness" doesn't seem to be mysterious at all to me. Our brains fire in a certain way when presented with certain stimuli. As for why they fire in that particular way, it's complicated because the brain is complicated (and each persons brain is unique). But it's a complicated physical system (and one that we're gaining a better understanding of each day).
  - carapace 9y ago
    So why is red red and green green? Why isn't red green and green blue? Light of a certain frequency, neurons, "and then a miracle occurs", and "I" experience red... With all due respect you're eliding that bit in the middle.
    - dwaltrip 9y ago
      > "and then a miracle occurs" In my understanding, this "miracle" is human general intelligence. I think that any dynamic pattern-matching and model-building entity will experience a certain degree of "consciousness". Conscious experience is the entity's internal modeling of its own sensory input [1]. And likewise, conscious thought is the entity's modeling of its own internal state and processes (including the modeling process itself). [1] This includes things like seeing my friend walk down the street. This sensory input is incredibly more difficult to model than in an alternative scenario where I'm looking at a red apple resting on a table.

goatlover 9y ago

So you've adopted an identity view of consciousness, where having a red experience is identical to the neuronal activity which results from our eyes detecting light at a certain wavelength. This is one way to go which possibly solves the problem. But it's not without difficulty. One is that it's hard to see (pun unintended) how the explanation for neuronal activity is the same thing as having a red experience. Second problem is that it makes the physical system of brain activity special. Searle might be down with that, but it won't help machine detectors have a red experience. Or maybe even aliens, if they're made of something other than meat. It's also hard to see what makes neuronal activity any more special than the cells in your toes or molecules in a rock. Why can't a rock have a red experience when interacting with light at that wavelength?

Chathamization 9y ago
> One is that it's hard to see (pun unintended) how the explanation for neuronal activity is the same thing as having a red experience. I guess I don't understand why that's hard to see. It seems pretty straightforward to me. We know that neuronal activity is necessary for the experience, we know that it coincides with the experience, and we know that changing how neurons operate can effect the experience. It doesn't seem like a stretch to say that they are the experience. > Second problem is that it makes the physical system of brain activity special...It's also hard to see what makes neuronal activity any more special than the cells in your toes or molecules in a rock. Why can't a rock have a red experience when interacting with light at that wavelength? If we're defining "red experience" as the neuronal activity that humans have when they see red, your wondering why a rock can't have that? I mean, because it's a rock that doesn't have a single neuron, let alone a human brain? But beyond that - are there people that actually argue that brain activity isn't special? You're not going to have a "red experience" if you have no brain activity.
- goatlover 9y ago
  > If we're defining "red experience" as the neuronal activity that humans have when they see red, your wondering why a rock can't have that? I mean, because it's a rock that doesn't have a single neuron, let alone a human brain? Because brains are made up of ordinary matter, just like rocks. If it's the behavior of neurons that's special, then consciousness is no longer identical with neurons, it's identical with any physical system that functions the same way. And then you have the possibility of very counterintuitive arrangements, like a billion Chinese instantiating a blue experience, or a meteor shower simulating experiences. > We know that neuronal activity is necessary for the experience, we know that it coincides with the experience, and we know that changing how neurons operate can affect the experience. It doesn't seem like a stretch to say that they are the experience. But what is it about neurons that make them experiential? And only some neurons, because a lot of neuronal activity is not conscious.
  - Chathamization 9y ago
    > If it's the behavior of neurons that's special, then consciousness is no longer identical with neurons, it's identical with any physical system that functions the same way. Sure, I don't think brain uploads are impossible. If we were having this conversation in 100 years, I might be saying that "red experience" is the result of neuronal/circuit activity. But functions the same way is the relevant part - a rock does not function the same way. I don't think either of us expect a human to act the same way if their brain is replaced by a rock. On some level, we both know that the brain is fundamentally different from a rock. > And then you have the possibility of very counterintuitive arrangements, like a billion Chinese instantiating a blue experience, or a meteor shower simulating experiences. I think we can both agree that a computer is merely a physical object. That doesn't mean that surfing the web or playing a video game on "a billion Chinese"/"a meteor shower" is any less counterintuitive. Imagining any incredibly complex system being completely simulated by random physical phenomena is bizarre. And the human brain is much, much more complex than a laptop. Really, go read up on it - 86 billion neurons, 100 trillion synapses, neurons firing 200 times a second. Consider the work it takes to simulate one second of brain activity (with far fewer neurons and synapses than a human brain)[1]: > The simulation involved 1.73 billion virtual nerve cells connected by 10.4 trillion synapses and was run on Japan's K computer, which was ranked the fastest in the world in 2011. > It took the Fujitsu-built K about 40 minutes to complete a simulation of one second of neuronal network activity in real time, according to Japanese research institute RIKEN, which runs the machine. > The simulation harnessed the power of 82,944 processors on the K computer, which is now ranked fourth on the biannual international Top500 supercomputer standings (China's Tianhe-2 is the fastest now). You're far more likely to see the dust in the air randomly play Casablanca for you from start to finish than you are for meteor showers to randomly start simulating the human brain. The human brain is complex. Really, really, really complex. So complex that weird emergent stuff like "red experience" happens. People have a hard time conceptualizing things when they become so vast; that's understandable. But there's no need to invent invisible qualia simply because we have a hard time understanding things on this scale. [1] https://www.cnet.com/news/fujitsu-supercomputer-simulates-1-second-of-brain-activity/ https://www.cnet.com/news/fujitsu-supercomputer-simulates-1-...

carapace 9y ago

The "need" for qualia? goatlover has explained it well: Subjective awareness exists. "Qualia" is a name for the content of awareness. We know awareness exists because we have it (or are it.) We literally know nothing except as qualia. The content of awareness is obviously mediated by our nervous system, but the subjective experience of "redness" is a mystery. (To take a simple example.) Why is red red? ------- edit: Chathamization what do you mean when you say "qualia"?

Chathamization 9y ago
> Subjective awareness exists. "Qualia" is a name for the content of awareness. Well, as I said in an earlier post, I'm talking about the existence of qualia "beyond being a vague description for emergent properties arising from our cells." People have a sense of self, sure, and people experience things. But usually the people who bring up "qualia" seem to think that our sense of self can't be explained as simply being neuronal activity. For instance, "redness" doesn't seem to be mysterious at all to me. Our brains fire in a certain way when presented with certain stimuli. As for why they fire in that particular way, it's complicated because the brain is complicated (and each persons brain is unique). But it's a complicated physical system (and one that we're gaining a better understanding of each day).
- carapace 9y ago
  So why is red red and green green? Why isn't red green and green blue? Light of a certain frequency, neurons, "and then a miracle occurs", and "I" experience red... With all due respect you're eliding that bit in the middle.
  - dwaltrip 9y ago
    > "and then a miracle occurs" In my understanding, this "miracle" is human general intelligence. I think that any dynamic pattern-matching and model-building entity will experience a certain degree of "consciousness". Conscious experience is the entity's internal modeling of its own sensory input [1]. And likewise, conscious thought is the entity's modeling of its own internal state and processes (including the modeling process itself). [1] This includes things like seeing my friend walk down the street. This sensory input is incredibly more difficult to model than in an alternative scenario where I'm looking at a red apple resting on a table.