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That might be so. It's intriguing. But that still doesn't close the gap on explaining consciousness.
by goatlover 9y ago
That might be so. It's intriguing. But that still doesn't close the gap on explaining consciousness.
- naasking 9y agoThere are many gaps in our scientific knowledge, yet for nearly every such gap except consciousness, we are quite certain that science will close those gaps. Why is that?
- goatlover 9y agoThe argument is that consciousness is subjectively experienced, while science is an objective explanation. There's a very fundamental split regarding objectivity and subjectivity. And the nature of what it means to explain something. As for closing gaps, do we really expect science to be able to explain everything in terms of some fundamental theory, from quarks to societies? Or maybe in terms of emerging complexity going from chemistry all the way up to social organization?
- naasking 9y ago> The argument is that consciousness is subjectively experienced, while science is an objective explanation. Certainly consciousness appears to be subjective experience. That doesn't make it so. See: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00500/full http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00... > As for closing gaps, do we really expect science to be able to explain everything in terms of some fundamental theory, from quarks to societies? That certainly seems to be the trend. Every step forward in some field sheds light on other fields, and cross-disciplinary work is becoming ever more relevant.
- goatlover 9y ago> Certainly consciousness appears to be subjective experience. That doesn't make it so. See: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00.. http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00.... That's an intriguing article, but it doesn't quite go far enough. It never really explains the experience of red or the smell of a rose, it just posits an attention model for having conscious awareness. It leaves the notion of qualia untouched. Similar criticisms of Dennett have been made. But it does look promising. What needs to happens is an accompanying mechanistic explanation for the color experience itself.
- naasking 9y ago> It never really explains the experience of red or the smell of a rose, it just posits an attention model for having conscious awareness. It leaves the notion of qualia untouched. Baby steps! Consciousness is an onion we'll have to peel apart one layer at a time.
- monktastic1 9y agoI can't tell you why, but I can point out that all of the other gaps are about how certain experiences correlate with each other (and let's face it, all measurements I make are made known to me by experiences I have), whereas this one is about why anything is experienced at all.
- aninhumer 9y agoIt's impossible to explore consciousness with empirical methods, because we have no mechanism to observe it other than our own brains. We cannot even be sure other people experience consciousness. There is no experiment we can construct which will tell us if a particular physical system experiences consciousness, be that a computer, a human brain, or a seemingly inert rock.
- naasking 9y ago> It's impossible to explore consciousness with empirical methods, because we have no mechanism to observe it other than our own brains. Only if you assume the conclusion in thinking consciousness is magic by making first-person subjective experience some irreducible fact of reality. Your exact same argument would apply to "living matter" too. What distinguishes living matter from non-living matter? Some philosophers made a big stink about how living matter cannot be created from non-living matter, and they invented philosophies to address this question, like vitalism. Where is vitalism now? The same thing will happen with dualistic philosophies of mind.
- goatlover 9y ago> Only if you assume the conclusion in thinking consciousness is magic by making first-person subjective experience some irreducible fact of reality. If experience is irreducible, then something else is. In physics, that would probably be fields. Irreducible doesn't mean magic. It means we can't find anything to reduce it to.
- naasking 9y agoTheories like IIT are just barely one step away from magic IMO. Consciousness is an intricate, macroscopic phenomenon, so to require it be present in every microscopic spec of matter just because we can't get a grip on qualia seems like a serious overreach.