4 ms·

I'm not really sure what your point is. Color certainly can exist outside of people seeing it; we can have machines detect it. We also understand how our eyes d

I'm not really sure what your point is. Color certainly can exist outside of people seeing it; we can have machines detect it. We also understand how our eyes detect it mechanically (and understand how it can fail, like when people are color blind). We understand that our eyes connect with our nervous system and brain and create signals when we encounter red, and that signal leads to neuronal activity. You claim that there's some other invisible force at work when this happens, but what evidence is there to back that up? It seems like the mechanical description does a pretty accurate job of describing what's happening. Neuroscientists who have studied this don't seem to be running into any issues. Not only is there no evidence for qualia, but the idea of qualia doesn't seem to even solve any particular problem.

goatlover 9y ago
> Color certainly can exist outside of people seeing it; we can have machines detect it. Machines detect wavelengths of light. That's not what a color experience is. Photons aren't literally colored red or green. That's just how we see objects when the cones in our eyes are excited, sending electrical signals to our visual cortex. This is more obvious with smell and taste, since that greatly depends on an animal's sensory apparatus. Nothing has an objective smell or taste. > You claim that there's some other invisible force at work when this happens, But I made no such claim. I'm only pointing out how the problem is hard. I have no idea what the answer is.
- Chathamization 9y ago
  > Machines detect wavelengths of light. That's not what a color experience is. Photons aren't literally colored red or green. That's just how we see objects when the cones in our eyes are excited, sending electrical signals to our visual cortex. Right. We detect certain wavelengths, which activate certain receptors, which send out certain signals, which cause certain neurons to fire. The "color experience" is the neurons firing and how that interacts with other neuronal activity. I'm not seeing where the need for qualia is, or what's particularly hard about this.
  - goatlover 9y ago
    So you've adopted an identity view of consciousness, where having a red experience is identical to the neuronal activity which results from our eyes detecting light at a certain wavelength. This is one way to go which possibly solves the problem. But it's not without difficulty. One is that it's hard to see (pun unintended) how the explanation for neuronal activity is the same thing as having a red experience. Second problem is that it makes the physical system of brain activity special. Searle might be down with that, but it won't help machine detectors have a red experience. Or maybe even aliens, if they're made of something other than meat. It's also hard to see what makes neuronal activity any more special than the cells in your toes or molecules in a rock. Why can't a rock have a red experience when interacting with light at that wavelength?
    - Chathamization 9y ago
      > One is that it's hard to see (pun unintended) how the explanation for neuronal activity is the same thing as having a red experience. I guess I don't understand why that's hard to see. It seems pretty straightforward to me. We know that neuronal activity is necessary for the experience, we know that it coincides with the experience, and we know that changing how neurons operate can effect the experience. It doesn't seem like a stretch to say that they are the experience. > Second problem is that it makes the physical system of brain activity special...It's also hard to see what makes neuronal activity any more special than the cells in your toes or molecules in a rock. Why can't a rock have a red experience when interacting with light at that wavelength? If we're defining "red experience" as the neuronal activity that humans have when they see red, your wondering why a rock can't have that? I mean, because it's a rock that doesn't have a single neuron, let alone a human brain? But beyond that - are there people that actually argue that brain activity isn't special? You're not going to have a "red experience" if you have no brain activity.
      - goatlover 9y ago
        > If we're defining "red experience" as the neuronal activity that humans have when they see red, your wondering why a rock can't have that? I mean, because it's a rock that doesn't have a single neuron, let alone a human brain? Because brains are made up of ordinary matter, just like rocks. If it's the behavior of neurons that's special, then consciousness is no longer identical with neurons, it's identical with any physical system that functions the same way. And then you have the possibility of very counterintuitive arrangements, like a billion Chinese instantiating a blue experience, or a meteor shower simulating experiences. > We know that neuronal activity is necessary for the experience, we know that it coincides with the experience, and we know that changing how neurons operate can affect the experience. It doesn't seem like a stretch to say that they are the experience. But what is it about neurons that make them experiential? And only some neurons, because a lot of neuronal activity is not conscious.

goatlover 9y ago

> Color certainly can exist outside of people seeing it; we can have machines detect it. Machines detect wavelengths of light. That's not what a color experience is. Photons aren't literally colored red or green. That's just how we see objects when the cones in our eyes are excited, sending electrical signals to our visual cortex. This is more obvious with smell and taste, since that greatly depends on an animal's sensory apparatus. Nothing has an objective smell or taste. > You claim that there's some other invisible force at work when this happens, But I made no such claim. I'm only pointing out how the problem is hard. I have no idea what the answer is.

Chathamization 9y ago
> Machines detect wavelengths of light. That's not what a color experience is. Photons aren't literally colored red or green. That's just how we see objects when the cones in our eyes are excited, sending electrical signals to our visual cortex. Right. We detect certain wavelengths, which activate certain receptors, which send out certain signals, which cause certain neurons to fire. The "color experience" is the neurons firing and how that interacts with other neuronal activity. I'm not seeing where the need for qualia is, or what's particularly hard about this.
- goatlover 9y ago
  So you've adopted an identity view of consciousness, where having a red experience is identical to the neuronal activity which results from our eyes detecting light at a certain wavelength. This is one way to go which possibly solves the problem. But it's not without difficulty. One is that it's hard to see (pun unintended) how the explanation for neuronal activity is the same thing as having a red experience. Second problem is that it makes the physical system of brain activity special. Searle might be down with that, but it won't help machine detectors have a red experience. Or maybe even aliens, if they're made of something other than meat. It's also hard to see what makes neuronal activity any more special than the cells in your toes or molecules in a rock. Why can't a rock have a red experience when interacting with light at that wavelength?
  - Chathamization 9y ago
    > One is that it's hard to see (pun unintended) how the explanation for neuronal activity is the same thing as having a red experience. I guess I don't understand why that's hard to see. It seems pretty straightforward to me. We know that neuronal activity is necessary for the experience, we know that it coincides with the experience, and we know that changing how neurons operate can effect the experience. It doesn't seem like a stretch to say that they are the experience. > Second problem is that it makes the physical system of brain activity special...It's also hard to see what makes neuronal activity any more special than the cells in your toes or molecules in a rock. Why can't a rock have a red experience when interacting with light at that wavelength? If we're defining "red experience" as the neuronal activity that humans have when they see red, your wondering why a rock can't have that? I mean, because it's a rock that doesn't have a single neuron, let alone a human brain? But beyond that - are there people that actually argue that brain activity isn't special? You're not going to have a "red experience" if you have no brain activity.
    - goatlover 9y ago
      > If we're defining "red experience" as the neuronal activity that humans have when they see red, your wondering why a rock can't have that? I mean, because it's a rock that doesn't have a single neuron, let alone a human brain? Because brains are made up of ordinary matter, just like rocks. If it's the behavior of neurons that's special, then consciousness is no longer identical with neurons, it's identical with any physical system that functions the same way. And then you have the possibility of very counterintuitive arrangements, like a billion Chinese instantiating a blue experience, or a meteor shower simulating experiences. > We know that neuronal activity is necessary for the experience, we know that it coincides with the experience, and we know that changing how neurons operate can affect the experience. It doesn't seem like a stretch to say that they are the experience. But what is it about neurons that make them experiential? And only some neurons, because a lot of neuronal activity is not conscious.