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Yes, this usually gets stated as if it were a fact, but never with any proof. In fact, proponents of the idea often claim that qualia's existence can't be detec

Yes, this usually gets stated as if it were a fact, but never with any proof. In fact, proponents of the idea often claim that qualia's existence can't be detected or proven (the debate here even mentions it). When a line of argument is based upon the existence of an invisible element that can't be shown or detected, it starts to veer into the territory of religion. If there's no evidence beyond "I feel it must be true," its important to acknowledge that others might feel differently.

goatlover 9y ago
It's easy to show that qualia exist. You have a red experience in seeing a ripe tomato. That redness is not part of the physical description of the tomatoe's surface, the photons bouncing off it, your eyes, or the neuronal activity in your nervous system as a result of seeing it. If you think it is, then you need to explain what it means for a tomato to be red without anyone seeing it, and how that redness gets into your brain, particularly since the color would have to be transmitted from tomato surface to electrons in your visual cortex. It gets worse for the other sensory modalities. All of that leaves off the red experience. There is no red experience in the physical world of things anymore than a tomato actually has an objective smell or taste. Those are all mental and creature dependant (carrion likely smells and tastes wonderful to vultures but not humans). Somehow, this is strongly correlated with perception and the brain, but how is a deep mystery. This isn't to deny the brain or the eye's role in experiencing red, only that we don't have an explanation for how the red experience is present, when none of those things (or processes) are objectively red.
- dragonwriter 9y ago
  > It's easy to show that qualia exist. No, it isn't. > There is no red experience in the physical world of things There is no way of showing that the subjective “red experience” is not simply a label applied to a particular set of conditions in the “physical world of things”. > This isn't to deny the brain or they eye's role in experiencing red, only that we don't have an explanation for it. There's a huge difference between “we can't explain the entire relationship between physical conditions and subjective experience”(which is true but does not require qualia) and “subjective experienced involve something outside of physical conditions” (which is unprovable—not merely in practice, but in principle—but necessary for qualia to be a real, nonphysical thing.)
  - goatlover 9y ago
    > There is no way of showing that the subjective “red experience” is not simply a label applied to a particular set of conditions in the “physical world of things”. This can be turned around to say that there's no way of showing that a particular set of conditions in the "physical world of things (or processes)" isn't an abstraction from subjective experience. Either way, you have an explanatory gap. I know I have red experiences. I know there are abstract explanations for how my visual system works, how objects reflect light, and so on, making it possible to see objects as colored. I don't see how the abstract explanation (the scientific one) explains my having a red experience, because an abstract explanation isn't the same thing as having an experience.
    - dragonwriter 9y ago
      > This can be turned around to say that there's no way of showing that a particular set of conditions in the "physical world of things (or processes)" isn't an abstraction from subjective experience. Sure, it can, and if someone said it was easy to show that o jective reality exists independent of subjective experience, that would even be relevant. Of course, the difference is that the concept of an objective reality is a useful abstraction from subjective experience (it's what let's science, which has utility in predicting future experiences, exist). Qualia offers... what?
      - goatlover 9y ago
        > Qualia offers... what? A way to clearly demarcate subjective experience. We don't have to use the term "qualia", but then people tend to use words like consciousness differently, and the debate ends up being a semantic one. > the difference is that the concept of an objective reality is a useful abstraction from subjective experience Agreed, and I think there is a real, objective world independent of our experiences. But to get at it, we do have to abstract from our consciousness. That works really well for most things, until we turn it around and try to explain the nature of our subjectivity. Qualia is philosophically specific term meant to highlight that difficulty.
      - carapace 9y ago
- Chathamization 9y ago
  I'm not really sure what your point is. Color certainly can exist outside of people seeing it; we can have machines detect it. We also understand how our eyes detect it mechanically (and understand how it can fail, like when people are color blind). We understand that our eyes connect with our nervous system and brain and create signals when we encounter red, and that signal leads to neuronal activity. You claim that there's some other invisible force at work when this happens, but what evidence is there to back that up? It seems like the mechanical description does a pretty accurate job of describing what's happening. Neuroscientists who have studied this don't seem to be running into any issues. Not only is there no evidence for qualia, but the idea of qualia doesn't seem to even solve any particular problem.
  - goatlover 9y ago
    > Color certainly can exist outside of people seeing it; we can have machines detect it. Machines detect wavelengths of light. That's not what a color experience is. Photons aren't literally colored red or green. That's just how we see objects when the cones in our eyes are excited, sending electrical signals to our visual cortex. This is more obvious with smell and taste, since that greatly depends on an animal's sensory apparatus. Nothing has an objective smell or taste. > You claim that there's some other invisible force at work when this happens, But I made no such claim. I'm only pointing out how the problem is hard. I have no idea what the answer is.
    - Chathamization 9y ago
      > Machines detect wavelengths of light. That's not what a color experience is. Photons aren't literally colored red or green. That's just how we see objects when the cones in our eyes are excited, sending electrical signals to our visual cortex. Right. We detect certain wavelengths, which activate certain receptors, which send out certain signals, which cause certain neurons to fire. The "color experience" is the neurons firing and how that interacts with other neuronal activity. I'm not seeing where the need for qualia is, or what's particularly hard about this.
      - 9y ago

goatlover 9y ago

It's easy to show that qualia exist. You have a red experience in seeing a ripe tomato. That redness is not part of the physical description of the tomatoe's surface, the photons bouncing off it, your eyes, or the neuronal activity in your nervous system as a result of seeing it. If you think it is, then you need to explain what it means for a tomato to be red without anyone seeing it, and how that redness gets into your brain, particularly since the color would have to be transmitted from tomato surface to electrons in your visual cortex. It gets worse for the other sensory modalities. All of that leaves off the red experience. There is no red experience in the physical world of things anymore than a tomato actually has an objective smell or taste. Those are all mental and creature dependant (carrion likely smells and tastes wonderful to vultures but not humans). Somehow, this is strongly correlated with perception and the brain, but how is a deep mystery. This isn't to deny the brain or the eye's role in experiencing red, only that we don't have an explanation for how the red experience is present, when none of those things (or processes) are objectively red.

dragonwriter 9y ago
> It's easy to show that qualia exist. No, it isn't. > There is no red experience in the physical world of things There is no way of showing that the subjective “red experience” is not simply a label applied to a particular set of conditions in the “physical world of things”. > This isn't to deny the brain or they eye's role in experiencing red, only that we don't have an explanation for it. There's a huge difference between “we can't explain the entire relationship between physical conditions and subjective experience”(which is true but does not require qualia) and “subjective experienced involve something outside of physical conditions” (which is unprovable—not merely in practice, but in principle—but necessary for qualia to be a real, nonphysical thing.)
- goatlover 9y ago
  > There is no way of showing that the subjective “red experience” is not simply a label applied to a particular set of conditions in the “physical world of things”. This can be turned around to say that there's no way of showing that a particular set of conditions in the "physical world of things (or processes)" isn't an abstraction from subjective experience. Either way, you have an explanatory gap. I know I have red experiences. I know there are abstract explanations for how my visual system works, how objects reflect light, and so on, making it possible to see objects as colored. I don't see how the abstract explanation (the scientific one) explains my having a red experience, because an abstract explanation isn't the same thing as having an experience.
  - dragonwriter 9y ago
    > This can be turned around to say that there's no way of showing that a particular set of conditions in the "physical world of things (or processes)" isn't an abstraction from subjective experience. Sure, it can, and if someone said it was easy to show that o jective reality exists independent of subjective experience, that would even be relevant. Of course, the difference is that the concept of an objective reality is a useful abstraction from subjective experience (it's what let's science, which has utility in predicting future experiences, exist). Qualia offers... what?
    - goatlover 9y ago
      > Qualia offers... what? A way to clearly demarcate subjective experience. We don't have to use the term "qualia", but then people tend to use words like consciousness differently, and the debate ends up being a semantic one. > the difference is that the concept of an objective reality is a useful abstraction from subjective experience Agreed, and I think there is a real, objective world independent of our experiences. But to get at it, we do have to abstract from our consciousness. That works really well for most things, until we turn it around and try to explain the nature of our subjectivity. Qualia is philosophically specific term meant to highlight that difficulty.
    - carapace 9y ago
Chathamization 9y ago
I'm not really sure what your point is. Color certainly can exist outside of people seeing it; we can have machines detect it. We also understand how our eyes detect it mechanically (and understand how it can fail, like when people are color blind). We understand that our eyes connect with our nervous system and brain and create signals when we encounter red, and that signal leads to neuronal activity. You claim that there's some other invisible force at work when this happens, but what evidence is there to back that up? It seems like the mechanical description does a pretty accurate job of describing what's happening. Neuroscientists who have studied this don't seem to be running into any issues. Not only is there no evidence for qualia, but the idea of qualia doesn't seem to even solve any particular problem.
- goatlover 9y ago
  > Color certainly can exist outside of people seeing it; we can have machines detect it. Machines detect wavelengths of light. That's not what a color experience is. Photons aren't literally colored red or green. That's just how we see objects when the cones in our eyes are excited, sending electrical signals to our visual cortex. This is more obvious with smell and taste, since that greatly depends on an animal's sensory apparatus. Nothing has an objective smell or taste. > You claim that there's some other invisible force at work when this happens, But I made no such claim. I'm only pointing out how the problem is hard. I have no idea what the answer is.
  - Chathamization 9y ago
    > Machines detect wavelengths of light. That's not what a color experience is. Photons aren't literally colored red or green. That's just how we see objects when the cones in our eyes are excited, sending electrical signals to our visual cortex. Right. We detect certain wavelengths, which activate certain receptors, which send out certain signals, which cause certain neurons to fire. The "color experience" is the neurons firing and how that interacts with other neuronal activity. I'm not seeing where the need for qualia is, or what's particularly hard about this.
    - 9y ago