Ooh I hadn't seen this before. First impression: gimmicky and just playing with language (as in so much of modern philosophy), but I prefer it to Nagel or Sear

Ooh I hadn't seen this before. First impression: gimmicky and just playing with language (as in so much of modern philosophy), but I prefer it to Nagel or Searle or Chalmers, at least its fucking consistent: >Emily sees a red apple floating in the air. However, there is no red apple in front of her. She is hallucinating. Is this a case of experience without an object? No. Emily perceives an apple that she met some time earlier in her life. For instance, she experiences the apple that had been on her table yesterday. Crucially, she perceives it, she does not re-imagine it! Fine. That's not really how people use the word "perceive", but if that allows you to accept how our "consciousness" can be a real-world thing, then it works. Amusingly, the "spread mind" has a superficial similarity to one of Chalmers' own ideas, the "extended mind". But I prefer Spread Mind because it is physicalist and incorporates the obviously correct notion of embodiment rather than taking the step (which Manzotti correctly diagnoses as insane) of separating the cognitive and the conscious.