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> The hard problem is hard because it seems something deep in science and reality itself would have to give way to come up with a real solution. An alternative

> The hard problem is hard because it seems something deep in science and reality itself would have to give way to come up with a real solution. An alternative is that qualia doesn't real exist (or doesn't exist beyond being a vague description for emergent properties arising from our cells) and that "consciousness" is a vague term with no clear definition. It's like if someone came up with a "hard problem of ghosts," and said that there wasn't any good alternative to where ghosts come from besides dead people. It can be difficult to come up with an opposing theory as to why something exist if you don't believe that it actually exists. This isn't because the question is hard, but because you find the premise to be completely flawed.

carapace 9y ago
Qualia exist. That's how we know that anything exists.
- Chathamization 9y ago
  Yes, this usually gets stated as if it were a fact, but never with any proof. In fact, proponents of the idea often claim that qualia's existence can't be detected or proven (the debate here even mentions it). When a line of argument is based upon the existence of an invisible element that can't be shown or detected, it starts to veer into the territory of religion. If there's no evidence beyond "I feel it must be true," its important to acknowledge that others might feel differently.
  - goatlover 9y ago
    It's easy to show that qualia exist. You have a red experience in seeing a ripe tomato. That redness is not part of the physical description of the tomatoe's surface, the photons bouncing off it, your eyes, or the neuronal activity in your nervous system as a result of seeing it. If you think it is, then you need to explain what it means for a tomato to be red without anyone seeing it, and how that redness gets into your brain, particularly since the color would have to be transmitted from tomato surface to electrons in your visual cortex. It gets worse for the other sensory modalities. All of that leaves off the red experience. There is no red experience in the physical world of things anymore than a tomato actually has an objective smell or taste. Those are all mental and creature dependant (carrion likely smells and tastes wonderful to vultures but not humans). Somehow, this is strongly correlated with perception and the brain, but how is a deep mystery. This isn't to deny the brain or the eye's role in experiencing red, only that we don't have an explanation for how the red experience is present, when none of those things (or processes) are objectively red.
    - dragonwriter 9y ago
      > It's easy to show that qualia exist. No, it isn't. > There is no red experience in the physical world of things There is no way of showing that the subjective “red experience” is not simply a label applied to a particular set of conditions in the “physical world of things”. > This isn't to deny the brain or they eye's role in experiencing red, only that we don't have an explanation for it. There's a huge difference between “we can't explain the entire relationship between physical conditions and subjective experience”(which is true but does not require qualia) and “subjective experienced involve something outside of physical conditions” (which is unprovable—not merely in practice, but in principle—but necessary for qualia to be a real, nonphysical thing.)
      - goatlover 9y ago
        > There is no way of showing that the subjective “red experience” is not simply a label applied to a particular set of conditions in the “physical world of things”. This can be turned around to say that there's no way of showing that a particular set of conditions in the "physical world of things (or processes)" isn't an abstraction from subjective experience. Either way, you have an explanatory gap. I know I have red experiences. I know there are abstract explanations for how my visual system works, how objects reflect light, and so on, making it possible to see objects as colored. I don't see how the abstract explanation (the scientific one) explains my having a red experience, because an abstract explanation isn't the same thing as having an experience.
        dragonwriter 9y ago
        > This can be turned around to say that there's no way of showing that a particular set of conditions in the "physical world of things (or processes)" isn't an abstraction from subjective experience. Sure, it can, and if someone said it was easy to show that o jective reality exists independent of subjective experience, that would even be relevant. Of course, the difference is that the concept of an objective reality is a useful abstraction from subjective experience (it's what let's science, which has utility in predicting future experiences, exist). Qualia offers... what?

carapace 9y ago

Qualia exist. That's how we know that anything exists.

Chathamization 9y ago
Yes, this usually gets stated as if it were a fact, but never with any proof. In fact, proponents of the idea often claim that qualia's existence can't be detected or proven (the debate here even mentions it). When a line of argument is based upon the existence of an invisible element that can't be shown or detected, it starts to veer into the territory of religion. If there's no evidence beyond "I feel it must be true," its important to acknowledge that others might feel differently.
- goatlover 9y ago
  It's easy to show that qualia exist. You have a red experience in seeing a ripe tomato. That redness is not part of the physical description of the tomatoe's surface, the photons bouncing off it, your eyes, or the neuronal activity in your nervous system as a result of seeing it. If you think it is, then you need to explain what it means for a tomato to be red without anyone seeing it, and how that redness gets into your brain, particularly since the color would have to be transmitted from tomato surface to electrons in your visual cortex. It gets worse for the other sensory modalities. All of that leaves off the red experience. There is no red experience in the physical world of things anymore than a tomato actually has an objective smell or taste. Those are all mental and creature dependant (carrion likely smells and tastes wonderful to vultures but not humans). Somehow, this is strongly correlated with perception and the brain, but how is a deep mystery. This isn't to deny the brain or the eye's role in experiencing red, only that we don't have an explanation for how the red experience is present, when none of those things (or processes) are objectively red.
  - dragonwriter 9y ago
    > It's easy to show that qualia exist. No, it isn't. > There is no red experience in the physical world of things There is no way of showing that the subjective “red experience” is not simply a label applied to a particular set of conditions in the “physical world of things”. > This isn't to deny the brain or they eye's role in experiencing red, only that we don't have an explanation for it. There's a huge difference between “we can't explain the entire relationship between physical conditions and subjective experience”(which is true but does not require qualia) and “subjective experienced involve something outside of physical conditions” (which is unprovable—not merely in practice, but in principle—but necessary for qualia to be a real, nonphysical thing.)
    - goatlover 9y ago
      > There is no way of showing that the subjective “red experience” is not simply a label applied to a particular set of conditions in the “physical world of things”. This can be turned around to say that there's no way of showing that a particular set of conditions in the "physical world of things (or processes)" isn't an abstraction from subjective experience. Either way, you have an explanatory gap. I know I have red experiences. I know there are abstract explanations for how my visual system works, how objects reflect light, and so on, making it possible to see objects as colored. I don't see how the abstract explanation (the scientific one) explains my having a red experience, because an abstract explanation isn't the same thing as having an experience.
      - dragonwriter 9y ago
        > This can be turned around to say that there's no way of showing that a particular set of conditions in the "physical world of things (or processes)" isn't an abstraction from subjective experience. Sure, it can, and if someone said it was easy to show that o jective reality exists independent of subjective experience, that would even be relevant. Of course, the difference is that the concept of an objective reality is a useful abstraction from subjective experience (it's what let's science, which has utility in predicting future experiences, exist). Qualia offers... what?