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There's no need to have smoking gun. If confrontation between countries go too far, this is a potential attack vector. It can be used even without any cooperati
by ComodoHacker 9y ago
There's no need to have smoking gun. If confrontation between countries go too far, this is a potential attack vector. It can be used even without any cooperation from Kaspersky, is necessary. And, if used wisely, even without attribution (this requires cooperation though). This risk is enough to justify this move.
- tptacek 9y agoIf that's true now, it was true 4 years ago too. The McCain/Rubio claims are what's new.
- joering2 9y agoSo its even more important for public to see the evidence. Otherwise it feels like private vendetta most likely because Kaspersky is Russian (you know, our current Administration doesn't like Russians much) who actually build his empire on fighting Russian Government-funded cyberspying (claims Wikipedia). I'm sure if Kaspersky sells tons of software on US soil, and most likely pay taxes on US soil, then they will sue and have a solid case against the US Government on discriminatory basis; unless of course said smoking gun will be made public. Otherwise it feels guilty until proven innocent (if given chance). Welcome to Russia, err. I mean: America. Edit: if this falls thru, we have a very dangerous precedence; until now, politicians were taking money and lobbying for/against certain rules to help certain businesses to gain competitive edge. Now we have 2 Senators who happen to have "smoking gun" from "anonymous sources" (I presume) that could pretty much shut the whole company down. Whether Russian or American, irrelevant.
- tptacek 9y agoYou're unlikely to see the evidence in this case. Could you be clearer about exactly which "discrimination" code or statute the USG would be violating, even if they were doing this capriciously?
- joering2 9y agoNot a lawyer to know one, just common sense they got banned based on being Russians, unless of course we can be proven otherwise (with evidence)
- tptacek 9y agoI think you're going to find that there is no such code or statute that prevents the USG from doing what they did.
- blasdel 9y agohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_of_attainder https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bill_of_attainder
- ubernostrum 9y agoThe federal government choosing to disallow a vendor on the basis of (presumably) security claims/policies is not a bill of attainder.
- puzzle 9y agoMore likely that not, the sources and methods behind the evidence are classified. See all the Russians that started dying under mysterious circumstances or got arrested, nominally for treason, after the US election.
- SapphireSun 9y agoYou can have secrets or you can public policy in a democracy. This stuff isn't chump change, this is a primary debate we are currently having and the public can't see the evidence.
- puzzle 9y agoThe DoD black budget looks even less like chump change, since it's at least two orders of magnitude larger than Kaspersky's worldwide revenues, yet it's always been top secret: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/black-budget/ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/black-...
- lawnchair_larry 9y agoMore likely than not, Rubio and McCain have no capability to assess anything technical and this is all bogus.
- ryanackley 9y agoIt's possible they're trying to tank Kapersky but considering all the backdoors the NSA injected in American software (RSA[0], PRISM[1]), it seems very plausible the Russian government does exactly the same thing to Russian software. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_BSAFE https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_BSAFE [1] https://www.theverge.com/2013/6/6/4403868/nsa-fbi-mine-data-apple-google-facebook-microsoft-others-prism https://www.theverge.com/2013/6/6/4403868/nsa-fbi-mine-data-...
- tptacek 9y agoPRISM isn't a software backdoor. It's a system for sending selectors (metadata query terms) to providers under FISA 702 Directives. PRISM : FISA warrants :: Stripe : credit card authorizations.
- secfirstmd 9y agoWe always suggested to activists to consider the geopolitical loyalty of the company selling your software (especially security software) when picking a provider. Its a crappy rule of thumb but can occasionally be helpful. Working in/on Russia - not Kaspersky Working in/on Israel - not Checkpoint Working in/on UK (e.g drone strikes) - not Sophos Working in/on US - etc etc Ultimately capability and costs of the software was the main thing but the more you heard about Kaspersky style stuff, the more its seems relevant. Hanging around the security space long enough, you meet people at Western security software companies who quietly will express some concern about what goes on inside their own places. It reminds me of Huawei hysteria.
- ComodoHacker 9y agoThe level of confrontation and its trend is what's new.
- tptacek 9y agoThat begs the question, which is "why is the level of confrontation increasing now, as opposed to 4 years ago?"
- barrkel 9y agoBecause Russia is a domestic political issue in the US - it's been anointed as the McGuffin in the battle between the two main parties over the presidency.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- banku_brougham 9y agoThe 'anoint' 'McGuffin' combo metaphor doesn't work, and the clash undermines your point.
- barrkel 9y agoThanks for your literary criticism :) I rather do think that political inclinations are religions in the US, however, but the wars are largely phony and forced - hence McGuffin. I'm sorry it upset you.
- 21 9y agoUkraine? Syria?
- QAPereo 9y agoIt does not, begging the question means something else entirely... this raises the question.