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I think it's more about assumptions. For example, Chalmers in his "p-zombie argument" implicitly assumes that the consciousness in one possible world and the co

I think it's more about assumptions. For example, Chalmers in his "p-zombie argument" implicitly assumes that the consciousness in one possible world and the consciousness in a physically identical but different world are separate entities. Thus his argument are about "separable consciousness", and we don't know if real consciousness is "separable consciousness".

mannykannot 9y ago
Ah, the p-zombies: you know they are there, waiting for it to get murky enough for them to come out (wait a minute... am I mistaking them for p-vampires?) Has anyone seen a good argument that p-zombies are logically possible, that goes beyond being some form of "I can string these words together, and they form a grammatically-correct sentence?"
- goatlover 9y ago
  Chalmers argument is that all physical explanations leave out consciousness, therefore a p-zombie world is logically possible. You just have a physical world that's lacking consciousness. Keep in mind that Chalmers is a property dualist who thinks there is some additional law of nature binding consciousness with informationally rich physical processes (not necessary brain activity).
  - mannykannot 9y ago
    Yet this article and others seem to be suggesting that the purpose of p-zombies is to argue against physicalism. It looks rather circular to me, though I am sure it isn't that obviously so.
    - goatlover 9y ago
      It is, because if there can be a world that's physically identical, but lacks consciousness, then consciousness is not physical. Law of identity plus the necessity of physicalism demonstrate this. The p-zombie argument isn't circular, but it can be attacked on other grounds.
    - dasil003 9y ago
      Physicalism is also inherently a circular argument. It really gets to the root of philosophy and metaphysics, which is that at some point you reach the firmest axioms and base assumptions that can be reasonably supported by evidence and still there is nothing stopping you from—like a 3-year-old— asking "why?" just one more time.
      - mannykannot 9y ago
        Insofar as either position is an assertion of certainty, that's very plausible.

mannykannot 9y ago

Ah, the p-zombies: you know they are there, waiting for it to get murky enough for them to come out (wait a minute... am I mistaking them for p-vampires?) Has anyone seen a good argument that p-zombies are logically possible, that goes beyond being some form of "I can string these words together, and they form a grammatically-correct sentence?"

goatlover 9y ago
Chalmers argument is that all physical explanations leave out consciousness, therefore a p-zombie world is logically possible. You just have a physical world that's lacking consciousness. Keep in mind that Chalmers is a property dualist who thinks there is some additional law of nature binding consciousness with informationally rich physical processes (not necessary brain activity).
- mannykannot 9y ago
  Yet this article and others seem to be suggesting that the purpose of p-zombies is to argue against physicalism. It looks rather circular to me, though I am sure it isn't that obviously so.
  - goatlover 9y ago
    It is, because if there can be a world that's physically identical, but lacks consciousness, then consciousness is not physical. Law of identity plus the necessity of physicalism demonstrate this. The p-zombie argument isn't circular, but it can be attacked on other grounds.
  - dasil003 9y ago
    Physicalism is also inherently a circular argument. It really gets to the root of philosophy and metaphysics, which is that at some point you reach the firmest axioms and base assumptions that can be reasonably supported by evidence and still there is nothing stopping you from—like a 3-year-old— asking "why?" just one more time.
    - mannykannot 9y ago
      Insofar as either position is an assertion of certainty, that's very plausible.