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Root DNS Zone Now DNSSEC Signed
- andrewtj 16y agoI'm going to continue ignoring DNSSEC until I see it affect clients in a meaningful way. Until then I think there is other things my users would prefer I spent my time on.
- djcapelis 16y agoThe entire point of this story is that until this week your clients couldn't have used it even if they wanted to and that changed. I'm not saying you have to go running off and caring about DNSSEC now, but the kneejerk "omg it's not deployed" argument really isn't helpful or insightful attached to a story about how it just finished getting deployed for real on the roots finally after years of waiting.
- andrewtj 16y agoYour reading of my post as "omg it's not deployed" is an unwarranted exaggeration. I merely stated that for me, someone who maintains a from the wire-up DNS implementation, this baby-step doesn't change anything practical — which is something you've agreed with. EDIT: It goes without saying but I'll state it anyway, this cascade of down-votes is not the reaction I'd expect for making what I consider to be a pretty innocuous comment about something that potentially affects the priorities of my startup.
- djcapelis 16y agoIt goes without saying but I'll state it anyway, this cascade of down-votes is not the reaction I'd expect for making what I consider to be a pretty innocuous comment about something that potentially affects the priorities of my startup It's probably a reaction to your advocacy for ignorance at the expense of a story marking an important milestone in DNS's capabilities. If you insist on not caring, do so quietly. Some people around here are trying to fix things, or break them, which hopefully will result in better systems. In any case, you appear to be doing neither. (As a side note, your assertion that I agree that this doesn't change anything practical is false, as of yesterday people can resolve domains over DNSSEC, that wasn't true last week. I consider this a practical change. I'm not a big fan of DNSSEC as a protocol, but this is a big deal(tm).)
- andrewtj 16y agoas of yesterday people can resolve domains over DNSSEC People can resolve the root over DNSSEC. This is a milestone, but it's one to be followed by many, many more before it affects clients.
- djcapelis 16y agoNo, some TLDs have already signed their zones. Some people are able to use DNSSEC today. isc.org appears to be using it already, for instance. Edit: $ whois isc.org | grep DNSSEC DNSSEC:Signed
- andrewtj 16y agoRegarding TLDs, you're again intimating that I have said something that I have not said. I do not dispute that some people are able to use DNSSEC and this does not belie my original comment.
- djcapelis 16y agoLast week: No one could use DNSSEC. No one did. No one was affected. Today: Many people can use DNSSEC. Some actually are. Some clients are affected. (Just obviously not yours, since you remain completely uncaring about the subject.) I don't see how it could be any clearer.
- andrewtj 16y agoYour assessment of what constitutes "many people" and mine clearly differs. You are quite right that my clients are unaffected. I like most of the world run a mix of Windows and OS X which like the software that runs on top of them, are not DNSSEC aware (with few exceptions). Clearly I do care about the subject and I'm not sure why you keep stating that I do not. There is a difference between ignoring a technology until it's useful and ignoring it full-stop. EDIT: Edited for brevity.
- tptacek 16y agoYou're messing with people's hope. People want a story about how the Internet is getting a cool new security capability. They especially want that story to come at the expense of Verisign and the SSL CA's. Expect downvotes.
- jf 16y agoSee also: http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/ http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/ http://arstechnica.com/security/news/2010/07/dns-root-zone-finally-signed-but-security-battle-not-over.ars http://arstechnica.com/security/news/2010/07/dns-root-zone-f... http://www.root-dnssec.org/ http://www.root-dnssec.org/
- deleted 16y ago[deleted]
- tptacek 16y agoDid you know that DNSSEC isn't designed to protect the DNS queries your laptop generates? Your laptop uses a "stub resolver" to talk to a real DNS cache, and there is another protocol that nobody will ever use that's intended to protect that traffic. Did you know that they designed DNSSEC in a way that makes it difficult to not dump all your hostnames to the public, 'host -l' style? In order to provide a non-repudiable "no such host" message, they made DNS zones walkable. When people freaked out about that (justifiably so!), they modified the protocol so that names are hashed, password-file-style --- and are password-file-style crackable. Did you know that because almost every piece of software that does name lookups uses "gethostbyname()", which provides no error channel, DNSSEC can't even give you a scary popup when a key expires or something is misconfigured? That unlike SSL --- which causes millions of such popups every day --- DNSSEC basically implies that either everything's configured 100% perfect or... that host doesn't exist? Did you know that SSL/HTTPS in no way relies on a secure DNS today? That all that certificate signature stuff that people complain about boils down to a system designed to work even if the DNS is totally hostile and owned by attackers? And that the system has been attacked and refined and basically solid for something like 15 years? Did you check out Dan Bernstein's presentation about using DNSSEC as a denial-of-service amplifier? I leave it as an exercise for you to find out how many megabytes of traffic you can get DNS servers to hurl at Twitter in response to just a few packets of your own. DNSSEC is a debacle. It's been scrapped and redesigned (I believe) three times now, from the days in the 90s when it was a government project to the "whitelies" and "NSEC3" scramble that happened just a few years ago when they tried to deploy the "everyone gets a list of everyone else's hosts" design. What's worse, we don't need it. DNS has been insecure for over 15 years, and DNS is not a primary attack vector on the Internet. When DNS is part of a malware attack, more often than not it's because the malware has reconfigured the victim host, which DNSSEC can't do anything about. What's worse than that is that the bit we really could stand to address --- the insecure connections between end user computers and DNS servers --- could have been secured at far less cost and drama than the cache-to-authority problem the DNSSEC group bit off. But wasn't. There seems to be some momentum behind finally getting DNSSEC deployed. I think it's actually bad for the Internet; that it will cause reliability problems, create a huge amount of work for server admins, not solve any real-world security problem, and create a false sense of security. But be that as it may, it appears to be coming. Just make sure nobody gets your credit card for any kind of DNSSEC-y service. That's, I guess, my advice.