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> Unfortunately, most of the language- and environment-specific package managers have pretty much ignored that issue. There's too often no way to verify that th
by GordonS 9y ago
> Unfortunately, most of the language- and environment-specific package managers have pretty much ignored that issue. There's too often no way to verify that the code you just downloaded hasn't been tampered with.
This is something Windows seems to have got right, with Authenticode and Catalog signatures - it's easy to verify who signed a file, and if it's been tampered with.
What options are there for this on Linux? File integrity monitoring (Tripwire, Ionx Verisys, whatever) will tell you when files change, but that doesn't help to know if a file is in a 'trusted' state.
- slrz 9y ago> What options are there for this on Linux? You have RPM signatures and the like to verify the authenticity of packages at the point of installation. If you mean detection of changes to files after the installation, then we need to talk about what it is you're trying to protect against. If you want to detect accidental corruption (e.g. clobbering of distro-provided files through pip or 'make install'), the built-in verification functionality of RPM (rpm -V) or dpkg (dpkg -V) does a good job at that. Malicious modification is something else entirely. Your system files are only modifiable by root. So if an attacker was able to mess with these files, any tool intended to detect that situation might've also been messed with so that it always gives the "everything is fine" assessment. You can tackle this problem using special hardware. Or do the assessment on a different system using a disk snapshot. The former can be done on Linux using a TPM and the trousers framework. If the protected set of software changes frequently, it's a pain in the ass to manage though.
- throwme211345 9y agoBrooooken. No change installs. Build once ,install once, ro mounts, writes to tempdirs by application, build release audits before push..it's the only way.