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Could someone please ELI5 how an "intimate" provider (such as Apple, Google or Microsoft) can collect any data ongoingly without eventual loss of privacy?
by mirimir 9y ago
Could someone please ELI5 how an "intimate" provider (such as Apple, Google or Microsoft) can collect any data ongoingly without eventual loss of privacy?
- omarforgotpwd 9y agoLet's say i'm collecting a simple yes / no piece of data such as... did this user open Google Chrome today. Every day my analytics engine sends the data back up: yes, no, no, yes, yes, yes, no. Someone could look at this data and know whether you used Chrome or not on a given day, but when Apple sends the data up it randomly flips the answer for a certain number of data points in such a way that the flipping effects will cancel each other out at scale and the overall stats will be more or less the same. Now, even if I were able to look at all the data your computer sent up about your Chrome usage I can't actually be sure which days you used Chrome because I know some of the answers are flipped. The more changes get made, the more privacy the user has.
- mirimir 9y agoOK, thanks :) But still, there are some questions that you'd arguably never want to say "yes" to. Such as, did you visit some verboten site (terrorist, child porn, etc) today? So how can an algorithm "know" which questions it's safe to use differential privacy with, and which it isn't? Or would you argue that it's safe enough to use differential privacy with even such questions?
- orf 9y agoI don't think this approach applies in such situations, and wouldn't be a good idea if it did. It may help with categories of sites, like "did you visit a news site today" or "did you watch porn".
- mirimir 9y agoSystems that don't deal well with edge cases aren't so great. For people who don't really need to care about privacy, I guess that differential privacy is good enough. But there's a gotcha there, for people who ought to care, but are clueless. I'm reminded of that ex cop in Philadelphia, who believed Freenet's claims about plausible deniability. Edit: A prudent standard for calling something "[foo] privacy" is arguably PGP.
- yorwba 9y agoYou're not really saying "yes", you're saying "I either visited this site or my coin came up heads.". Of course this only works if the other person believes that you flipped a coin beforehand, but in this case it's part of the data-collection procedure, so not much trust is necessary.
- geofft 9y agoPresumably almost nobody visits the verboten sites, and so if you answer "yes", it's far more likely that you answered "yes" because your coin came up tails than because you actually visited it. Or, in other words, the question is not "Did you visit this site," the question is "Did your coin come up tails or did you visit this site," which is a perfectly safe question to say "yes" to.
- frankmcsherry 9y ago> The more changes get made, the more privacy the user has. This is a minor, pedantic point, but what you really mean to say is "the closer the changes get to 50%, the more privacy the user has". If you change all results, then it is easy to flip them all back. This distinction trips up several folks, where the research world initially believed (and some in official stats still believe[1]) that a part of privacy is literally not publishing the true answer (e.g. above: literally flip every output). What you actually want is Pr[output | input] ~= Pr[output | input'] which may mean that you should leave things alone, which feels weird but is important. [1]: Noise addition is a common way to obscure real-valued data, and some official stats bureaus have the ridiculous rule that "you always add noise, and you never add less than X in absolute value", leading to releases where you can be 100% confident that the true value is not in a range around the published number.
- quantisan 9y agoLet’s say you wanted to count how many of your online friends were dogs, while respecting the maxim that, on the Internet, nobody should know you’re a dog. To do this, you could ask each friend to answer the question “Are you a dog?” in the following way. Each friend should flip a coin in secret, and answer the question truthfully if the coin came up heads; but, if the coin came up tails, that friend should always say “Yes” regardless. Then you could get a good estimate of the true count from the greater-than-half fraction of your friends that answered “Yes”. However, you still wouldn’t know which of your friends was a dog: each answer “Yes” would most likely be due to that friend’s coin flip coming up tails. Source: Google's RAPPOR project I pointed to some open source repos on my blog post from 2015 https://www.quantisan.com/a-magical-promise-of-releasing-your-data-and-keeping-everyones-privacy https://www.quantisan.com/a-magical-promise-of-releasing-you...
- cm2187 9y agoIt doesn't really protect privacy, unless your first coin is highly biased toward the random answer. You can still infer that there is a higher likelihood that this individual is a dog. A few 60-70% reliability inferences on various dog related characteristics and you can identify a dog with 95% chance.
- tempay 9y agoThis would be a flawed implementation. The method still works, you just have to be extremely careful to avoid exposing users through correlations when collecting anything more than a single value just once. The aforementioned RAPPOR paper[1] covers this in Section 6. [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.6981 https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.6981
- cm2187 9y agoIf I understand correctly, they just call it a limitation of the approach and invite to sample the user base rather than collect data systematically (plausible deniability is a bit of a moot point, once you have been exposed as a dog with 95% confidence, pleading that there is still a small chance you might not be one doesn't really help). I am not sure how any of that helps in a mass collection of data like OS telemetry.
- tgragnato 9y agoAnything collected might break privacy, because that information may be something sensitive. Differential privacy relies upon obfuscating reported data in a statistically meaningful way. Accordingly, you need to analyse aggregate statistics only, add random inaccuracy and apply data binning, anonymise reports. And you need to calibrate the noise. The latter is what the paper seems to be mainly focused on. > We call for Apple to make its implementation of privacy-preserving algorithms public and to make the rate of privacy loss fully trans-parent and tunable by the user. "Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis" is about the matter. - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/calibrating-noise-to-sensitivity-in-private-data-analysis/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/calibra... - https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F11681878_14.pdf https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F11681878_14....
- makomk 9y agoOn an ongoing basis? Probably can't. Differential privacy may work OK for one-off measurements, but it's known to leak when doing ongoing measurements of data that's somewhat correlated over time such as emoji use. It's not clear there's any way around this.