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> I wish browser vendors would let me choose a trusted entity and make it simple for me to trust only CAs that my trusted entity supports, or the intersection o
by geofft 9y ago
> I wish browser vendors would let me choose a trusted entity and make it simple for me to trust only CAs that my trusted entity supports, or the intersection of what multiple trusted entities endorse.
But you do; the trusted entity is your browser manufacturer. Given the massive amount of attack surface in the browser, I'm already trusting my browser to make sound security decisions all the time. And I've seen really good work from both the Firefox and Chrome teams on asking hard questions towards CAs; I don't think I can think of a group I'd trust to make better decisions. (Arguably there's the EFF, but I definitely trust the EFF less as a technical body than Mozilla or Google, for the simple reason that the EFF is an advocacy body, not a technical body.)
> The incentive for a mass-market browser ... If I were a state actor intelligence agency
But protecting against intelligence agencies is most effective and important in a mass-market browser, not in a nerd browser. There isn't any sense in a society where nerds as a group have more protection against government dragnet surveillance than everyone else.
If you're a specific nerd working to save the world in a specific way and you're worried about targeted attacks against you personally, you have a threat model that can't be adequately responded to by trusting a subset of CAs. You need to do your important work on a machine that's locked down far more deeply than just by distrusting a few CAs (e.g., you probably want to disable 80% of the web platform to reduce attack surface), and ideally you'd do your less-sensitive work, e.g., reading the news and chatting with friends and listening to music, on a browser that looks as normal as possible to avoid standing out.