2 ms·
> To exploit this we need to construct a string which will be a valid request, and also a valid MIGS server response. Whoa, crypto 101 fail. In a secure chann
by amluto 9y ago
> To exploit this we need to construct a string which will be a valid request, and also a valid MIGS server response.
Whoa, crypto 101 fail.
In a secure channel between two parties, you either key the two directions differently or you explicitly mark the directions in the authenticated data. You never really on the next layer down to notice the the message was produced by the wrong party.
From looking at the example messages in the article, it's totally unclear to me that anything binds the response to the request that generated it, either. This could make replay attacks possible. Or maybe even more fun attacks: buy two things, but cancel one partway through and use its MIGS reply for the other one.