8 ms·

Virginia has decertified its most hackable voting machines

155 points by janober 9y ago

terravion 9y ago
Good on Virginia. When I voted there they had pretty modern and well run machines in my county with some sort of printout to confirm that you vote was cast. Voting is a messy process, but really important, and really important to have the counting be transparent and beyond reproach.
- irishasaurus 9y ago
  Paper receipts are crucial to voting.
  - stenius 9y ago
    I don't think you should leave with any proof of who you voted for. I'm worried that it could be used by people to influence elections by paying for receipts from certain candidates or by punishing people who are not able to produce the correct receipt. I think we should return back to paper ballots. When there are witnesses to elections, I don't think any of them are qualified to judge if an election has been done in a honest fashion. This would require experts on the voting equipment where they can guarantee that it has not been tampered with and that is too high a burden and something that complex can not be trusted.
    - jlgaddis 9y ago
      > I don't think you should leave with any proof of who you voted for. I don't think you should leave without (at least seeing) proof that your votes were properly and accurately recorded. If that means that you have to be given a "receipt" with the names of those you voted for on it, well, so be it. It isn't like your name and/or any other personally identifiable information would be on it -- just the minimal details needed to achieve the singlemost important purpose: verification.
      - stenius 9y ago
        That doesn't solve my concern. If your boss at work tells you to go vote and then demands you show your receipt when you get back it wont matter that your name isn't on it. You would be pressure to vote how they told you to. The proof would be a paper ballot that you turn in. Your actual vote.
        space_fountain 9y ago
        These machines, generally print out a receipt. Show it to you and store it in a bin so that it can in theory be counted.
      - jasonjayr 9y ago
        In RI --- we mark a paper, and surrender it to the scanner that stores it to a locked box before we exit the polling place. A printed receipt, from an electronic polling place could just as easily be placed in a secure box prior to leaving. It's amusing watching "ballot selfies" issue too -- it seems that folks just don't understand how important it is not allowing any coercive force influencing or verifying your vote.
      - icelancer 9y ago
        >>If that means that you have to be given a "receipt" with the names of those you voted for on it, well, so be it. It isn't like your name and/or any other personally identifiable information would be on it -- just the minimal details needed to achieve the singlemost important purpose: verification. Now imagine cults and other groups that pressure their members into producing those receipts with the correct candidate on them... or else.
    - QAPereo 9y ago
      The receipt could be hashed, but I agree that these machines are a bad idea either way.
      - gruez 9y ago
        not sure how that helps. if you can verify the hash, it means the baddies can verify the hash as well, which means they can still operate a pay-for-receipts-shows-you-voted-for-our-guy program.
        QAPereo 9y ago
        Don't make it trivial to verify the hash, after all it only needs to come into play if there is an audit.
    - skybrian 9y ago
      Yes, they don't actually give you a receipt, for this reason. One way it's done is that after entering your choices on touchscreen, you see the printed receipt through a glass window, and then it's stored so a recount can be done if necessary. However, an electrically scanned paper ballot seems a lot simpler.
      - AdamJacobMuller 9y ago
        > you see the printed receipt through a glass window I actually believe this is actually the best possible situation. The voting machine should print a clear, unambiguous, ballot and on-screen tell you to verify it before you officially "cast" your vote. "If the ballot below does not represent your choices, please click <HERE> to request an attendant." I'm thinking of this more as having printers that print out an unambiguous completed ballot and less as voting machines that "also print out a copy".
- tssva 9y ago
  All new electronic voting machines in Virginia have been required to be optical scan since 2007. Unfortunately when the law was changed the state didn't mandate a date for localities to replace their current touch screen machines with optical scan. The board of elections was given the power to decertify existing machines, which they just used, but have been hesitant to do so due to political pressure from localities that don't want have to pay for new machines.
umanwizard 9y ago
Why the fuck do we need to vote on machines, anyway? I don't understand this. Many other countries use paper ballots, including highly developed ones (e.g., France, UK...)
- jlgaddis 9y ago
  Because we're becoming lazier with each passing day? I do think we need paper -- a "hard copy" -- at some level, whether for the ballot itself or just a verifiable audit trail. I think 100% electronic voting would be fine so long as there's an audit trail that matches the (electronically) talkied results perfectly. I don't think dealing with millions of paper ballots would be any more advantageous than that -- you'd have to distribute and collect them (although that would happen at the centralized polling places), a few people would have to hand tally them (to ensure everyone's numbers match up), and then securely store them (via very strict "physical security" procedures/protocols) until, at some later point, they can be properly destroyed. Logistically, electronic voting with a paper audit trail would be much easier, would require fewer people (i.e., election workers -- who are already in short supply), would give us results much quicker, and would be easier to verify/authenticate later (in the event of disputes).
  - umanwizard 9y ago
    Yeah sure there are some rube goldberg schemes you can concoct like printing a hard copy or whatever, where electronic voting might be secure. But... why? What is the point of adding all this complexity? What problem is electronic voting solving?
    - jlgaddis 9y ago
      Sorry, after posting my comment, I went back and elaborated a bit and just so happened to address the questions you asked in the meantime.
      - umanwizard 9y ago
        > Logistically, electronic voting with a paper audit trail would be much easier, Putting a piece of paper in a box is something everyone understands how to do, even elderly people who have never touched a computer -- how is electronic voting easier? > would require fewer people (i.e., election workers -- who are already in short supply) They are? I can't believe it would be more expensive to hire a few more election workers for one day than we're paying for these machines. > would give us results much quicker, France uses paper ballots and results are known within hours. > and would be easier to verify/authenticate later (in the event of disputes). This is not realistic. We are never going to go back and change an election result whether or not records of the votes were saved. Cf. Florida 2000.
dpacmittal 9y ago
I think blockchain is a perfect application for voting machines. Blockchain is public, immutable, cryptographic. Every voter can vote and then verify their vote was actually registered and was untampered via a web platform or something. The network can be run by the public. Ofcourse there is risk associated with the 51% attack, but it's still a more transparent process than what we have today.
- vkou 9y ago
  Making everyone's voting record public is just about the worst possible idea for a voting system. Secret ballot is a feature, not a bug. It protects you from coercion and retaliation.
  - NicoJuicy 9y ago
    The wallet owner is secret, but can be checked by the owner and by the government
    - tormeh 9y ago
      So the government knows what you voted? Great.
    - hacst 9y ago
      You must not be able to prove who you voted for. Otherwise you are still at risk of retaliation, coercion and can sell your vote. For the very same reasons the government must not be able to know who you voted for either. Secret paper ballots really deserve more credit. The tech might be old but it gets the essential features right.
  - __s 9y ago
    Using a system like ZCash the government could have citizens register a public address, then 1 token is distributed to each public address, votes work by sending the token to the candidate you vote for, whomever has the highest balance at the end of the election is the electee (this even allows for off ballot candidates, but up to rules). ZCash is designed so that you can't tell the contents of a transaction despite it being immutably on the blockchain
a_humean 9y ago
In the UK I walk into my local primary school/church/community hall (no more than a 5-10 min walk away), utter my name and address as identification (no other ID needed), and use a pencil to write a big 'X' against my preferences on a piece of paper I was handed when I entered the polling station. There are multiple local party volunteers (I was one in the last election) from all the major parties at all stages of the process watching the flow of paper ballots from the sealed black collection bins to the voting halls where local council officals that volunteered, with paltry compensation, to a 12-18 hour shift to collect and count the vote. Some local councils take pride in being amoung the first to report their results, and there is a side competition to see who reports first. We usually know the broad outcome of the election by the early hours of the next morning, with a handful of recounts in tight races going into the next couple of days.
- ezoe 9y ago
  In the Japan I walk into my local school/community hall(on rare occasion, the church was used, no more than a 5-10 min walk away), present the voting announcement paper the govt send it to my physical address, and use a pencil to write a name of a candidates on a piece of paper I was exchanged it with my voting announcement paper. In the Japanese writing system, candidate's name can be written in multiple ways. If writing doesn't match one of the exact registered candidates names, the human vote counter decides if it refer to the unambiguous candidate. If such candidate exists, it is counted to the voting for that candidate. > There are multiple local party volunteers ... Same.
  - rangibaby 9y ago
    So that's why candidate names are always written in hiragana on their posters!
  - umanwizard 9y ago
    How do people vote who don't know how to read/write? Japan's literacy rate is very high, but it's not 100%.
- yomly 9y ago
loudouncodes 9y ago
I live in Loudoun County, va, and we've always had the option of using paper with an electronic scanner. There have been touch screen voting machines in the last couple of elections, but I didn't use them,
beastcoast 9y ago
In WA we have absentee ballots which is really the best of all worlds. You fill it in, sign it and mail it back. Couldn't be easier and you don't have to worry about polling locations. They are also hardcore about checking your signature; If it doesn't match your voter registration the ballot isn't counted and you get a letter in the mail.
- umanwizard 9y ago
  The problem with this system is that it's possible to prove to someone else who you voted for. Voting needs plausible deniability so you can't be coerced or bribed into voting for a particular candidate as was alleged to happen in the Balkans many times: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgarian_train https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgarian_train
- e40 9y ago
  I've read accounts that many absentee ballots are invalidated by a very sketchy process of signature verification. And that was in Alameda County in CA, a very liberal place. It seems attacks on voting are coming from all sides.

155 points by janober 9y ago

Good on Virginia. When I voted there they had pretty modern and well run machines in my county with some sort of printout to confirm that you vote was cast. Voting is a messy process, but really important, and really important to have the counting be transparent and beyond reproach.

irishasaurus 9y ago
Paper receipts are crucial to voting.
- stenius 9y ago
  I don't think you should leave with any proof of who you voted for. I'm worried that it could be used by people to influence elections by paying for receipts from certain candidates or by punishing people who are not able to produce the correct receipt. I think we should return back to paper ballots. When there are witnesses to elections, I don't think any of them are qualified to judge if an election has been done in a honest fashion. This would require experts on the voting equipment where they can guarantee that it has not been tampered with and that is too high a burden and something that complex can not be trusted.
  - jlgaddis 9y ago
    > I don't think you should leave with any proof of who you voted for. I don't think you should leave without (at least seeing) proof that your votes were properly and accurately recorded. If that means that you have to be given a "receipt" with the names of those you voted for on it, well, so be it. It isn't like your name and/or any other personally identifiable information would be on it -- just the minimal details needed to achieve the singlemost important purpose: verification.
    - stenius 9y ago
      That doesn't solve my concern. If your boss at work tells you to go vote and then demands you show your receipt when you get back it wont matter that your name isn't on it. You would be pressure to vote how they told you to. The proof would be a paper ballot that you turn in. Your actual vote.
      - space_fountain 9y ago
        These machines, generally print out a receipt. Show it to you and store it in a bin so that it can in theory be counted.
    - jasonjayr 9y ago
      In RI --- we mark a paper, and surrender it to the scanner that stores it to a locked box before we exit the polling place. A printed receipt, from an electronic polling place could just as easily be placed in a secure box prior to leaving. It's amusing watching "ballot selfies" issue too -- it seems that folks just don't understand how important it is not allowing any coercive force influencing or verifying your vote.
    - icelancer 9y ago
      >>If that means that you have to be given a "receipt" with the names of those you voted for on it, well, so be it. It isn't like your name and/or any other personally identifiable information would be on it -- just the minimal details needed to achieve the singlemost important purpose: verification. Now imagine cults and other groups that pressure their members into producing those receipts with the correct candidate on them... or else.
  - QAPereo 9y ago
    The receipt could be hashed, but I agree that these machines are a bad idea either way.
    - gruez 9y ago
      not sure how that helps. if you can verify the hash, it means the baddies can verify the hash as well, which means they can still operate a pay-for-receipts-shows-you-voted-for-our-guy program.
      - QAPereo 9y ago
        Don't make it trivial to verify the hash, after all it only needs to come into play if there is an audit.
  - skybrian 9y ago
    Yes, they don't actually give you a receipt, for this reason. One way it's done is that after entering your choices on touchscreen, you see the printed receipt through a glass window, and then it's stored so a recount can be done if necessary. However, an electrically scanned paper ballot seems a lot simpler.
    - AdamJacobMuller 9y ago
      > you see the printed receipt through a glass window I actually believe this is actually the best possible situation. The voting machine should print a clear, unambiguous, ballot and on-screen tell you to verify it before you officially "cast" your vote. "If the ballot below does not represent your choices, please click <HERE> to request an attendant." I'm thinking of this more as having printers that print out an unambiguous completed ballot and less as voting machines that "also print out a copy".
tssva 9y ago
All new electronic voting machines in Virginia have been required to be optical scan since 2007. Unfortunately when the law was changed the state didn't mandate a date for localities to replace their current touch screen machines with optical scan. The board of elections was given the power to decertify existing machines, which they just used, but have been hesitant to do so due to political pressure from localities that don't want have to pay for new machines.

umanwizard 9y ago

Why the fuck do we need to vote on machines, anyway? I don't understand this. Many other countries use paper ballots, including highly developed ones (e.g., France, UK...)

jlgaddis 9y ago
Because we're becoming lazier with each passing day? I do think we need paper -- a "hard copy" -- at some level, whether for the ballot itself or just a verifiable audit trail. I think 100% electronic voting would be fine so long as there's an audit trail that matches the (electronically) talkied results perfectly. I don't think dealing with millions of paper ballots would be any more advantageous than that -- you'd have to distribute and collect them (although that would happen at the centralized polling places), a few people would have to hand tally them (to ensure everyone's numbers match up), and then securely store them (via very strict "physical security" procedures/protocols) until, at some later point, they can be properly destroyed. Logistically, electronic voting with a paper audit trail would be much easier, would require fewer people (i.e., election workers -- who are already in short supply), would give us results much quicker, and would be easier to verify/authenticate later (in the event of disputes).
- umanwizard 9y ago
  Yeah sure there are some rube goldberg schemes you can concoct like printing a hard copy or whatever, where electronic voting might be secure. But... why? What is the point of adding all this complexity? What problem is electronic voting solving?
  - jlgaddis 9y ago
    Sorry, after posting my comment, I went back and elaborated a bit and just so happened to address the questions you asked in the meantime.
    - umanwizard 9y ago
      > Logistically, electronic voting with a paper audit trail would be much easier, Putting a piece of paper in a box is something everyone understands how to do, even elderly people who have never touched a computer -- how is electronic voting easier? > would require fewer people (i.e., election workers -- who are already in short supply) They are? I can't believe it would be more expensive to hire a few more election workers for one day than we're paying for these machines. > would give us results much quicker, France uses paper ballots and results are known within hours. > and would be easier to verify/authenticate later (in the event of disputes). This is not realistic. We are never going to go back and change an election result whether or not records of the votes were saved. Cf. Florida 2000.

dpacmittal 9y ago

I think blockchain is a perfect application for voting machines. Blockchain is public, immutable, cryptographic. Every voter can vote and then verify their vote was actually registered and was untampered via a web platform or something. The network can be run by the public. Ofcourse there is risk associated with the 51% attack, but it's still a more transparent process than what we have today.

vkou 9y ago
Making everyone's voting record public is just about the worst possible idea for a voting system. Secret ballot is a feature, not a bug. It protects you from coercion and retaliation.
- NicoJuicy 9y ago
  The wallet owner is secret, but can be checked by the owner and by the government
  - tormeh 9y ago
    So the government knows what you voted? Great.
  - hacst 9y ago
    You must not be able to prove who you voted for. Otherwise you are still at risk of retaliation, coercion and can sell your vote. For the very same reasons the government must not be able to know who you voted for either. Secret paper ballots really deserve more credit. The tech might be old but it gets the essential features right.
- __s 9y ago
  Using a system like ZCash the government could have citizens register a public address, then 1 token is distributed to each public address, votes work by sending the token to the candidate you vote for, whomever has the highest balance at the end of the election is the electee (this even allows for off ballot candidates, but up to rules). ZCash is designed so that you can't tell the contents of a transaction despite it being immutably on the blockchain

a_humean 9y ago

In the UK I walk into my local primary school/church/community hall (no more than a 5-10 min walk away), utter my name and address as identification (no other ID needed), and use a pencil to write a big 'X' against my preferences on a piece of paper I was handed when I entered the polling station. There are multiple local party volunteers (I was one in the last election) from all the major parties at all stages of the process watching the flow of paper ballots from the sealed black collection bins to the voting halls where local council officals that volunteered, with paltry compensation, to a 12-18 hour shift to collect and count the vote. Some local councils take pride in being amoung the first to report their results, and there is a side competition to see who reports first. We usually know the broad outcome of the election by the early hours of the next morning, with a handful of recounts in tight races going into the next couple of days.

ezoe 9y ago
In the Japan I walk into my local school/community hall(on rare occasion, the church was used, no more than a 5-10 min walk away), present the voting announcement paper the govt send it to my physical address, and use a pencil to write a name of a candidates on a piece of paper I was exchanged it with my voting announcement paper. In the Japanese writing system, candidate's name can be written in multiple ways. If writing doesn't match one of the exact registered candidates names, the human vote counter decides if it refer to the unambiguous candidate. If such candidate exists, it is counted to the voting for that candidate. > There are multiple local party volunteers ... Same.
- rangibaby 9y ago
  So that's why candidate names are always written in hiragana on their posters!
- umanwizard 9y ago
  How do people vote who don't know how to read/write? Japan's literacy rate is very high, but it's not 100%.
yomly 9y ago

loudouncodes 9y ago

I live in Loudoun County, va, and we've always had the option of using paper with an electronic scanner. There have been touch screen voting machines in the last couple of elections, but I didn't use them,

beastcoast 9y ago

In WA we have absentee ballots which is really the best of all worlds. You fill it in, sign it and mail it back. Couldn't be easier and you don't have to worry about polling locations. They are also hardcore about checking your signature; If it doesn't match your voter registration the ballot isn't counted and you get a letter in the mail.

umanwizard 9y ago
The problem with this system is that it's possible to prove to someone else who you voted for. Voting needs plausible deniability so you can't be coerced or bribed into voting for a particular candidate as was alleged to happen in the Balkans many times: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgarian_train https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgarian_train
e40 9y ago
I've read accounts that many absentee ballots are invalidated by a very sketchy process of signature verification. And that was in Alameda County in CA, a very liberal place. It seems attacks on voting are coming from all sides.