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This is interesting, because the case is clearly being structured (intentionally by the government, one presumes) to force the test case of "is compelled decryp

This is interesting, because the case is clearly being structured (intentionally by the government, one presumes) to force the test case of "is compelled decryption legal" onto the most unsympathetic possible defendant. If the government "knows beyond doubt" that the encrypted drives have CP on them, then they have everything necessary to move forward with a trial without decrypting the drives at all. That satisfies society's legitimate interest in suppressing child porn, while also not trampling all over the legal right to use encryption. Choosing to structure the case in this way, with an appeal to the Supreme Court over a matter that's a technicality in the original case, clearly shows that the goal is to get a precedent for forced decryption, not merely to jail one child porn possessor.

jo909 9y ago
They don't "know beyond doubt" in an absolute sense. They know sure enough to make the encrypted drives content part of the trial in the first place, which is a determination the judge made himself and that wasn't challenged by the defense so far. At some point the main trial will continue, very probably without the decrypted drives. Then the defense will very very likely argue why the hashes aren't enough proof for possession of illegal files, and they will hear experts statements on the matter on both sides, other evidence for the possession etc. And then a _jury_ will make the judgement, with much more factors and on a very different standard of "beyond doubt".
- eridius 9y ago
  They "know beyond doubt" that the drives at least used to contain CP, and most likely do now. It's possible that the CP was deleted at some point, and the only way to determine that would be to decrypt the drives.
  - dragonwriter 9y ago
    > They "know beyond doubt" that the drives at least used to contain CP If they even merely had sufficient evidence to know beyond a reasonable doubt, then they would have sufficient evidence for a trial conviction and the decryption would be a sideshow. Either they are lying about their knowledge (unnecessarily from a legal perspective, so probably for PR), or lying about needing the decryption for evidence, or telling the truth about both but the source of their knowledge is itself illegal evidence (and any evidence they collect based on that knowledge is fruit of the poisonous tree.)
    - eridius 9y ago
      Or they're telling the truth but they're worried that a jury won't understand the explanation of how they know and would really like to have the actual CP in-hand to use as evidence instead.
      - alethiophile 9y ago
        If they've linked specific hashes to known CP content, then presumably they have those files available. They can still present that as evidence, then have the experts testify that those specific files are known to have been on the drive. Going to the Supreme Court specifically on the forced-decryption issue sends a pretty strong signal that that's what they actually care about.
        louithethrid 9y ago
        There could be hash-colissions of entirely diffrent files. Hashes are not proof enough.
        alethiophile 9y ago
        If it's a hash without known collision vulnerabilities, then it's 2^80 proof at least. This is definitely "beyond a reasonable doubt". Even if there were, what's the threat model? "Government creates colliding images one CP and one not, seeds the non-CP versions widely in torrents or something, then uses the hash collision to accuse anyone who downloaded of CP"? That's way more roundabout than governments will bother with; a dirty prosecutor will just fabricate evidence entirely, or have witnesses lie. (Plus, just producing the innocuous colliding image and demonstrating the collision would be an easy and ironclad defense.)
        manicdee 9y ago
        The threat model is "antagonist creates colliding image which is CP, claims original unviewable file was CP." So you, the protagonist, have an encrypted volume full of the names and addresses of people helping evacuate Jews from Nazi-controlled Europe / blockade the construction of a new mine which was approved through bribery and corruption. The antagonist claims you are a CPer and produces a list of known hashes on files on your disk, and a sample of really awful images that conveniently have the same hashes. So the end game is either bust your information out to assist prosecution of the anti-government activists, or land you in the slammer as a CPer thus dragging your cause into the mud.
abhi3 9y ago
> the case is clearly being structured (intentionally by the government, one presumes) to force the test case of "is compelled decryption legal" onto the most unsympathetic possible defendant. This is called strategic litigation for a rule change and is quite common amongst 'repeat-player litigants'. Prosecutors, insurance companies, and even the plaintiffs' bar routinely take unnecessary cases to trial if they think it would set a favorable precedent and also settle cases where they think a trial might set an unfavorable precedent.

jo909 9y ago

They don't "know beyond doubt" in an absolute sense. They know sure enough to make the encrypted drives content part of the trial in the first place, which is a determination the judge made himself and that wasn't challenged by the defense so far. At some point the main trial will continue, very probably without the decrypted drives. Then the defense will very very likely argue why the hashes aren't enough proof for possession of illegal files, and they will hear experts statements on the matter on both sides, other evidence for the possession etc. And then a _jury_ will make the judgement, with much more factors and on a very different standard of "beyond doubt".

eridius 9y ago
They "know beyond doubt" that the drives at least used to contain CP, and most likely do now. It's possible that the CP was deleted at some point, and the only way to determine that would be to decrypt the drives.
- dragonwriter 9y ago
  > They "know beyond doubt" that the drives at least used to contain CP If they even merely had sufficient evidence to know beyond a reasonable doubt, then they would have sufficient evidence for a trial conviction and the decryption would be a sideshow. Either they are lying about their knowledge (unnecessarily from a legal perspective, so probably for PR), or lying about needing the decryption for evidence, or telling the truth about both but the source of their knowledge is itself illegal evidence (and any evidence they collect based on that knowledge is fruit of the poisonous tree.)
  - eridius 9y ago
    Or they're telling the truth but they're worried that a jury won't understand the explanation of how they know and would really like to have the actual CP in-hand to use as evidence instead.
    - alethiophile 9y ago
      If they've linked specific hashes to known CP content, then presumably they have those files available. They can still present that as evidence, then have the experts testify that those specific files are known to have been on the drive. Going to the Supreme Court specifically on the forced-decryption issue sends a pretty strong signal that that's what they actually care about.
      - louithethrid 9y ago
        There could be hash-colissions of entirely diffrent files. Hashes are not proof enough.
        alethiophile 9y ago
        If it's a hash without known collision vulnerabilities, then it's 2^80 proof at least. This is definitely "beyond a reasonable doubt". Even if there were, what's the threat model? "Government creates colliding images one CP and one not, seeds the non-CP versions widely in torrents or something, then uses the hash collision to accuse anyone who downloaded of CP"? That's way more roundabout than governments will bother with; a dirty prosecutor will just fabricate evidence entirely, or have witnesses lie. (Plus, just producing the innocuous colliding image and demonstrating the collision would be an easy and ironclad defense.)
        manicdee 9y ago
        The threat model is "antagonist creates colliding image which is CP, claims original unviewable file was CP." So you, the protagonist, have an encrypted volume full of the names and addresses of people helping evacuate Jews from Nazi-controlled Europe / blockade the construction of a new mine which was approved through bribery and corruption. The antagonist claims you are a CPer and produces a list of known hashes on files on your disk, and a sample of really awful images that conveniently have the same hashes. So the end game is either bust your information out to assist prosecution of the anti-government activists, or land you in the slammer as a CPer thus dragging your cause into the mud.

abhi3 9y ago

> the case is clearly being structured (intentionally by the government, one presumes) to force the test case of "is compelled decryption legal" onto the most unsympathetic possible defendant. This is called strategic litigation for a rule change and is quite common amongst 'repeat-player litigants'. Prosecutors, insurance companies, and even the plaintiffs' bar routinely take unnecessary cases to trial if they think it would set a favorable precedent and also settle cases where they think a trial might set an unfavorable precedent.