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If we establish these ground-rules: 1. [proof of concept] the inventor is responsible for the invention's (initial) appearance, but not for any other person's
by pizza 9y ago
If we establish these ground-rules:
1. [proof of concept] the inventor is responsible for the invention's (initial) appearance, but not for any other person's epiphanies regarding possible use-cases {in HN speak: execution(opportunity) >= execution(invention) >> imagination(invention) > imagination(execution(opportunity)) }
2. [proof that one can rely upon proof of concept] the user is responsible for the opportunity in which the invention is used
3. [proof of concept evolves into paradigm] society becomes aware of opportunities in which established inventions have typically been used or hypothetical (realistic?) situations in which their use would be significant
..it may become easier to discriminate the components of responsibility.
[does responsibility obey the distribute property? Does it obey association? (Could it ever be abelian???), etc...]
Furthermore... I can understand people making choices affect the choices that others can make as a lemma - but I don't particularly believe the TOOLS that people decide upon ARE EXACTLY those 'choice-deltas' - without a huge deviation from ordinary definition of technology ( which I think is not without rationale).
- jonahx 9y agoI probably shouldn't have mentioned responsibility -- it wasn't the main point I was trying to make. My point is something like "people living in a world with X" are different from "people living in a world without X" in profound ways, and it's not under anyone's control. I'm not really interested in how we distribute blame -- only in pointing out that you can't release new technology, shrug your shoulders, and say, "Well, if it's misused, not on us." A far more accurate metaphor would be to consider us like animals in captivity.
- pizza 9y agoOK. I admit that the preexisting presence of an object influences the decision to use it or not far more than most would probably care to admit. But I think one of the problems is when people start to sum history to explain something new's causality. It's like saying you should trust a prior probability to predict an event's occurrence more than the posterior probability after it happens - a new piece of evidence is categorically different than a historical tendency.. if that makes sense?