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As mentioned elsewhere in this thread, the payoff for these games never takes into consideration reputation effects. That is, what's the result of other partic
by jdonaldson 9y ago
As mentioned elsewhere in this thread, the payoff for these games never takes into consideration reputation effects. That is, what's the result of other participants observing your actions? Are they more likely to trust you or not trust you when you interact?
I mention this because it's clear that we're changing the way we trust and interact with each other online. Whether it's virtue signaling or trolling, we're adopting new strategies for "winning"... whatever that prize may be.
- morogop 9y agoAll actual study of these games involves both one-time and repeated versions of the games, which changes those dynamics. Reputational effects are interesting. If you wanted a reputation as an intelligent person, you'd learn something before you post. But you realized that HN rewards snarkiness and superiority, not actual intelligence, so you're posting ignorantly, and pretending you're making some wise point. Your post will get upvoted because of your decision to embrace ignorant arrogance. Mine, on the other hand, will be downvoted, because I was very slightly mean to you, and HN doesn't tolerate rudeness toward white men who think they're smarter than they are. After all, that's HN's core demographic.
- jzl 9y agoSee my other comment. In the competitions discussed in The Selfish Gene, PD strategies are allowed to have memory and the simulation is run thousands of times per round. However it is pretty consistently the case that long-term memory is not an outright win for either the competitor or the opponent, compared to the simple "tit-for-tat" strategy which only remembers the previous iteration. Of course the PD only models certain kinds of human/animal interactions. Knowing that a particular person is a cheater or is vindictive or whatever is obviously important for evolutionary strategy as a whole. But the question is more about heterogenous populations. Is there an optimal strategy that wins more than any other across a wide range of opposing strategies, including if everyone else is actually using the same strategy?