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While the particularities may be interesting, much of what's said isn't surprising (though for Cartesians, it may be, and the author does throw Descartes' name

• _dps 9y ago
  > ... a number of philosophical errors in the comments (w.r.t. language, religion, qualia, zombies, etc). I feel like this is, intentionally or not, aimed at least 80% at my comments :) Would you mind giving me some quick pointers on what the "errors" are? I can assure you that, though I may well be wrong, I have read several books on philosophy of mind and many more on cognitive science research. Despite that I'm struggling to see anything I said that would have been controversial at the time I was taking those courses in university.
  • mannykannot 9y ago
    You are not likely to get an answer. This is a style of comment that is quite common in discussions where there are philosophical issues. The defining features are an assertion that someone is wrong, followed by a long list of general references, with the unstated implication that the alleged error will be corrected somewhere within them. The authors of such comments are careful not to take a position that can be debated, and in this case, the comment's author has been especially careful in avoiding giving clues that might indicate specifically what he objects to. This style is also seen in discussions where religion is raised, where it is used to avoid questions like why an omnipotent and benevolent creator thought smallpox was a good idea.
  • danielam 9y ago
    I wasn't intentionally aiming at your comments, but some of what I wrote does seem to concern, at least loosely, some of the things you've written. As you can imagine, philosophical issues usually can't be resolved in a comment section, hence the links to material that addresses a couple of these issues. But for starters, the problem of qualia is neither here nor there. I will note that the problem is rooted in a Cartesian metaphysical tradition that persists even among materialists, though they are in an even worse place than their dualist counterparts. Whereas Cartesian dualists could at least defer to the res cogitans as the "substrate" in which qualia exist, materialists--having dropped the res cogitans while maintaining a more or less Cartesian res extensa--cannot hope to account for qualia because the res extensa, by definition, precludes qualia. The only recourse is to reexamine those broadly Cartesian metaphysical presuppositions, something few materialists seem to be doing. Putting aside the cryptodualisms of some of the more sophisticated materialists, perhaps one of the more annoying things you'll see is the invocation of "emergence" as a magical cure-all to any of the problems facing materialism. Another issue is what seems to be the claim that when accounting for consciousness, you've either got religion or a (reductionist) materialism. Nonsense. Aristotelians have always held that animals are both composed of matter[0] and conscious. One area Aristotelians and materialists differ is their concept of matter. The materialist's concept of matter is the reason why Descartes denied non-human animals consciousness. He understood that without the res cogitans--which he denied non-human animals--the impoverished res extensa he presupposed could not "support" consciousness. Aristotelianism avoids the problem without having to take refuge in substance dualism. [0] The exception is man. While most faculties of human beings are understood to be material, the exception is the intellect. Why? Because the intellect engages in abstraction. If matter is concrete and particular ("this red apple"), and universals existing apart from particulars are abstract ("redness"), then the intellect, in which they reside, cannot be material. Compare this with the imagination which always deals with images and thus particulars.
• skadamou 9y ago
  Boy there is a lot in Feser’s work to unpack. I haven’t gotten through all of the links you posted yet, but the crux of his argument (and evidently the argument Thomists make) is that humans are different because we are capable of abstract reasoning and logic whereas animals are not. Do you suppose animals really are not capable of these two mental faculties? Abstraction seems more difficult to dissect but it does not seem too farfetched to imagine that animals are capable of making future plans based on an understanding of cause and effect. Don’t you think that implies some level of logical reasoning? I know Feser’s views are not necessarily indicative of your own but I would appreciate your opinion
  • mabub24 9y ago
    Personally, I have not read Feser. I would recommend PMS Hacker's book "Human Nature: A Categorical Framework", which, from reading Fraser's blog posts, I see moves along similar lines. The philosophy of mind is a topic I'm quite interested in, so I think I can respond to some of your questions. > humans are different because we are capable of abstract reasoning and logic whereas animals are not. Do you suppose animals really are not capable of these two mental faculties? We need to ask, in what sense and depth are animals able to express that form of reasoning and logic? Humans do so at unique levels through language. There is a layer of reasoning and following logic that can be expressed by being shown by doing, like preparing, but there is another, higher form, that can be expressed by being said through language, like planning. The former is continually in the present. It does involve a kind of thinking and a kind of intelligence. But unlike the latter form, which expresses an understanding, and therefore the ability to express in language, the past and future tenses, there is no expression of why it is being done. That expressing of why, that kind of expression of reasoning, animals lack and humans are capable of through language. Language is not just some thing we slap over thought. It is an ability that, through its use, expresses the concepts and limits of our thoughts. It is the animate expression of our thinking, that is the collection of our rational and cogitative faculties that define us as persons rather than animals. It's not so much that animals lack reasoning or logic (that is the view of a crude Behaviorism), it is that humans are capable of the same and far more unique expressions of reasoning and logic than animals, so much so that humans are unique from animals as a result.
  • 9y ago