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From https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-inductive/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-inductive/ : > It is now generally held that the core idea of
by westurner 9y ago
From https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-inductive/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-inductive/ :
> It is now generally held that the core idea of Bayesian logicism is fatally flawed—that syntactic logical structure cannot be the sole determiner of the degree to which premises inductively support conclusions. A crucial facet of the problem faced by Bayesian logicism involves how the logic is supposed to apply to scientific contexts where the conclusion sentence is some hypothesis or theory, and the premises are evidence claims. The difficulty is that in any probabilistic logic that satisfies the usual axioms for probabilities, the inductive support for a hypothesis must depend in part on its prior probability. This prior probability represents how plausible the hypothesis is supposed to be based on considerations other than the observational and experimental evidence (e.g., perhaps due to relevant plausibility arguments). A Bayesian logicist must tell us how to assign values to these pre-evidential prior probabilities of hypotheses, for each of the hypotheses or theories under consideration. Furthermore, this kind of Bayesian logicist must determine these prior probability values in a way that relies only on the syntactic logical structure of these hypotheses, perhaps based on some measure of their syntactic simplicities. There are severe technical problems with getting this idea to work. Moreover, various kinds of examples seem to show that such an approach must assign intuitively quite unreasonable prior probabilities to hypotheses in specific cases (see the footnote cited near the end of section 3.2 for details). Furthermore, for this idea to apply to the evidential support of real scientific theories, scientists would have to formalize theories in a way that makes their relevant syntactic structures apparent, and then evaluate theories solely on that syntactic basis (together with their syntactic relationships to evidence statements). Are we to evaluate alternative theories of gravitation (and alternative quantum theories) this way?
- nonbel 9y ago>"This prior probability represents how plausible the hypothesis is supposed to be based on considerations other than the observational and experimental evidence (e.g., perhaps due to relevant plausibility arguments)." I guess I don't know about how "Bayesian logicism" differs from "Bayesian probability", but this is totally false in the latter case. The prior is just supposed to be independent of the current data (eg devised before it was collected). In practice info almost always leaks into the prior + model via tinkering. That is why a priori predictions are so important to proving you are onto something.
- westurner 9y agoBayesian logicism is the logic derived from Bayesian probability. Magic numbers are an anti-pattern: which constants are what and why should be justified OR it should be shown that a non-expert-biased form converges regardless.
- nonbel 9y agoThe use of the term prior probability in that paragraph is not consistent with its use in bayesian probability, so something is wrong. Also, I am not sure what magic numbers you are referring to.
- westurner 9y agoArbitrary priors are magic numbers. Is there a frequentist statistic that can be used in a deterministic function to determine which arbitrary priors to use?