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The prior can generally only be understood in the context of the likelihood
- ta1929901 9y agoNice article, in the sense that I would assign it to students, although I think it presents sort of a strawman and doesn't really introduce anything that hasn't been discussed at length elsewhere. It provides a nice introduction to types of objective priors, hinting at their advantages and disadvantages. Also a nice discussion of why priors matter. Incidentally, I agree that "subjective" and "objective" are poor labels for priors--something better would be something like "estimand-predictive" and "inferential-property" priors, respectively. I'm not really sure why they suggest objective priors violate assumptions about not using information from the data. The model, and thus many objective priors, can be specified given the design, without any knowledge of what the data looks like. This is the strawman part of it. I get the sense Gelman has been wrestling with objective priors the last few years.
- confounded 9y agoHe (and the Stan team) have been my main source of 'default priors' where I don't have a strong opinion, and am mainly looking for regularization-style properties (most of the time).
- nerdponx 9y agoMany of the Gelman-style default "objective" priors aren't so hard to interpret as "I am skeptical that this parameter is non-zero".
- nonbel 9y agoGelman has been pretty adamant about the idea there probably always is some real correlation between almost any two measurements (that is why he advocates his type M and type S error concepts). Perhaps you are confusing "skeptical the parameter is far from zero" with "skeptical the parameter is non-zero". It makes a big difference.
- sgt101 9y agoOdd because I read the abstract of the paper as a claim for a fundamental advance in statistics; systematic and objective determination of priors in Bayesian analysis. I can't speak to whether the paper is successful in delivering this as I am very dense and it takes me weeks to understand things, but if they have identified mechanisms that allow complex priors to be constructed that minimize overfitting: 1. I will do a little dance 2. I will learn how to construct such priors 3. I will attempt to apply this in practice to see what happens. I don't see overfitting risk as a strawman, I see it as a nasty business that means that production models can't be trusted.
- ta1929901 9y agoA lot of what they discuss is in the literature on reference priors, if not in other literature on objective priors as well. It's a little complex for a comment on HN, but IMHO the best formalization of overfitting is in the literature on minimum description length, and related information-theoretic literature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_description_length https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_description_length ; the wikipedia page is a little off on some things but the general points are probably about right). The relationship between MDL/NML and Bayesian statistics is a little complicated--Barron, Roos, and Watanabe have a nice recent paper about it (https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.7116 https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.7116) -- but the short story is that there's a certain equivalence (or at least very close relationship) between MDL/NML and Bayesian inference with reference priors (i.e., the "capacity-achieving prior" in IT parlance). So Bayesian inference with reference priors minimizes risk of overfitting in a very technical minimax sense. The problem is that reference priors are very difficult in general to construct, although that is changing rapidly, and they have been worked out for certain important cases (this paper provides an interesting new approach with a nice overview of recent papers https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.01168 https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.01168). The Jeffreys prior is a form of the reference prior for models meeting certain constraints. A lot of the issues Gelman et al. touch on have been written about in various places in the MDL/NML/reference prior/information theory literature.
- Xcelerate 9y ago> but IMHO the best formalization of overfitting is in the literature on minimum description length It's always surprised me how few people know about MDL, considering it's pretty darn close to what we might consider a "universal predictor" (granted, the difficulty with MDL is that it's uncomputable in the general sense). Even among most data scientists I know, very few understand what overfitting really is (and thus cross-validation and regularization are merely tools to what seems like the blackbox "art" of model selection). But the concepts of MDL/MML and Kolmogorov complexity are very deep and fundamental—to such an extent that I think the path to true AGI will rely much more heavily upon algorithmic information theory than neural networks in the future.
- kgwgk 9y ago> With the above prior and likelihood, the posterior for β is a product of independent Gaussians with unit variance and mean given by the least squares estimator of β. The problem is that standard concentration of measure inequalities show that this posterior is not uniformly distributed in a unit ball around the ordinary least squares estimator but rather is exponentially close in the number of coefficients to a sphere of radius 1 centered at the estimate. Of course the posterior is not uniformly distributed in a unit ball (the density is higher at the center of the ball, and extends beyond the limits of the ball). But the fact that it is exponentially close to a sphere doesn’t have anything to do with that! If the posterior was uniformly distributed in a unit ball it would also be exponentially close to a sphere.
- kgwgk 9y ago> Stein's trick was to notice that the point µ = 0 has the property that if y is sufficiently close to it, It’s not clear in this presentation but shrinkage can be done toward any arbitrary point, not just toward the origin.
- kgwgk 9y ago> For a fully informative prior for δ, we might choose normal with mean 0 because we see no prior reason to expect the population difference to be positive or negative and standard deviation 0.001 because we expect any differences in the population to be small, given the general stability of sex ratios and the noisiness of the measure of attractiveness. That’s a very strong prior. To put it into context (if I did my calculations right): assuming that every single child from very attractive parents in the study was a girl (let’s say 600 out of 600) while for the rest we have the expected distribution (i.e. 1150 girls out of 2400) the estimate of the difference would be 0.1%.
- westurner 9y agoBayes assumes/requires conditional independence of observations; which is sometimes the case. For example: - Are the positions of the Earth and the Moon conditionally independent? No. - In the phrase "the dog and the cat", are "and" and "the" independent? No. - In a biological system, are we to assume conditional independence? We should not. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conditional_independence https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conditional_independence ... "Efficient test for nonlinear dependence of two continuous variables" https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4539721/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4539721/ - In no particular sequence: CANOVA, ANOVA, Pearson, Spearman, Kendall, MIC, Hoeffding
- westurner 9y agoFrom https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-inductive/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-inductive/ : > It is now generally held that the core idea of Bayesian logicism is fatally flawed—that syntactic logical structure cannot be the sole determiner of the degree to which premises inductively support conclusions. A crucial facet of the problem faced by Bayesian logicism involves how the logic is supposed to apply to scientific contexts where the conclusion sentence is some hypothesis or theory, and the premises are evidence claims. The difficulty is that in any probabilistic logic that satisfies the usual axioms for probabilities, the inductive support for a hypothesis must depend in part on its prior probability. This prior probability represents how plausible the hypothesis is supposed to be based on considerations other than the observational and experimental evidence (e.g., perhaps due to relevant plausibility arguments). A Bayesian logicist must tell us how to assign values to these pre-evidential prior probabilities of hypotheses, for each of the hypotheses or theories under consideration. Furthermore, this kind of Bayesian logicist must determine these prior probability values in a way that relies only on the syntactic logical structure of these hypotheses, perhaps based on some measure of their syntactic simplicities. There are severe technical problems with getting this idea to work. Moreover, various kinds of examples seem to show that such an approach must assign intuitively quite unreasonable prior probabilities to hypotheses in specific cases (see the footnote cited near the end of section 3.2 for details). Furthermore, for this idea to apply to the evidential support of real scientific theories, scientists would have to formalize theories in a way that makes their relevant syntactic structures apparent, and then evaluate theories solely on that syntactic basis (together with their syntactic relationships to evidence statements). Are we to evaluate alternative theories of gravitation (and alternative quantum theories) this way?
- selimthegrim 9y agohttp://andrewgelman.com/2017/09/05/never-total-eclipse-prior/ http://andrewgelman.com/2017/09/05/never-total-eclipse-prior...