5 ms·

Given the lack of network effect in cars already, it's not likely we'll see a huge explosion of inter-car connectivity anytime soon. Even Tesla see their cars l

Given the lack of network effect in cars already, it's not likely we'll see a huge explosion of inter-car connectivity anytime soon. Even Tesla see their cars largely as individual machines, and not nodes on a highway network. Example: Driving with cruise control on at 60 mph. The car in front is going ~59.5 mph, so you slowly gain on them. Why do the cars not communicate their speed, so your car can adjust speed to maintain a safe distance? Even cars of the same brand can't do this today. What will be the catalyst for this changing?

pscarey 9y ago
Surely the (already) observable relative difference is more important than what the car thinks it's speed is? Both cars might read 60mph and go at different speeds. Therefore I don't see much need for that to change. I think more interesting would be smarter traffic control systems which communicate with cars in cities to advise traffic flows - a simple example being a (wirelessly) counting down light rather than red/amber/green.
tomsthumb 9y ago
> Why do the cars not communicate their speed, so your car can adjust speed to maintain a safe distance? How do you deal with spoofing info for/from another vehicle? What happens when someone decides to see what happens when they `inter_car_radio.broadcast(myspeed=0)` or `inter_car_radio.broadcast(myspeed=120)` when the speed limit is 80?
- colejohnson66 9y ago
  The naive solution would be to make it illegal to modify the communication system of your car, but wouldn't just making it illegal to broadcast false data be enough? And then if an accident is caused because of that, you can tack on some other charge like an autonomous version of reckless driving.
  - sah2ed 9y ago
    A better solution would be to provision each car with its own key pair and the car maker's root CA just before it rolls off the factory floor, that way it can constantly beam 2 signals: - a signed (regulator-mandated) signal for cars from other manufacturers; - an encrypted signal intended for cars from the same manufacturer. The first signal would be signed by the root CA of the car maker to indicate that its communications can be trusted. The encrypted signal would of course carry an information-rich payload for coordinating a convoy to travel at the same speed, brake, signal a turn, etc simultaneously, for instance.
    - icebraining 9y ago
      Signed messages only ensure that they weren't modified by a MITM. If the attack controls the sending vehicle, the signature doesn't help.
      - colejohnson66 9y ago
        Tamper proof modules that store the key? Like Secure Enclave?
6d6b73 9y ago
Cars should not depend on information from other cars, they should treat them just as suggestions, or intents, not actual events. In your example, the reported speed of the car will depend of many factors like tire size, quality of the sensor or even humidity or temperature, so it can't be trusted by other cars.
deleted 9y ago
[deleted]
oh_sigh 9y ago
Cars already communicate their speed through the EM spectrum, and it's very hard to spoof this. LIDAR can easily determine if it is approaching an object at even 1 cm/s.

pscarey 9y ago

Surely the (already) observable relative difference is more important than what the car thinks it's speed is? Both cars might read 60mph and go at different speeds. Therefore I don't see much need for that to change. I think more interesting would be smarter traffic control systems which communicate with cars in cities to advise traffic flows - a simple example being a (wirelessly) counting down light rather than red/amber/green.

tomsthumb 9y ago

> Why do the cars not communicate their speed, so your car can adjust speed to maintain a safe distance? How do you deal with spoofing info for/from another vehicle? What happens when someone decides to see what happens when they `inter_car_radio.broadcast(myspeed=0)` or `inter_car_radio.broadcast(myspeed=120)` when the speed limit is 80?

colejohnson66 9y ago
The naive solution would be to make it illegal to modify the communication system of your car, but wouldn't just making it illegal to broadcast false data be enough? And then if an accident is caused because of that, you can tack on some other charge like an autonomous version of reckless driving.
- sah2ed 9y ago
  A better solution would be to provision each car with its own key pair and the car maker's root CA just before it rolls off the factory floor, that way it can constantly beam 2 signals: - a signed (regulator-mandated) signal for cars from other manufacturers; - an encrypted signal intended for cars from the same manufacturer. The first signal would be signed by the root CA of the car maker to indicate that its communications can be trusted. The encrypted signal would of course carry an information-rich payload for coordinating a convoy to travel at the same speed, brake, signal a turn, etc simultaneously, for instance.
  - icebraining 9y ago
    Signed messages only ensure that they weren't modified by a MITM. If the attack controls the sending vehicle, the signature doesn't help.
    - colejohnson66 9y ago
      Tamper proof modules that store the key? Like Secure Enclave?

6d6b73 9y ago

Cars should not depend on information from other cars, they should treat them just as suggestions, or intents, not actual events. In your example, the reported speed of the car will depend of many factors like tire size, quality of the sensor or even humidity or temperature, so it can't be trusted by other cars.

deleted 9y ago

[deleted]

oh_sigh 9y ago

Cars already communicate their speed through the EM spectrum, and it's very hard to spoof this. LIDAR can easily determine if it is approaching an object at even 1 cm/s.