4 ms·

As with most things security, people tend to be the weakest link in the chain. This type of issue could be solved in a lot of ways. I think a solution wherein

As with most things security, people tend to be the weakest link in the chain. This type of issue could be solved in a lot of ways. I think a solution wherein: 1. ICOs use a standard 'escrow' contract wherein ether and coin get held by the contract for 7 days or so before either party can withdraw the opposite pair (where either can back out). 2. Building some standard 'ether address' widget that verifies the type of contract an address is. A user-wallet would usually be a warning sign.

jstanley 9y ago
That wouldn't solve this problem. Did you read the article? The ICO investors were tricked.
- mhluongo 9y ago
  The user wallet vs contract distinction might help, but that means tooling and education.
- SirensOfTitan 9y ago
  And how wouldn't it solve the problem? (1) would act as a more safe instrument for sending money to addresses you don't regularly interact with, (2) would attempt to make the address type much more apparent to the user so they don't send to addresses they aren't familiar with.
  - jstanley 9y ago
    Just because you invent a special type of escrow contract that makes it harder to steal money doesn't mean an attacker would use it... he would just instruct users to send money to his own contract and bypass all of the protections you've invented.
    - SirensOfTitan 9y ago
      When did I mention an attacker should use this? How does that argument make sense at all? Legitimate ICOs should take on use of these widgets and contracts, educating users in the process to only send to particular contracts. This requires a great deal of improved hygiene for ICO providers and education for consumers, but there’s no easy foot forward here.
      - eswat 9y ago
        One problem is that the correct contract to fund an ICO might even change during the ICO (as it has happened with EOS) and the current way these “businesses” are communicating these contract changes is pretty poor. So yeah, we definitely need improved hygiene that addresses the pain points of trying to do these funding events through a blockchain.
- deleted 9y ago
  [deleted]
- 659087 9y ago
  They were being tricked anyway.

jstanley 9y ago

That wouldn't solve this problem. Did you read the article? The ICO investors were tricked.

mhluongo 9y ago
The user wallet vs contract distinction might help, but that means tooling and education.
SirensOfTitan 9y ago
And how wouldn't it solve the problem? (1) would act as a more safe instrument for sending money to addresses you don't regularly interact with, (2) would attempt to make the address type much more apparent to the user so they don't send to addresses they aren't familiar with.
- jstanley 9y ago
  Just because you invent a special type of escrow contract that makes it harder to steal money doesn't mean an attacker would use it... he would just instruct users to send money to his own contract and bypass all of the protections you've invented.
  - SirensOfTitan 9y ago
    When did I mention an attacker should use this? How does that argument make sense at all? Legitimate ICOs should take on use of these widgets and contracts, educating users in the process to only send to particular contracts. This requires a great deal of improved hygiene for ICO providers and education for consumers, but there’s no easy foot forward here.
    - eswat 9y ago
      One problem is that the correct contract to fund an ICO might even change during the ICO (as it has happened with EOS) and the current way these “businesses” are communicating these contract changes is pretty poor. So yeah, we definitely need improved hygiene that addresses the pain points of trying to do these funding events through a blockchain.
deleted 9y ago
[deleted]
659087 9y ago
They were being tricked anyway.