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That's kind of a moot point when your browser handles most of your online interactions (and therefore a good chunk of your online identity, which is quite valua
by 4c2383f5c88e911 9y ago
That's kind of a moot point when your browser handles most of your online interactions (and therefore a good chunk of your online identity, which is quite valuable to most people). Even if you isolate it as much as you can, which is a good thing to do in any case, it can still do a lot of damage without escaping the sandbox.
- walterbell 9y agoYes, usage of isolated browser instances should be restricted to information within a single context or risk profile. E.g. a stateless, frequently rebooted VM for occasional use of a particular extension. Or a Bromium micro-VM for each tab, redirect, etc.
- testestx 9y agoThis is totally impractical, or people would be already doing this when using other browsers as a defense in depth thing.
- walterbell 9y agoBromium claims to be seamless to end-users, but it's not available to consumers, except on some HP devices, https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/02/13/hp_bromium_virtualization/ https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/02/13/hp_bromium_virtuali... As for practicality, if your daily workflow involves a browser extension that has no replacement, the options are: - stop doing the task - all browsing with insecure browser, no isolation - single task with insecure browser, no isolation - single task with insecure browser, some isolation Most people will do #2 or #3. Those who care about security will do #4, with quality of isolation dependent on their threat model.