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I too disagree. I'm discussing cogitation rather than cognition. I'm in no way saying animals are not cognitive. I'm saying animals do not possess even close to

I too disagree. I'm discussing cogitation rather than cognition. I'm in no way saying animals are not cognitive. I'm saying animals do not possess even close to equal cogitative powers as humans do. Animals are conscious, but if we are frank, their consciousness is not as deep as our own. A sword does not make one a soldier if he does not use it as a soldier. Animals don't have, or possess only the simplest, language. They have no means to express their cogitating or cogitation. We do.

jdmichal 9y ago
Someone else already pointed this out to you: absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. What evidence do you have that animals don't have an internally-rich, deep, contemplative life? Your only substantial point is that they haven't walked up to us and start talking about it... If your barrier is "human language and socialization", then of course by definition no other animal has the capability! It's a self-serving definition. But I have certainly had many different animals communicate with me in various physical and verbal ways -- they certainly can express themselves, and in ways that we can understand. And they have certainly verified that they can understand to some extent our language and communications. Meanwhile, anyone who has a dog knows they have both dreams and nightmares, which is certainly some form of internal contemplation.
- mabub24 9y ago
  The evidence that I have is observation. Animals can feel, can have sensations, and can act with volition, they get hungry and they get tired. They get excited and they get sad. But to what extent can you say they wonder why they are that way? Can you assuredly say you have seen that? As Hacker argues in Human Nature: The Categorical Framework, "They can intelligibly (truly or falsely) be said to think only what they can express in their behaviour.... with us, unlike other animals, those limits are set by the linguistic expression of thought. If one has mastered the use of tenses and of temporal referring expressions, one can think of the past and the future. One can remember not only where – as exhibited in an animal’s seeking or homing behaviour – but also when. Non-human animals may prepare for the future – bury food for later consumption, build dams or dig burrows, but only man can plan for the future." What particularly defines an "internally rich contemplative life" besides what is possible for humans, and not assigned to animals by humans? Animals have an internal life. They are conscious. But by what means do we have to understand them as self-conscious? Can they distinguish between myself and my self? There is considerable debate about this. You end up in philosophy. You end up in conceptual analysis. Eventually, it comes down to principles of sense and nonsense in language. What does it make sense to say of animals? Does it make sense to say a dog is planning for the next walk on August 30th? Or does it make more sense to say I think he is planning? The two say imply different things about the dog's capabilities.

jdmichal 9y ago

Someone else already pointed this out to you: absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. What evidence do you have that animals don't have an internally-rich, deep, contemplative life? Your only substantial point is that they haven't walked up to us and start talking about it... If your barrier is "human language and socialization", then of course by definition no other animal has the capability! It's a self-serving definition. But I have certainly had many different animals communicate with me in various physical and verbal ways -- they certainly can express themselves, and in ways that we can understand. And they have certainly verified that they can understand to some extent our language and communications. Meanwhile, anyone who has a dog knows they have both dreams and nightmares, which is certainly some form of internal contemplation.

mabub24 9y ago
The evidence that I have is observation. Animals can feel, can have sensations, and can act with volition, they get hungry and they get tired. They get excited and they get sad. But to what extent can you say they wonder why they are that way? Can you assuredly say you have seen that? As Hacker argues in Human Nature: The Categorical Framework, "They can intelligibly (truly or falsely) be said to think only what they can express in their behaviour.... with us, unlike other animals, those limits are set by the linguistic expression of thought. If one has mastered the use of tenses and of temporal referring expressions, one can think of the past and the future. One can remember not only where – as exhibited in an animal’s seeking or homing behaviour – but also when. Non-human animals may prepare for the future – bury food for later consumption, build dams or dig burrows, but only man can plan for the future." What particularly defines an "internally rich contemplative life" besides what is possible for humans, and not assigned to animals by humans? Animals have an internal life. They are conscious. But by what means do we have to understand them as self-conscious? Can they distinguish between myself and my self? There is considerable debate about this. You end up in philosophy. You end up in conceptual analysis. Eventually, it comes down to principles of sense and nonsense in language. What does it make sense to say of animals? Does it make sense to say a dog is planning for the next walk on August 30th? Or does it make more sense to say I think he is planning? The two say imply different things about the dog's capabilities.