19 ms·

Security Keys

218 points by ikeboy 9y ago

LeoPanthera 9y ago
These are currently Chrome only. The Firefox extension requires an external binary and doesn't work in Firefox 57 anyway. I like the idea of a physical token, but it would need to be more universally compatible, which seems difficult unless you go the route of one of those RSA tags with an LCD display on it. But there's no open standard for those, except for TOTP, and if you wanted hardware TOTP you'd need a separate dongle for every site. Inconvenient. (I wonder if you could make a TOTP dongle that can store multiple keys?) I do use TOTP, but I use 1Password, which means my keys are not confined to a single device. I wonder how much less secure this makes them, but it's probably still better than not using 2FA at all.
- sowbug 9y ago
  TOTP is phishable. U2F isn't. It wouldn't be good for the world if TOTP became universal, as phishing would adapt. However, the single TOTP hardware device for multiple sites that you postulate converges on the U2F design if you wrap the OTP in signatures so both sides know who they're talking to.
- bugmen0t 9y ago
  An upcoming Firefox release will get built-in U2F support, no need for an add-on. It already supports a softtoken (I.e., implemented in software) behind a pref. Works well for me on e.g., GitHub. But that's unlikely ever to be enabled by default in a Firefox release.
  - bostik 9y ago
    This was a nice piece of news, so of course I went to check the release schedule. https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/CryptoEngineering#Web_Authentication https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/CryptoEngineering#Web_Auth... states that FF 56 or 57 should have native U2F support, and 57 or 58 would have it flipped on for everyone. Promising. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1065729 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1065729 is still open, but has seen plenty of progress. Even with current version (55), one would expect lot of the groundwork to be in place. And sure enough, searching for "u2f" in about:config brings up a nice triplet of security.webauth.u2f* keys.
jessaustin 9y ago
If you have a laptop that only has USB-C ports then a USB-A device is useless to you. Currently your only option is the Yubikey 4C at $50 a piece. Is there any reason why a $3 A-to-C adapter wouldn't work for this?
- huntsman 9y ago
  Yes the adapters work.
  - euyyn 9y ago
    The downside is they're easy to break if they're left plugged in. I'm on my 3rd one.
stouset 9y ago
As an addendum to this, I'll relate my own experiences. The YubiKey NEO-n (and I'll assume the more recent 4 Nano) are phenomenal if you can (semi-)permanently spare a USB-A port. The ability to generate TOTPs and FIDO tokens without having to dig out your keys is an amazing convenience. Unfortunately I can't say the same for their 4C, which I'm using with the new USB-C-only MacBook Pro. The plastic it's made from begins cracking apart within a month of use, and completely disintegrates within three months, rendering the device inoperable. To their credit, Yubico has replaced my device twice so far, but how this made it past their quality control I have no idea. I deeply hope they fix the plastic durability on this device, as well as offer a nano version with USB-C support that I can leave in my laptop permanently.
- kqr 9y ago
  > if you can (semi-)permanently spare a USB-A port Or use subkeys most of the time and have master on dongle?
  - stouset 9y ago
    I don't think this makes sense in the context of a U2F or TOTP device.
- kqr 9y ago
  > if you can (semi-)permanently spare a USB-A port Or use subkeys most of the time and have master on dongle?
- deleted 9y ago
  [deleted]
deleted 9y ago
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jwcrux 9y ago
U2F/UAF/Webauthn are a really interesting chicken/egg problem. Right now, not too many providers support these auth protocols, even though they are more secure than current 2fa alternatives and provide a better user experience. The aren't widely supported because that costs development time and many of their customers don't have security keys. Customers won't buy security keys because it's an added cost that isn't supported by many websites. The author of the post briefly mentions SoftU2F at the bottom of the post, but it's important to recognize how significant SoftU2F is to the U2F ecosystem. We're just now starting to see consumer hardware come with HSM's built in. Apple SEP, Intel SGX, etc. are examples of this. SoftU2F _will_ be able to leverage these consumer HSM's to do secure crypto operations - see the pull request at [0] about storing keys in the SEP. This will effectively put U2F and UAF capability into the hands of your average consumer with no additional cost. Things can be just _built-in_, which is what it'll take to start seeing increased protocol adoption across browsers and service providers. I'm stoked about the future of security keys and the associated protocols. Both external keys and HSM's built directly into consumer hardware. [0] https://github.com/github/SoftU2F/pull/29 https://github.com/github/SoftU2F/pull/29
- weeks 9y ago
  While I absolutely agree with you, it seems far more likely that native implementations by Apple, Google and Microsoft will dominate the market. Windows Hello is a great early example of this.
  - ptoomey3 9y ago
    SoftU2F was designed fully conscious of this. It was largely developed to help push forward the idea of a software based token with every hope that, over time, native browser and operating system implementations push things fully into the mainstream.
  - jwcrux 9y ago
    I hope they do. Wouldn't that be incredible? Having _native_ U2F/UAF built right into the browser. The hard part is that there's another more subtle chicken and egg problem when it comes to software implementations and consumer HSM. Google/Apple/Microsoft will likely only really push forward native implementations when there is enough market share for consumer hardware having HSM's built in to make it worth it with feasible fallback options.
tedunangst 9y ago
Teachable moment: Five paragraphs explaining what security keys are and why they're good, then it's off to Amazon to buy one with the search phrase "U2F security token". The term U2F appears nowhere in the previous five paragraphs.
- jlgaddis 9y ago
  I agree that the author should've at least explained what U2F stands for (at the least) but, FWIW, both Google and Facebook just refer to them generally as "security keys" (I presume because they {do|intend to} support other types of security keys?).
  - idlewords 9y ago
    I think the decision to call them 'security keys' is to avoid jargon, and to give a helpful metaphor to how they work (you need a security key to unlock your account like you need a car key to unlock your car).
voiper1 9y ago
ELI5 why these are unphishable?
- Tomte 9y ago
  In phishing, bad guys lure users to site B while users believe they are at site A. Users enter their credentials and game over. The important point is that users are deceived, but not the web browser. The browser knows perfectly well, that the URL is amazon.com.something.com, the problem is that it has no expectation which URL is the one the user has in mind. With a U2F key it's the same scenario. But the browser tells the key "this is for amazon.com.something.com" the key incorporates that into it's cryptographic input, so it's "bound" to that URL. Later the bad guy presents the key's output to amazon.com, and now the server has an expectation that's not fulfilled: "I'm sorry, that's not for me".
  - pmoriarty 9y ago
    What happens if the attacker spoofs DNS? Also, the scheme you describe requires the user to trust the web browser. But, if the web browser is, say, on a public computer, it can't necessarily be trusted.
    - Tomte 9y ago
      a) Please describe in more detail. As long as the initial setup was with the true web site I don't see how DNS spoofing might play into it. b) Right. Perfect is the enemy of good.
    - pfg 9y ago
      > What happens if the attacker spoofs DNS? They would also have to get a publicly-trusted TLS certificate for that domain. U2F is HTTPS-only, at least on Chrome. If the attacker can do that, you have bigger problems. > Also, the scheme you describe requires the user to trust the web browser. But, if the web browser is, say, on a public computer, it can't necessarily be trusted. No one has really solved secure authentication on a compromised system. I dare say it's not a problem that can be solved.
jlgaddis 9y ago
List of sites that support 2FA (and which methods, including U2F): https://twofactorauth.org https://twofactorauth.org
jlgaddis 9y ago
I've got several (~7?) Yubikeys: one that Mt. Gox sent me several years ago (that would only work with their web site!), an old "Symantec VIP" key, a NEO that's permanently plugged into the keyboard on my workstation, a couple of Nanos (almost always plugged into a pair of laptops), and a couple of the U2F-only ones. I don't think I've ever had any issues with any of them (there was a "bug" a few years back and they had to "re-issue" some keys) and I really don't have any big complaints other than they're a little expensive (but I keep buying them so apparently not too expensive), just a few minor things. I've never actually used the U2F ones (browser usage is ~90% Chromium, ~10% Firefox, on Linux exclusively) but maybe I'll get to someday. The NEO and Nanos get used dozens of times a day as my SSH keys (GPG subkeys) are on them. They're also used for unlocking LUKS containers at boot (challenge/response, with a "passphrase"). I do wish it was easier to load (SSL/TLS) certificates on them -- and I wish they held more of them! -- but I have a bunch of physical ("real") smart cards so I just use those instead. Ideally, I'd be able to put certificates on them and use them to authenticate (Open)VPN clients on both Linux and Windows. That might even be possible today but, if it is, it's likely way more complicated than it should be. Oh, also I used the VIP and NEO at one point with LastPass and they worked great (but I switched from LastPass when LogMeIn bought them).
- sasas 9y ago
  > Oh, also I used the VIP and NEO at one point with LastPass and they worked great Have you tried logging into LastPass on your mobile device? It doesn't require the token - effectively bypassing the point of requiring a hardware token in the first place ..
  - jlgaddis 9y ago
    I haven't, actually, but I'm not really that surprised (I moved off of LastPass two years or so ago, a few hours after they were bought). I think you can restrict access via TouchID (on the iPhone) but don't quote me on that.
  - ago 9y ago
    That was my problem first too, but you can make it require the token on mobile too. I have it set up that way and I need to tap my Yubikey NEO to authenticate using NFC on Android. Works great.
technion 9y ago
I'll repeat a comment I made last week: I love the principle, but I can't use it with AWS, I can't use it with my bank, I can't use it with my domain registrar, and I can't use it with Office 365. That's 0/4 of the high priority targets for me. Edit: If anyone from AWS is around, please consider this. Your organisation has made huge headway in the field of security, but the AWS console logon is a very high profile target.
- idlewords 9y ago
  The highest profile target is your personal email account, because that's generally the account that can reset the others. Does your email have support for U2F or at least an authenticator app?
  - technion 9y ago
    I'm running Office 365 with the only thing is supports - Microsoft's app. Which is not infallible: https://lolware.net/2017/08/01/capturing-mfa-logons.html https://lolware.net/2017/08/01/capturing-mfa-logons.html Edit: I've always felt strongly about having things like the AWS logon connected to a dedicated and otherwise unused mailbox, it helps minimise the risk discussed here.
    - ownagefool 9y ago
      Last time I used Office 365 you could disable the push requirment when configuring the auth app, that would then allow you to use alternatives. I used freeotp with my o365. :)
      - ihattendorf 9y ago
        Yep, just set it up a couple days ago. Supports Google Authenticator/Authy/etc.
    - tokenizerrr 9y ago
      > Edit: I've always felt strongly about having things like the AWS logon connected to a dedicated and otherwise unused mailbox, it helps minimise the risk discussed here. Do you check this mailbox frequently? If not, won't you miss important communication?
idlewords 9y ago
Security keys are the best. Here are step-by-step instructions for how to add one (or several) to your Gmail account: https://techsolidarity.org/resources/security_key_gmail.htm https://techsolidarity.org/resources/security_key_gmail.htm
makmanalp 9y ago
I keep asking this on every key thread and don't get great answers - shouldn't we care which ones are actually audited by a 3rd party? Should we bother at all if they aren't? It appears that most aren't, yubikey and nitrokey are the two that are.
- Tomte 9y ago
  I think U2F keys either work (obviously) or don't. How could they fail silent? Bind to another URL? No, that's a functional failure. Leak cryptographic material to an attacker? I guess not, unless the attacker controls the web browser, and then all bets are off. I'm not a security expert, so take with heaps of salt, but I can't see much exposure here.
  - icebraining 9y ago
    I guess not, unless the attacker controls the web browser, and then all bets are off. The point of U2F is to avoid trusting the system, including the browser. Otherwise, what's the point over using just a password manager?
    - Tomte 9y ago
      No, that's obviously not the point, because U2F cannot do that. The point is to combat phishing.
      - icebraining 9y ago
        Ok, fair enough; then what was the point of TOTP?
        pfg 9y ago
        TOTP keeps authentication secure in the face of password reuse/compromise. If you add a password manager to the mix, it keeps you safe in the event that only your password manager is compromised, unless you're storing your TOTP secrets in it. (All of this applies to U2F too, of course.)
pmoriarty 9y ago
My main concern is getting access when the security key breaks or I lose it. For this, it's imperative that there's either another way to get access or that I associate a 2nd security key with the service I need access to. Of course, it's possible that the 2nd key breaks or is lost. At least with hard drives, it's common for two hard drives manufactures around the same time to fail around the same time, so I'd be concerned with the possibility of that happening with the two security keys as well.
- Freak_NL 9y ago
  This holds true for any 2FA solution, and is generally solved by services that use this kind of technology (e.g., in the form of FIDO U2F) to allow you to register more than one device (so you can have a backup key) and crucially, to allow you to generate a large set of security codes that can be used once to reset access to the service. These codes you would ideally print out and store with your other valuables, or backup in some other manner not dependant on your security keys.
- chaz6 9y ago
  I have 2 keys, one stored in a safe place. They are cheap enough that you can have several, but then it becomes a challenge to keep your various accounts up to date. I wish that openid was still well supported as I would like to have one authentication provider for all my online accounts.
  - jimktrains2 9y ago
    > I would like to have one authentication provider for all my online accounts that I control and trust. Ftfy
  - Corrado 9y ago
    So, when you join a new site that supports U2F do you have to retrieve your "extra" key and join it to the site? That seems quite fragile and fraught with danger. :(
- zeeZ 9y ago
  But you wouldn't be using both hard drives at the same time. You put one in a safe (place) and only take it out for the occasional setup, maybe swap them every couple months.
hdhzy 9y ago
Unfortunately they are basically unusable on Android. Only Yubikey NEO has NFC interface and others cannot be used even by USB-C/OTG interface. The support would have to be implemented in Google Authenticator but it seems they are not interested in it.
- veeti 9y ago
  Good news, it's coming! https://developers.google.com/identity/fido/android/native-apps https://developers.google.com/identity/fido/android/native-a...
  - hdhzy 9y ago
    Could you point to where does it mention USB? I see only: > The API supports both NFC and BLE U2F devices.
    - veeti 9y ago
      Dig a little deeper: https://developers.google.com/android/reference/com/google/android/gms/fido/common/Transport https://developers.google.com/android/reference/com/google/a... I suppose USB support might need integration on the operating system level, whereas NFC and BLE can be integrated through Play Services. It's a start.
      - hdhzy 9y ago
        Great! Thanks for the reference.
- ianburrell 9y ago
  The Feitan key in article supports NFC and works on Android.
teddyh 9y ago
Not listed: http://wiki.seeed.cc/FST-01/ http://wiki.seeed.cc/FST-01/
cromantin 9y ago
I've been using Yubikey as my 2-nd factor password source for years. It's great. I would have even thrown away second factor if yubikey could have unlocked macos FileVault. What's 2-nd factor password? Well, basically yubikey stores just long text string, and another, shorter string, is stored in my brain. When i login i enter short string, then press yubikey. To steal my data you don't only need to steal yubikey but also get my part of the password from me.
- jakob223 9y ago
  If you just use the yubikey to store passwords, though, then you're vulnerable to a https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Replay_attack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Replay_attack .
  - kelnage 9y ago
    [-You would be correct if-] It seems you are correct when the protocol works as described in the parent comment. [-But it so happens that the-] Of course in OTP mode, the YubiKey protocol protects against replay attacks by using a counter on the YubiKey. This (authenticated) counter value is included in the messages that are exchanged during the authentication - and hence any replays can be detected/ignored as the counter value will be less than or equal to the last received counter value. Edit (deletions marked with [- -]): I had no idea people used modes other than OTP with their YubiKey...
    - cromantin 9y ago
      Unfortunately parent is right. What you describe is using generated one time passwords. But there is no way (to my knowledge) to incorporate 2nd string into it. Ex: right now - myPass<boop the yubikey><long password from yubikey followed by linefeed> with otp - myPass<boop><hashed and signed one time password that no nothing about myPass>
      - kelnage 9y ago
        Wow, I had no idea YubiKey offered that mode of operation. I had assumed it was purely used as a OTP. Do you know of any documentation for it?
eeZah7Ux 9y ago
FTA: "U2F Zero ... the only token on Amazon that has open source firmware (and hardware designs) ... you value the coolness factor of it being open-source" Coolness factor? The openness of software and hardware is very important for a security device as this. We should expect something so critical and simple to be easily auditable.
- vog 9y ago
  It is really a pity that FOSS is not yet a strict requirement for every security-relevant component. This is especially strange given that "Security by Obscurity doesn't work" and "Nobody can analyze code which they can't easily build and modify" are well established concepts by now.
  - dsacco 9y ago
    > Security by Obscurity doesn't work. Yes it does! This meme is both widespread and incorrect. Security by obscurity is a great layer for defense in depth. The only time it's not sane is when it's used as the only method. But that's also like saying whitelisted input or parameterized queries don't work - they don't work on their own, but all things being equal you can have very secure systems that function in an opaque way while still getting strong assurances through formal audits. > Nobody can analyze code they can't build and modify. Essentially no one analyzes open source code regardless, unless they have a financial incentive. Even if you are one of the vanishingly small number of people who inspect the code for every FOSS tool you use, you are, with probability approaching 1, incapable of identifying all potential backdoors or critical security failures. You need to balance the Platonic ideal of open software for audits with the fiscal reality that secure software is highly expensive and typically emerges as the product of well funded teams with significant expertise. This describes very few open source projects.
- dsacco 9y ago
  It's a myth that open source tools are more secure than closed source tools. Use whatever tool is put out by the team with the most expertise and the least reason to do something untrustworthy (or alternatively: the most to lose). A backdoor can persist in open source tools just as easily as it can persist in proprietary ones, and teams which make open source tools are frequently smaller and underfunded for secure feature engineering when compared to teams which develop closed source tools.
baby 9y ago
The nano is my favorite one as well. It's so unintrusive. Now I hope agl is writing this because he's looking into making these keys more useful. Because right now the usecases can be counted on one hand.
GreaterFool 9y ago
Somebody please make a Yubikey Nano like key for USB-C. Don't know what magic would be needed but need something that I can just carry with my laptop that doesn't stick out all the time. Or make it work over BLE.
- pfg 9y ago
  Yubico is working on a nano-like design for USB-C[1]. [1]: https://www.yubico.com/2017/01/yubikey-usb-c-ces2017/ https://www.yubico.com/2017/01/yubikey-usb-c-ces2017/
  - euyyn 9y ago
    That's the one Adam bought and described in the article. It totally sticks out.
    - pfg 9y ago
      It's mentioned in the last sentence of the article: > We are working on an additional smaller YubiKey form factor with a USB-C design akin to the YubiKey 4 Nano, but do not yet have a time frame for availability.
- brians 9y ago
  It's got to be BTLE: there aren't enough USB-C ports on most USB-C machines.
- deleted 9y ago
  [deleted]
anoother 9y ago
I have a HyperFIDO Mini and a Key-ID and have had no problems with them across at least 3 machines. Very surprised about them causing reboots (I assume this means hard resets?) on the reviewer's computer.
- idm_guru 9y ago
  I prefer my HyperFIDO Mini. The Nano sends OTP text if you accidentally brush into something, and it's very awkward to get out. The light is "blinding" ??? That is ridiculous...
drewg123 9y ago
What's the current state of U2F with Firefox? The last time I tried to use U2F on Firefox, I had install an extension, and I had to change my user agent string to Chrome to even be offered U2F on most sites, including my employer's DUO based auth system. This caused no end of headaches, because my employer would ... helpfully... send me nagging email about using an out-of-date browser, due to the user agent strings specifying some older version of Chrome.
- jimktrains2 9y ago
  https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1065729 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1065729 Someone wrote an add-on, but it doesn't work in nightly. https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/u2f-support-add-on/ https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/u2f-support-a...
  - drewg123 9y ago
    I think that's the extension I was using. I fear that even once Firefox has native U2F support, websites may still be checking for a Chrome agent string.
argentinaIT 9y ago
Has anyone build a U2F + PIV device? I need a device that does both u2f and digital signatures (like in standard PKI) Only nitrokey says they are working on something like that, and Yubico doesn't care to answer emails about this.
- mbthomas 9y ago
  I think the Yubico 4 series would do what you want. They supports U2F, GPG, and PIV: https://developers.yubico.com/yubico-piv-tool/YubiKey_PIV_introduction.html https://developers.yubico.com/yubico-piv-tool/YubiKey_PIV_in...
  - deleted 9y ago
    [deleted]
devy 9y ago
I just recently bought a Feitian ePass FIDO NFC U2F security key. It works great with Google, Dropbox, GitHub and Facebook. Considering Feitian ePass FIDO security key's pretty good quality (injection molded and sealed key), great price point (with the special, it was almost half the price of lowest Yubico keys yet still NFC capable), it's gonna be my next go-to choice for future U2F keys.
rthomas6 9y ago
Off topic: I like how this website is set up and would like to know how it's made. Does anyone know what CMS/static generator/whatever it's using?
saganus 9y ago
What I'd like to have is a TOTP hardware device that can store multiple keys. Even though U2F is much more secure, it seems like the adoption is a bit slow, unlike TOTP which is broadly supported in my opinion. However using TOTP with e.g. Google Authenticator makes it a pain when you lose/reset your phone, and it's harder to share, for example for administration of certain services at a company (say Heroku). If I had a chance to buy a multi-key TOTP hardware device I could enable it on every service and then give the administrators one of the devices. So yeah, ideally I'd prefer broader U2F support, but in the meantime I'd love a multi-key TOTP device, which I haven't been able to find unfortunately. Closest thing I know about is the Protectimus Slim NFC [0], but I would to need to buy two of them for each service, which gets expensive and unwieldy very fast. [0] https://www.protectimus.com/protectimus-slim-mini https://www.protectimus.com/protectimus-slim-mini
- johnmaguire2013 9y ago
  Authenticator Plus for iOS and Android supports encrypted backup of TOTP tokens to Dropbox and Google Drive. I imagine some other products do as well.
  - saganus 9y ago
    Yeah, there are definitely workarounds, but I'd rather have a hardware device than a phone, in particular so I don't have to ask employees/administrators to load stuff on their phones.
- ianburrell 9y ago
  Yubikey Neo can store multiple TOTP keys. Have to use Yubico Authenticator app to load or read them on Android phone through NFC. There is also desktop app for USB.
  - saganus 9y ago
    I was not aware of that and it does sound like a solution. However I'd love to have a hardware device that I don't need an app to use. To load the keys and configure it I have no problem with, but to actually read the TOTP it would be great if I could just click a button and read a display instead of having to use extra infrastructure. Kind of like my 2FA token for my bank, which just requires me to push a button and that's it. Thanks for the tip though.
confounded 9y ago
I imagine the answer is "because it's not on Amazon", but I wonder why they didn't review the Nitrokey? https://www.nitrokey.com/ https://www.nitrokey.com/ Despite being a little fat and ugly, it seems like the best of the devices to me (I'll be ordering one soon).

218 points by ikeboy 9y ago

These are currently Chrome only. The Firefox extension requires an external binary and doesn't work in Firefox 57 anyway. I like the idea of a physical token, but it would need to be more universally compatible, which seems difficult unless you go the route of one of those RSA tags with an LCD display on it. But there's no open standard for those, except for TOTP, and if you wanted hardware TOTP you'd need a separate dongle for every site. Inconvenient. (I wonder if you could make a TOTP dongle that can store multiple keys?) I do use TOTP, but I use 1Password, which means my keys are not confined to a single device. I wonder how much less secure this makes them, but it's probably still better than not using 2FA at all.

sowbug 9y ago
TOTP is phishable. U2F isn't. It wouldn't be good for the world if TOTP became universal, as phishing would adapt. However, the single TOTP hardware device for multiple sites that you postulate converges on the U2F design if you wrap the OTP in signatures so both sides know who they're talking to.
bugmen0t 9y ago
An upcoming Firefox release will get built-in U2F support, no need for an add-on. It already supports a softtoken (I.e., implemented in software) behind a pref. Works well for me on e.g., GitHub. But that's unlikely ever to be enabled by default in a Firefox release.
- bostik 9y ago
  This was a nice piece of news, so of course I went to check the release schedule. https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/CryptoEngineering#Web_Authentication https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/CryptoEngineering#Web_Auth... states that FF 56 or 57 should have native U2F support, and 57 or 58 would have it flipped on for everyone. Promising. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1065729 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1065729 is still open, but has seen plenty of progress. Even with current version (55), one would expect lot of the groundwork to be in place. And sure enough, searching for "u2f" in about:config brings up a nice triplet of security.webauth.u2f* keys.

jessaustin 9y ago

If you have a laptop that only has USB-C ports then a USB-A device is useless to you. Currently your only option is the Yubikey 4C at $50 a piece. Is there any reason why a $3 A-to-C adapter wouldn't work for this?

huntsman 9y ago
Yes the adapters work.
- euyyn 9y ago
  The downside is they're easy to break if they're left plugged in. I'm on my 3rd one.

stouset 9y ago

As an addendum to this, I'll relate my own experiences. The YubiKey NEO-n (and I'll assume the more recent 4 Nano) are phenomenal if you can (semi-)permanently spare a USB-A port. The ability to generate TOTPs and FIDO tokens without having to dig out your keys is an amazing convenience. Unfortunately I can't say the same for their 4C, which I'm using with the new USB-C-only MacBook Pro. The plastic it's made from begins cracking apart within a month of use, and completely disintegrates within three months, rendering the device inoperable. To their credit, Yubico has replaced my device twice so far, but how this made it past their quality control I have no idea. I deeply hope they fix the plastic durability on this device, as well as offer a nano version with USB-C support that I can leave in my laptop permanently.

kqr 9y ago
> if you can (semi-)permanently spare a USB-A port Or use subkeys most of the time and have master on dongle?
- stouset 9y ago
  I don't think this makes sense in the context of a U2F or TOTP device.
kqr 9y ago
> if you can (semi-)permanently spare a USB-A port Or use subkeys most of the time and have master on dongle?
deleted 9y ago
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deleted 9y ago

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jwcrux 9y ago

U2F/UAF/Webauthn are a really interesting chicken/egg problem. Right now, not too many providers support these auth protocols, even though they are more secure than current 2fa alternatives and provide a better user experience. The aren't widely supported because that costs development time and many of their customers don't have security keys. Customers won't buy security keys because it's an added cost that isn't supported by many websites. The author of the post briefly mentions SoftU2F at the bottom of the post, but it's important to recognize how significant SoftU2F is to the U2F ecosystem. We're just now starting to see consumer hardware come with HSM's built in. Apple SEP, Intel SGX, etc. are examples of this. SoftU2F _will_ be able to leverage these consumer HSM's to do secure crypto operations - see the pull request at [0] about storing keys in the SEP. This will effectively put U2F and UAF capability into the hands of your average consumer with no additional cost. Things can be just _built-in_, which is what it'll take to start seeing increased protocol adoption across browsers and service providers. I'm stoked about the future of security keys and the associated protocols. Both external keys and HSM's built directly into consumer hardware. [0] https://github.com/github/SoftU2F/pull/29 https://github.com/github/SoftU2F/pull/29

weeks 9y ago
While I absolutely agree with you, it seems far more likely that native implementations by Apple, Google and Microsoft will dominate the market. Windows Hello is a great early example of this.
- ptoomey3 9y ago
  SoftU2F was designed fully conscious of this. It was largely developed to help push forward the idea of a software based token with every hope that, over time, native browser and operating system implementations push things fully into the mainstream.
- jwcrux 9y ago
  I hope they do. Wouldn't that be incredible? Having _native_ U2F/UAF built right into the browser. The hard part is that there's another more subtle chicken and egg problem when it comes to software implementations and consumer HSM. Google/Apple/Microsoft will likely only really push forward native implementations when there is enough market share for consumer hardware having HSM's built in to make it worth it with feasible fallback options.

tedunangst 9y ago

Teachable moment: Five paragraphs explaining what security keys are and why they're good, then it's off to Amazon to buy one with the search phrase "U2F security token". The term U2F appears nowhere in the previous five paragraphs.

jlgaddis 9y ago
I agree that the author should've at least explained what U2F stands for (at the least) but, FWIW, both Google and Facebook just refer to them generally as "security keys" (I presume because they {do|intend to} support other types of security keys?).
- idlewords 9y ago
  I think the decision to call them 'security keys' is to avoid jargon, and to give a helpful metaphor to how they work (you need a security key to unlock your account like you need a car key to unlock your car).

voiper1 9y ago

ELI5 why these are unphishable?

Tomte 9y ago
In phishing, bad guys lure users to site B while users believe they are at site A. Users enter their credentials and game over. The important point is that users are deceived, but not the web browser. The browser knows perfectly well, that the URL is amazon.com.something.com, the problem is that it has no expectation which URL is the one the user has in mind. With a U2F key it's the same scenario. But the browser tells the key "this is for amazon.com.something.com" the key incorporates that into it's cryptographic input, so it's "bound" to that URL. Later the bad guy presents the key's output to amazon.com, and now the server has an expectation that's not fulfilled: "I'm sorry, that's not for me".
- pmoriarty 9y ago
  What happens if the attacker spoofs DNS? Also, the scheme you describe requires the user to trust the web browser. But, if the web browser is, say, on a public computer, it can't necessarily be trusted.
  - Tomte 9y ago
    a) Please describe in more detail. As long as the initial setup was with the true web site I don't see how DNS spoofing might play into it. b) Right. Perfect is the enemy of good.
  - pfg 9y ago
    > What happens if the attacker spoofs DNS? They would also have to get a publicly-trusted TLS certificate for that domain. U2F is HTTPS-only, at least on Chrome. If the attacker can do that, you have bigger problems. > Also, the scheme you describe requires the user to trust the web browser. But, if the web browser is, say, on a public computer, it can't necessarily be trusted. No one has really solved secure authentication on a compromised system. I dare say it's not a problem that can be solved.

jlgaddis 9y ago

List of sites that support 2FA (and which methods, including U2F): https://twofactorauth.org https://twofactorauth.org

jlgaddis 9y ago

I've got several (~7?) Yubikeys: one that Mt. Gox sent me several years ago (that would only work with their web site!), an old "Symantec VIP" key, a NEO that's permanently plugged into the keyboard on my workstation, a couple of Nanos (almost always plugged into a pair of laptops), and a couple of the U2F-only ones. I don't think I've ever had any issues with any of them (there was a "bug" a few years back and they had to "re-issue" some keys) and I really don't have any big complaints other than they're a little expensive (but I keep buying them so apparently not too expensive), just a few minor things. I've never actually used the U2F ones (browser usage is ~90% Chromium, ~10% Firefox, on Linux exclusively) but maybe I'll get to someday. The NEO and Nanos get used dozens of times a day as my SSH keys (GPG subkeys) are on them. They're also used for unlocking LUKS containers at boot (challenge/response, with a "passphrase"). I do wish it was easier to load (SSL/TLS) certificates on them -- and I wish they held more of them! -- but I have a bunch of physical ("real") smart cards so I just use those instead. Ideally, I'd be able to put certificates on them and use them to authenticate (Open)VPN clients on both Linux and Windows. That might even be possible today but, if it is, it's likely way more complicated than it should be. Oh, also I used the VIP and NEO at one point with LastPass and they worked great (but I switched from LastPass when LogMeIn bought them).

sasas 9y ago
> Oh, also I used the VIP and NEO at one point with LastPass and they worked great Have you tried logging into LastPass on your mobile device? It doesn't require the token - effectively bypassing the point of requiring a hardware token in the first place ..
- jlgaddis 9y ago
  I haven't, actually, but I'm not really that surprised (I moved off of LastPass two years or so ago, a few hours after they were bought). I think you can restrict access via TouchID (on the iPhone) but don't quote me on that.
- ago 9y ago
  That was my problem first too, but you can make it require the token on mobile too. I have it set up that way and I need to tap my Yubikey NEO to authenticate using NFC on Android. Works great.

technion 9y ago

I'll repeat a comment I made last week: I love the principle, but I can't use it with AWS, I can't use it with my bank, I can't use it with my domain registrar, and I can't use it with Office 365. That's 0/4 of the high priority targets for me. Edit: If anyone from AWS is around, please consider this. Your organisation has made huge headway in the field of security, but the AWS console logon is a very high profile target.

idlewords 9y ago
The highest profile target is your personal email account, because that's generally the account that can reset the others. Does your email have support for U2F or at least an authenticator app?
- technion 9y ago
  I'm running Office 365 with the only thing is supports - Microsoft's app. Which is not infallible: https://lolware.net/2017/08/01/capturing-mfa-logons.html https://lolware.net/2017/08/01/capturing-mfa-logons.html Edit: I've always felt strongly about having things like the AWS logon connected to a dedicated and otherwise unused mailbox, it helps minimise the risk discussed here.
  - ownagefool 9y ago
    Last time I used Office 365 you could disable the push requirment when configuring the auth app, that would then allow you to use alternatives. I used freeotp with my o365. :)
    - ihattendorf 9y ago
      Yep, just set it up a couple days ago. Supports Google Authenticator/Authy/etc.
  - tokenizerrr 9y ago
    > Edit: I've always felt strongly about having things like the AWS logon connected to a dedicated and otherwise unused mailbox, it helps minimise the risk discussed here. Do you check this mailbox frequently? If not, won't you miss important communication?

idlewords 9y ago

Security keys are the best. Here are step-by-step instructions for how to add one (or several) to your Gmail account: https://techsolidarity.org/resources/security_key_gmail.htm https://techsolidarity.org/resources/security_key_gmail.htm

makmanalp 9y ago

I keep asking this on every key thread and don't get great answers - shouldn't we care which ones are actually audited by a 3rd party? Should we bother at all if they aren't? It appears that most aren't, yubikey and nitrokey are the two that are.

Tomte 9y ago
I think U2F keys either work (obviously) or don't. How could they fail silent? Bind to another URL? No, that's a functional failure. Leak cryptographic material to an attacker? I guess not, unless the attacker controls the web browser, and then all bets are off. I'm not a security expert, so take with heaps of salt, but I can't see much exposure here.
- icebraining 9y ago
  I guess not, unless the attacker controls the web browser, and then all bets are off. The point of U2F is to avoid trusting the system, including the browser. Otherwise, what's the point over using just a password manager?
  - Tomte 9y ago
    No, that's obviously not the point, because U2F cannot do that. The point is to combat phishing.
    - icebraining 9y ago
      Ok, fair enough; then what was the point of TOTP?
      - pfg 9y ago
        TOTP keeps authentication secure in the face of password reuse/compromise. If you add a password manager to the mix, it keeps you safe in the event that only your password manager is compromised, unless you're storing your TOTP secrets in it. (All of this applies to U2F too, of course.)

pmoriarty 9y ago

My main concern is getting access when the security key breaks or I lose it. For this, it's imperative that there's either another way to get access or that I associate a 2nd security key with the service I need access to. Of course, it's possible that the 2nd key breaks or is lost. At least with hard drives, it's common for two hard drives manufactures around the same time to fail around the same time, so I'd be concerned with the possibility of that happening with the two security keys as well.

Freak_NL 9y ago
This holds true for any 2FA solution, and is generally solved by services that use this kind of technology (e.g., in the form of FIDO U2F) to allow you to register more than one device (so you can have a backup key) and crucially, to allow you to generate a large set of security codes that can be used once to reset access to the service. These codes you would ideally print out and store with your other valuables, or backup in some other manner not dependant on your security keys.
chaz6 9y ago
I have 2 keys, one stored in a safe place. They are cheap enough that you can have several, but then it becomes a challenge to keep your various accounts up to date. I wish that openid was still well supported as I would like to have one authentication provider for all my online accounts.
- jimktrains2 9y ago
  > I would like to have one authentication provider for all my online accounts that I control and trust. Ftfy
- Corrado 9y ago
  So, when you join a new site that supports U2F do you have to retrieve your "extra" key and join it to the site? That seems quite fragile and fraught with danger. :(
zeeZ 9y ago
But you wouldn't be using both hard drives at the same time. You put one in a safe (place) and only take it out for the occasional setup, maybe swap them every couple months.

hdhzy 9y ago

Unfortunately they are basically unusable on Android. Only Yubikey NEO has NFC interface and others cannot be used even by USB-C/OTG interface. The support would have to be implemented in Google Authenticator but it seems they are not interested in it.

veeti 9y ago
Good news, it's coming! https://developers.google.com/identity/fido/android/native-apps https://developers.google.com/identity/fido/android/native-a...
- hdhzy 9y ago
  Could you point to where does it mention USB? I see only: > The API supports both NFC and BLE U2F devices.
  - veeti 9y ago
    Dig a little deeper: https://developers.google.com/android/reference/com/google/android/gms/fido/common/Transport https://developers.google.com/android/reference/com/google/a... I suppose USB support might need integration on the operating system level, whereas NFC and BLE can be integrated through Play Services. It's a start.
    - hdhzy 9y ago
      Great! Thanks for the reference.
ianburrell 9y ago
The Feitan key in article supports NFC and works on Android.

teddyh 9y ago

Not listed: http://wiki.seeed.cc/FST-01/ http://wiki.seeed.cc/FST-01/

cromantin 9y ago

I've been using Yubikey as my 2-nd factor password source for years. It's great. I would have even thrown away second factor if yubikey could have unlocked macos FileVault. What's 2-nd factor password? Well, basically yubikey stores just long text string, and another, shorter string, is stored in my brain. When i login i enter short string, then press yubikey. To steal my data you don't only need to steal yubikey but also get my part of the password from me.

jakob223 9y ago
If you just use the yubikey to store passwords, though, then you're vulnerable to a https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Replay_attack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Replay_attack .
- kelnage 9y ago
  [-You would be correct if-] It seems you are correct when the protocol works as described in the parent comment. [-But it so happens that the-] Of course in OTP mode, the YubiKey protocol protects against replay attacks by using a counter on the YubiKey. This (authenticated) counter value is included in the messages that are exchanged during the authentication - and hence any replays can be detected/ignored as the counter value will be less than or equal to the last received counter value. Edit (deletions marked with [- -]): I had no idea people used modes other than OTP with their YubiKey...
  - cromantin 9y ago
    Unfortunately parent is right. What you describe is using generated one time passwords. But there is no way (to my knowledge) to incorporate 2nd string into it. Ex: right now - myPass<boop the yubikey><long password from yubikey followed by linefeed> with otp - myPass<boop><hashed and signed one time password that no nothing about myPass>
    - kelnage 9y ago
      Wow, I had no idea YubiKey offered that mode of operation. I had assumed it was purely used as a OTP. Do you know of any documentation for it?

eeZah7Ux 9y ago

FTA: "U2F Zero ... the only token on Amazon that has open source firmware (and hardware designs) ... you value the coolness factor of it being open-source" Coolness factor? The openness of software and hardware is very important for a security device as this. We should expect something so critical and simple to be easily auditable.

vog 9y ago
It is really a pity that FOSS is not yet a strict requirement for every security-relevant component. This is especially strange given that "Security by Obscurity doesn't work" and "Nobody can analyze code which they can't easily build and modify" are well established concepts by now.
- dsacco 9y ago
  > Security by Obscurity doesn't work. Yes it does! This meme is both widespread and incorrect. Security by obscurity is a great layer for defense in depth. The only time it's not sane is when it's used as the only method. But that's also like saying whitelisted input or parameterized queries don't work - they don't work on their own, but all things being equal you can have very secure systems that function in an opaque way while still getting strong assurances through formal audits. > Nobody can analyze code they can't build and modify. Essentially no one analyzes open source code regardless, unless they have a financial incentive. Even if you are one of the vanishingly small number of people who inspect the code for every FOSS tool you use, you are, with probability approaching 1, incapable of identifying all potential backdoors or critical security failures. You need to balance the Platonic ideal of open software for audits with the fiscal reality that secure software is highly expensive and typically emerges as the product of well funded teams with significant expertise. This describes very few open source projects.
dsacco 9y ago
It's a myth that open source tools are more secure than closed source tools. Use whatever tool is put out by the team with the most expertise and the least reason to do something untrustworthy (or alternatively: the most to lose). A backdoor can persist in open source tools just as easily as it can persist in proprietary ones, and teams which make open source tools are frequently smaller and underfunded for secure feature engineering when compared to teams which develop closed source tools.

baby 9y ago

The nano is my favorite one as well. It's so unintrusive. Now I hope agl is writing this because he's looking into making these keys more useful. Because right now the usecases can be counted on one hand.

GreaterFool 9y ago

Somebody please make a Yubikey Nano like key for USB-C. Don't know what magic would be needed but need something that I can just carry with my laptop that doesn't stick out all the time. Or make it work over BLE.

pfg 9y ago
Yubico is working on a nano-like design for USB-C[1]. [1]: https://www.yubico.com/2017/01/yubikey-usb-c-ces2017/ https://www.yubico.com/2017/01/yubikey-usb-c-ces2017/
- euyyn 9y ago
  That's the one Adam bought and described in the article. It totally sticks out.
  - pfg 9y ago
    It's mentioned in the last sentence of the article: > We are working on an additional smaller YubiKey form factor with a USB-C design akin to the YubiKey 4 Nano, but do not yet have a time frame for availability.
brians 9y ago
It's got to be BTLE: there aren't enough USB-C ports on most USB-C machines.
deleted 9y ago
[deleted]

anoother 9y ago

I have a HyperFIDO Mini and a Key-ID and have had no problems with them across at least 3 machines. Very surprised about them causing reboots (I assume this means hard resets?) on the reviewer's computer.

idm_guru 9y ago
I prefer my HyperFIDO Mini. The Nano sends OTP text if you accidentally brush into something, and it's very awkward to get out. The light is "blinding" ??? That is ridiculous...

drewg123 9y ago

What's the current state of U2F with Firefox? The last time I tried to use U2F on Firefox, I had install an extension, and I had to change my user agent string to Chrome to even be offered U2F on most sites, including my employer's DUO based auth system. This caused no end of headaches, because my employer would ... helpfully... send me nagging email about using an out-of-date browser, due to the user agent strings specifying some older version of Chrome.

jimktrains2 9y ago
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1065729 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1065729 Someone wrote an add-on, but it doesn't work in nightly. https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/u2f-support-add-on/ https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/u2f-support-a...
- drewg123 9y ago
  I think that's the extension I was using. I fear that even once Firefox has native U2F support, websites may still be checking for a Chrome agent string.

argentinaIT 9y ago

Has anyone build a U2F + PIV device? I need a device that does both u2f and digital signatures (like in standard PKI) Only nitrokey says they are working on something like that, and Yubico doesn't care to answer emails about this.

mbthomas 9y ago
I think the Yubico 4 series would do what you want. They supports U2F, GPG, and PIV: https://developers.yubico.com/yubico-piv-tool/YubiKey_PIV_introduction.html https://developers.yubico.com/yubico-piv-tool/YubiKey_PIV_in...
- deleted 9y ago
  [deleted]

devy 9y ago

I just recently bought a Feitian ePass FIDO NFC U2F security key. It works great with Google, Dropbox, GitHub and Facebook. Considering Feitian ePass FIDO security key's pretty good quality (injection molded and sealed key), great price point (with the special, it was almost half the price of lowest Yubico keys yet still NFC capable), it's gonna be my next go-to choice for future U2F keys.

rthomas6 9y ago

Off topic: I like how this website is set up and would like to know how it's made. Does anyone know what CMS/static generator/whatever it's using?

saganus 9y ago

What I'd like to have is a TOTP hardware device that can store multiple keys. Even though U2F is much more secure, it seems like the adoption is a bit slow, unlike TOTP which is broadly supported in my opinion. However using TOTP with e.g. Google Authenticator makes it a pain when you lose/reset your phone, and it's harder to share, for example for administration of certain services at a company (say Heroku). If I had a chance to buy a multi-key TOTP hardware device I could enable it on every service and then give the administrators one of the devices. So yeah, ideally I'd prefer broader U2F support, but in the meantime I'd love a multi-key TOTP device, which I haven't been able to find unfortunately. Closest thing I know about is the Protectimus Slim NFC [0], but I would to need to buy two of them for each service, which gets expensive and unwieldy very fast. [0] https://www.protectimus.com/protectimus-slim-mini https://www.protectimus.com/protectimus-slim-mini

johnmaguire2013 9y ago
Authenticator Plus for iOS and Android supports encrypted backup of TOTP tokens to Dropbox and Google Drive. I imagine some other products do as well.
- saganus 9y ago
  Yeah, there are definitely workarounds, but I'd rather have a hardware device than a phone, in particular so I don't have to ask employees/administrators to load stuff on their phones.
ianburrell 9y ago
Yubikey Neo can store multiple TOTP keys. Have to use Yubico Authenticator app to load or read them on Android phone through NFC. There is also desktop app for USB.
- saganus 9y ago
  I was not aware of that and it does sound like a solution. However I'd love to have a hardware device that I don't need an app to use. To load the keys and configure it I have no problem with, but to actually read the TOTP it would be great if I could just click a button and read a display instead of having to use extra infrastructure. Kind of like my 2FA token for my bank, which just requires me to push a button and that's it. Thanks for the tip though.

confounded 9y ago

I imagine the answer is "because it's not on Amazon", but I wonder why they didn't review the Nitrokey? https://www.nitrokey.com/ https://www.nitrokey.com/ Despite being a little fat and ugly, it seems like the best of the devices to me (I'll be ordering one soon).

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