4 ms·
This is idiocy. Modern drives AES encrypt data to provide whitening. You do not have the key nor do you set it or care for it. Without it you'll not be able to
by dmitrygr 9y ago
This is idiocy. Modern drives AES encrypt data to provide whitening. You do not have the key nor do you set it or care for it. Without it you'll not be able to pull this off. Their attack will only work on very old SSDs that do not whiten data. All modern MLC/TLC chips REQUIRE whitening and AES is often used since it whitens well and is fast.
- dom0 9y agoNot necessarily. Depending on the mode bitflips produce predictable results and a SSD probably does not authenticate blocks.
- dmitrygr 9y agoAES is not linear thanks to the SubBytes step. You don't know the key. Good luck :)
- dom0 9y agoAES being linear or not is wholly irrelevant for this. I recommend you read this article: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation
- dmitrygr 9y agoPlease explain how you'll mutate a single bit of output given only input and no knowledge of key
- snakeanus 9y agoIf you use a mode like CTR you just flip the corresponding ciphertext bit. As for CBC there are padding-oracle attacks.
- tedunangst 9y agoDo SSDs use CTR mode? How does one perform a padding oracle against an SSD? I feel like we're pretty far away from the relevant context, which is users corrupting data on an SSD.
- heheocoenev 9y agoXTS mode for block storage. Can't be CBC or CTR, where would you Store the IV or counter/nonce?
- Scaevolus 9y agoYou could store it in the block metadata, which SSD flash translation layers already use for wear-leveling purposes.
- tedunangst 9y agoThis sounds more like random speculation than informed commentary.
- rlanday 9y agoDoes the SSD let you read the raw ciphertext to perform that attack? Or does it only expose the decrypted data?
- dmitrygr 9y agoThere is no documented way to read cyphertext. I am SURE some manufacturer specific commands exist. But they will likely be undocumented, model-specific, and may be locked away behind a manufacturer key
- bsder 9y agohttps://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blog/2009/july/if-youre-typing-the-letters-a-e-s-into-your-code-youre-doing-it-wrong/ https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/b...
- lightedman 9y ago"Please explain how you'll mutate a single bit of output given only input" Same way Rowhammer works. Exploiting a physical vulnerability gives zero damns about encryption. Now whether you get VALID or USABLE data from the attack is an entirely different story.
- burkaman 9y agoThis would be a much more productive comment if you took out the first sentence.
- wtallis 9y agoSome mention needs to be made of how unreasonably sensationalized the article is.
- burkaman 9y agoIt doesn't seem sensationalized to me, but I don't know much about the domain. Other ways to phrase a comment are "This isn't very dangerous in practice" or "This won't work on modern hardware" or "The risk in this article is exaggerated".
- wtallis 9y agoTrust me, it's sensationalized to the point of being highly irresponsible reporting. This research first made the rounds early this year, and I analyzed it in depth. Properly explaining all the caveats behind this "attack" requires more space than this entire article. Among other things, making a successful attack would require sufficient privilege level to bypass all layers of read caches (and probably also all write caches), a target SSD that doesn't use modern 3D NAND, and intimate knowledge of the internals of the SSD controller and firmware, potentially up to the internal state of the LFSR or AES used to scramble data before it is written to the flash. There's interesting stuff in this research; it highlights aspects of the unreliability of flash memory that I haven't previously seen emphasized so clearly. But since everything about SSD design already assumes that the flash memory is thoroughly unreliable and untrustworthy, these corner cases don't rise to the level of a real-world vulnerability.
- jontro 9y agoThis is the paper https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b9bc/a3c9f531002854af48de121cdcc8e0520c7f.pdf https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b9bc/a3c9f531002854af48de12... that this is based on. They claim to be able to extract the key using hdparm. Afaik that needs elevated permissions to run.
- street 9y agoDoes flipping a bit in the ciphertext not flip the same bit in the plain text, for naive implementations?
- dmitrygr 9y agoNo because of SubBytes step
- czinck 9y agoAES and similar algorithms are specifically designed to not do that, because otherwise details of the ciphertext leak details about the plaintext. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Differential_cryptanalysis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Differential_cryptanalysis is about exploiting any unintentional leak of info like that.
- rocqua 9y agoAES in CTR mode does work like that. So do most stream ciphers. Differential cryptanalysis is not about defending against bit-flips. Instead, it is about comparing two cipher texts to learn something about the relation between corresponding plain-text. This is only possible on AES-CTR if you have to ciphertexts with the same key and nonce/IV. This is why a nonce is supposed to be used only once. Same goes for other xor based stream ciphers.
- the8472 9y agoNot all cipher modes are immalleable.
- dmitrygr 9y agoAES without a known key doesn't allow modifications of a single output bit by only modifying plaintext and having no way to observe cyphertext.
- tedunangst 9y agoAnd which cipher modes are used by SSDs?
- dom0 9y agoLooking at this thread of comments a couple hours later, clearly, no one has an idea (so any security cleams seem unbased).
- dijit 9y agoYou're right. The AES key used on _all_ drives is 8bytes. 00000000 If it's anything else the user would have to enter the key. So in practice, it's not /really/ encrypted.
- Piskvorrr 9y agoNope. The drive's firmware generates the key pseudorandomly when it receives the "securely wipe drive" command, this happens at least once before the drive is shipped from a factory. Thence, the key remains unchanged, unless another "securely wipe drive" command is received. This happens transparently to the user.
- leereeves 9y agoEvery SSD works that way? Is that a standard?
- Piskvorrr 9y agoBog-standard. As mentioned in sibling thread, you could find really old SSDs without this feature, but they're getting rare.
- ericseppanen 9y agoDrives that lack cryptographic scrambling are not rare. Search a few vendors' sites and you'll find some that don't support "self-encrypting" capabilities.
- wtallis 9y agoIt's pretty common for drives to have hardware AES support even if they don't implement the full TCG Opal feature set for use as a "self encrypting drive". I think Phison is the only SSD controller vendor that doesn't advertise encryption capability on all of their mainstream SSD controllers.
- 9y ago
- ericseppanen 9y agoGood modern SSDs do this. Cheap SSDs use only a non-cryptographic scrambler.