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Only if you have some sort of trust in the putative other party. I don't trust news.ycombinator.com more than I trust some rando pretending to be news.ycombinat
by bandrami 9y ago
Only if you have some sort of trust in the putative other party. I don't trust news.ycombinator.com more than I trust some rando pretending to be news.ycombinator.com, so domain validation here is pointless for me. It's nice to know that, whatever entity I'm communicating with, the message was not altered or inspected in transit.
- Ajedi32 9y ago> I don't trust news.ycombinator.com more than I trust some rando pretending to be news.ycombinator.com, so domain validation here is pointless for me. Okay, so if you try to connect to news.ycombinator.com and instead get connected to a random MITM attacker who then connects to the real news.ycombinator.com and proxies your traffic, you're fine with that? > It's nice to know that, whatever entity I'm communicating with, the message was not altered or inspected in transit. So just so long as another MITM attacker can't inspect or alter your messages to the first MITM attacker you're fine? I'm having trouble following your logic here. Again, without some way to validate that the certificate you're using is controlled by the website you intended to connect to, you might as well not be using TLS at all; it's completely pointless.
- bandrami 9y agoOkay, so if you try to connect to news.ycombinator.com and instead get connected to a random MITM attacker who then connects to the real news.ycombinator.com and proxies your traffic, you're fine with that? Right. Why would I trust ycombinator.com more than the MITMer? I have zero actual experience with YC, so any information I give them is by definition information I would give to an untrusted party.
- Ajedi32 9y ago> any information I give them is by definition information I would give to an untrusted party Including your password to the real news.ycombinator.com?