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> Tell me, what intractable problem are "value systems" and "moral codes" heuristics for? Suppose you already have a solution in-hand for determining what the

> Tell me, what intractable problem are "value systems" and "moral codes" heuristics for? Suppose you already have a solution in-hand for determining what the "best world" is, and everyone agrees on this definition of what is "right" and "good". Now, can you calculate with any accuracy what actions each person should take in order for us all to arrive at that "best world"? I think it's clear to most people who have taken an algorithms course that such a calculation -- even with perfect knowledge about the current and future state of the world -- is completely and totally intractable. (And besides, it doesn't take an algorithms course to notice we don't have that perfect knowledge; I don't even know if it will rain this afternoon.) Value systems and moral codes -- e.g., "no stealing and no murdering except in X,Y,Z cases" -- provide us with a set of heuristics that while perhaps not optimal at least seem to keep us in decently good steady states for a while. > The hypothetico-dialectical method of talking about morality, as if it was simultaneously mathematics and politics, has always confused me. The point is to explore the theoretical limits of what's even possible. If we can show that something is impossible even in a highly idealized setting, then we can probably conclude that the same thing is impossible in more messy settings. Of course, "all models are wrong" and all that. But if pure consequentialism doesn't work well even in the most ideal of settings, that might be a good indicator that it also doesn't work well in far more messy settings. > Plainly there ought to be some observable evidence that we've done the right thing Why is that so "plain"? Besides, "what should I do?" is a far more... timely... question than "did I just do the right thing?" > or the term "right" has no meaning at all other than "theorem within a politically fashionable consistent axiom schema." Outside of religious and spiritual folks, I think most people agree that morality is socially constructed.

eli_gottlieb 9y ago
>Suppose you already have a solution in-hand for determining what the "best world" is, and everyone agrees on this definition of what is "right" and "good". It doesn't matter whether people agree with it. It matters whether it's actually correct, and actually refers to real things. >Outside of religious and spiritual folks, I think most people agree that morality is socially constructed. Then stop talking about morality already. There's no point in spending massive sums of effort, money, and even military manpower on made-up constructions if you know damn well they're made up. (Mind, I don't think morality is made up: I'm a moral realist. Of course, religious folks aren't moral realists, they're usually just plain confused about what counts as "real", as are you, since you appear to think "real morality" means "morality enforced by a giant authority figure in the sky".)
- mistermann 9y ago
  > It doesn't matter whether people agree with it. It matters whether it's actually correct, and actually refers to real things. This debate suggests that is not a safe assumption. > There's no point If it redirects money, there certainly is a point.
  - eli_gottlieb 9y ago
    If someone is redirecting money by reference to things which apparently do not exist, it should be pointed out that they're duping everyone else, and that, so to speak, humanity will not be free until the last stone of the last church is cast upon the last priest. Or people could just admit moral realism every time they try to argue moral stuff. You know. Alternatives.
- throwawayjava 9y ago
  > It matters whether it's actually correct, and actually refers to real things. You're completely missing my point. Replace the quoted sentence with "Suppose you already have an actually correct morality that refers to real things". The computational intractability argument remains a damning condemnation of consequentialism. Just because you can state the theorem doesn't mean you can find the witnessing construction. > Then stop talking about morality already Just because things are socially constructed doesn't mean they aren't valuable, and it also doesn't mean that they have no effect on our lives. > There's no point in spending massive sums of effort, money, and even military manpower on made-up constructions if you know damn well they're made up. Why not? Why can't we just say some things are "self-evident" and worth fighting for? And if this is true, then why are moral considerations such potent rhetorical devices? The only possible explanation I can think of is extraordinarily condescending. > I'm a moral realist Now I'm even more confused. First, the realists play this game all the time; each branch of moral realism basically corresponds to a different -- usually embarrassingly pseudo-scientific -- way of justifying a priori ethical concerns. From my perspective, moral realism isn't an escape from the problem; it's just a way of ignoring the actually hard problem and playing games that are completely parametric in the actually hard problems. Second, the view of morality as a social construction isn't even inconsistent with moral realism as long as you're willing to go past whatever nice distinctions make for easy-to-grade multiple choice exams in PHIL 101. E.g., one plausible (and, per usual, embarrassingly pseudo-scientific) hypothesis bridging this divide is that morality is a social construction that necessarily arises from ethical intuitions that have a physiological basis.

eli_gottlieb 9y ago

>Suppose you already have a solution in-hand for determining what the "best world" is, and everyone agrees on this definition of what is "right" and "good". It doesn't matter whether people agree with it. It matters whether it's actually correct, and actually refers to real things. >Outside of religious and spiritual folks, I think most people agree that morality is socially constructed. Then stop talking about morality already. There's no point in spending massive sums of effort, money, and even military manpower on made-up constructions if you know damn well they're made up. (Mind, I don't think morality is made up: I'm a moral realist. Of course, religious folks aren't moral realists, they're usually just plain confused about what counts as "real", as are you, since you appear to think "real morality" means "morality enforced by a giant authority figure in the sky".)

mistermann 9y ago
> It doesn't matter whether people agree with it. It matters whether it's actually correct, and actually refers to real things. This debate suggests that is not a safe assumption. > There's no point If it redirects money, there certainly is a point.
- eli_gottlieb 9y ago
  If someone is redirecting money by reference to things which apparently do not exist, it should be pointed out that they're duping everyone else, and that, so to speak, humanity will not be free until the last stone of the last church is cast upon the last priest. Or people could just admit moral realism every time they try to argue moral stuff. You know. Alternatives.
throwawayjava 9y ago
> It matters whether it's actually correct, and actually refers to real things. You're completely missing my point. Replace the quoted sentence with "Suppose you already have an actually correct morality that refers to real things". The computational intractability argument remains a damning condemnation of consequentialism. Just because you can state the theorem doesn't mean you can find the witnessing construction. > Then stop talking about morality already Just because things are socially constructed doesn't mean they aren't valuable, and it also doesn't mean that they have no effect on our lives. > There's no point in spending massive sums of effort, money, and even military manpower on made-up constructions if you know damn well they're made up. Why not? Why can't we just say some things are "self-evident" and worth fighting for? And if this is true, then why are moral considerations such potent rhetorical devices? The only possible explanation I can think of is extraordinarily condescending. > I'm a moral realist Now I'm even more confused. First, the realists play this game all the time; each branch of moral realism basically corresponds to a different -- usually embarrassingly pseudo-scientific -- way of justifying a priori ethical concerns. From my perspective, moral realism isn't an escape from the problem; it's just a way of ignoring the actually hard problem and playing games that are completely parametric in the actually hard problems. Second, the view of morality as a social construction isn't even inconsistent with moral realism as long as you're willing to go past whatever nice distinctions make for easy-to-grade multiple choice exams in PHIL 101. E.g., one plausible (and, per usual, embarrassingly pseudo-scientific) hypothesis bridging this divide is that morality is a social construction that necessarily arises from ethical intuitions that have a physiological basis.