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You are suggesting that there may be some aspect of humans which (a) can be observed by another un-augmented human over a low-bandwidth TTY and (b) can never --

You are suggesting that there may be some aspect of humans which (a) can be observed by another un-augmented human over a low-bandwidth TTY and (b) can never -- at any point in the future -- be simulated by a computer, no matter how complicated the algorithm or how powerful the computer. While I admit that this is possible, it strikes me as implausible for the following reason: the capabilities of computers are increasing as time goes by, while those of humans are not (the Flynn effect notwithstanding). I could understand if you were to say that we won't have the technology to make computers that pass the Turing Test in the next x years, for a sufficiently large x. But you are suggesting that it is plausible that we will never do it, in the same sense that a physical object will never move faster than the speed of light. In the absence of a well-accepted theory supported by evidence (as we have for the limit of the speed of light), this strikes me as a very strong claim that is difficult to defend given the existence of technological evolution in the world.

gruseom 19y ago
At this point I can only appeal back to what I already said: it depends on whether or not there's an algorithm for everything. If this is true, then sure: assuming enough processing power (and programming power), anything can be simulated. And if it's not true, well, it follows that there's a hard limit, à la your speed-of-light analogy, to what computers will ever be capable of. Doesn't it? How is that a strong claim? I don't state that the "algorithms for everything" thesis is true or false, because I don't know. Nobody does. My point is that singularianism depends on a belief about this; a belief that is, based on what we currently know, rather miraculous, and therefore not very hard to dispute. Thanks, by the way, for quoting me as saying "may be". I was starting to doubt my ability to get my point across!
- bumbledraven 19y ago
  [I]t depends on whether or not there's an algorithm for everything. We already know that there is not an algorithm for everything. Indeed, Turing himself showed that there is not an algorithm for solving the halting problem <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem>. But that has no bearing on whether or not there exists an algorithm that would someday allow a computer to pass the Turing Test.
  - gruseom 19y ago
    Replace that phrase with algorithm for everything that's intrinsic to being human. Or, if you prefer, algorithm for everything necessary to simulate being human sufficiently well to consistently fool humans via low-bandwidth TTY. My point remains the same: it's a belief either way. And throwing processing power at it will only yield the predicted effect in one of those cases. Edit: the existence of undecidability results (and the general failure of the formalist project) ought to make us more, not less skeptical of grandiose claims concerning computability.
    - bumbledraven 19y ago
      [I]t depends on whether or not there's an algorithm for everything necessary to simulate being human sufficiently well to consistently fool humans via low-bandwidth TTY. But clearly such an algorithm does exist, so this objection fails. Its existence follows from these facts: (1) only a fixed amount of data in the form of questions can flow through the low-bandwidth TTY, (2) only a fixed amount of data in the form of responses can be sent back back, and (3) there exists an algorithm for any function with a bounded input and output. (To see this, note that the algorithm could consist of a lookup table containing a correct output for each of the finite number of inputs it has to deal with.) I concede that it is another matter entirely whether or not we will ever discover such an algorithm and implement it on a sufficiently powerful computer. But the fact that an algorithm for passing the Test must exist takes the discussion out of the realm of physical and/or philosophical possibility and into the realm of technology and engineering.
      - gruseom 19y ago
        Uh oh, you got technical on me! It's been a long time since I've studied this stuff, but for what it's worth, your argument feels incorrect to me. It might not be possible to address that effectively here, but let me try. Let's call a particular run of the Turing test a "Turing dialog". Say a Turing dialog D consists of alternating statements C1,H1,...,Cn,Hn where C stands for "computer" and H for "human". Say a "successful Turing dialog" is one that succeeds in fooling the human participant - that is, Hn is something like "I think you're human". You're right that for any Turing dialog D, D is finite and therefore an algorithm exists to reproduce it (a simple lookup table will do). But such an algorithm is only good for one specific D. To build it, you'd have to know all of D in advance. To pass the Turing test, we need more. We need an algorithm, which, given any valid prefix of a Turing dialog, i.e. any sequence C1,H1,...,Ck,Hk, knows how to produce Ck+1 in such a way that the dialog will end successfully. That's not the same thing, is it?

gruseom 19y ago

At this point I can only appeal back to what I already said: it depends on whether or not there's an algorithm for everything. If this is true, then sure: assuming enough processing power (and programming power), anything can be simulated. And if it's not true, well, it follows that there's a hard limit, à la your speed-of-light analogy, to what computers will ever be capable of. Doesn't it? How is that a strong claim? I don't state that the "algorithms for everything" thesis is true or false, because I don't know. Nobody does. My point is that singularianism depends on a belief about this; a belief that is, based on what we currently know, rather miraculous, and therefore not very hard to dispute. Thanks, by the way, for quoting me as saying "may be". I was starting to doubt my ability to get my point across!

bumbledraven 19y ago
[I]t depends on whether or not there's an algorithm for everything. We already know that there is not an algorithm for everything. Indeed, Turing himself showed that there is not an algorithm for solving the halting problem <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem>. But that has no bearing on whether or not there exists an algorithm that would someday allow a computer to pass the Turing Test.
- gruseom 19y ago
  Replace that phrase with algorithm for everything that's intrinsic to being human. Or, if you prefer, algorithm for everything necessary to simulate being human sufficiently well to consistently fool humans via low-bandwidth TTY. My point remains the same: it's a belief either way. And throwing processing power at it will only yield the predicted effect in one of those cases. Edit: the existence of undecidability results (and the general failure of the formalist project) ought to make us more, not less skeptical of grandiose claims concerning computability.
  - bumbledraven 19y ago
    [I]t depends on whether or not there's an algorithm for everything necessary to simulate being human sufficiently well to consistently fool humans via low-bandwidth TTY. But clearly such an algorithm does exist, so this objection fails. Its existence follows from these facts: (1) only a fixed amount of data in the form of questions can flow through the low-bandwidth TTY, (2) only a fixed amount of data in the form of responses can be sent back back, and (3) there exists an algorithm for any function with a bounded input and output. (To see this, note that the algorithm could consist of a lookup table containing a correct output for each of the finite number of inputs it has to deal with.) I concede that it is another matter entirely whether or not we will ever discover such an algorithm and implement it on a sufficiently powerful computer. But the fact that an algorithm for passing the Test must exist takes the discussion out of the realm of physical and/or philosophical possibility and into the realm of technology and engineering.
    - gruseom 19y ago
      Uh oh, you got technical on me! It's been a long time since I've studied this stuff, but for what it's worth, your argument feels incorrect to me. It might not be possible to address that effectively here, but let me try. Let's call a particular run of the Turing test a "Turing dialog". Say a Turing dialog D consists of alternating statements C1,H1,...,Cn,Hn where C stands for "computer" and H for "human". Say a "successful Turing dialog" is one that succeeds in fooling the human participant - that is, Hn is something like "I think you're human". You're right that for any Turing dialog D, D is finite and therefore an algorithm exists to reproduce it (a simple lookup table will do). But such an algorithm is only good for one specific D. To build it, you'd have to know all of D in advance. To pass the Turing test, we need more. We need an algorithm, which, given any valid prefix of a Turing dialog, i.e. any sequence C1,H1,...,Ck,Hk, knows how to produce Ck+1 in such a way that the dialog will end successfully. That's not the same thing, is it?