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[Consciousness] is human. If one or more aspects of being human aren't computable, then it's plausible that computers will never pass the Turing test. You seem

[Consciousness] is human. If one or more aspects of being human aren't computable, then it's plausible that computers will never pass the Turing test. You seem to be saying that a computer would have to actually be human or be conscious in order to pass the Turing Test. But passing the Test only requires the computer to simulate some observable behaviors of a conscious human well enough to fool a skilled interrogator. In particular, it only has to simulate those behaviors that are observable through a low-bandwidth TTY. I suppose one could argue that there simply does not exist an algorithm that could pass the Turing test (when run on a the powerful computers of the future), but that seems like a very hard case to make, particularly here on Hacker News. One could instead try to argue that though such an algorithm may exist, we will never find it, but that doesn't seem to be what you are saying either.

gruseom 19y ago
I'm not saying there simply does not exist such an algorithm; I don't have an opinion on that one way or the other. I'm questioning your claim that "it would be very hard to argue that the singularity won't arrive eventually" because "eventually there will be machines that are capable of passing the Turing test" (emphasis added). You don't know that. Nobody does. Some people like the idea, some people don't; it's wishful thinking on both sides. My point was to offer one possible scenario under which computers might not pass the Turing test: namely, if there turns out to be some essential aspect of humans (capable of being observed through a low-bandwidth TTY, if you insist) that can't be captured algorithmically. Consciousness might be one such feature. (It's a reasonable one to suggest for two reasons: it's central to human existence and no one has a clue what it is.) "We'll just simulate it, then" is, in my view, a dodge. If there isn't an algorithm for X, why should there necessarily be one that approximates X arbitrarily closely? Partisans of the "singularity" are fond of insisting that it's all a matter of processing power, but that's only true if there's an algorithm for everything. That blithe assumption seems to me an article of faith. It reminds me of G.K. Chesterton's line, "Give us one free miracle and we'll explain everything."
- rms 19y ago
  Why is consciousness special? What do you think about IBM's project to simulate a rat brain neuron by neuron?
  - gruseom 19y ago
    I'm not sure consciousness is special (or what "special" means). I brought it up as an example. But it doesn't really matter. "What if consciousness is not an algorithm" is just a special case of "What if not everything about humans is computable". That's the real point. Any grandiose claim about this seems to me laughably unsubstantiated. Yet there it is, giggling underneath the solemnity of the Singularians. Edit: don't know about the rat project. Curious to know the results.
- bumbledraven 19y ago
  You are suggesting that there may be some aspect of humans which (a) can be observed by another un-augmented human over a low-bandwidth TTY and (b) can never -- at any point in the future -- be simulated by a computer, no matter how complicated the algorithm or how powerful the computer. While I admit that this is possible, it strikes me as implausible for the following reason: the capabilities of computers are increasing as time goes by, while those of humans are not (the Flynn effect notwithstanding). I could understand if you were to say that we won't have the technology to make computers that pass the Turing Test in the next x years, for a sufficiently large x. But you are suggesting that it is plausible that we will never do it, in the same sense that a physical object will never move faster than the speed of light. In the absence of a well-accepted theory supported by evidence (as we have for the limit of the speed of light), this strikes me as a very strong claim that is difficult to defend given the existence of technological evolution in the world.
  - gruseom 19y ago
    At this point I can only appeal back to what I already said: it depends on whether or not there's an algorithm for everything. If this is true, then sure: assuming enough processing power (and programming power), anything can be simulated. And if it's not true, well, it follows that there's a hard limit, à la your speed-of-light analogy, to what computers will ever be capable of. Doesn't it? How is that a strong claim? I don't state that the "algorithms for everything" thesis is true or false, because I don't know. Nobody does. My point is that singularianism depends on a belief about this; a belief that is, based on what we currently know, rather miraculous, and therefore not very hard to dispute. Thanks, by the way, for quoting me as saying "may be". I was starting to doubt my ability to get my point across!

gruseom 19y ago

I'm not saying there simply does not exist such an algorithm; I don't have an opinion on that one way or the other. I'm questioning your claim that "it would be very hard to argue that the singularity won't arrive eventually" because "eventually there will be machines that are capable of passing the Turing test" (emphasis added). You don't know that. Nobody does. Some people like the idea, some people don't; it's wishful thinking on both sides. My point was to offer one possible scenario under which computers might not pass the Turing test: namely, if there turns out to be some essential aspect of humans (capable of being observed through a low-bandwidth TTY, if you insist) that can't be captured algorithmically. Consciousness might be one such feature. (It's a reasonable one to suggest for two reasons: it's central to human existence and no one has a clue what it is.) "We'll just simulate it, then" is, in my view, a dodge. If there isn't an algorithm for X, why should there necessarily be one that approximates X arbitrarily closely? Partisans of the "singularity" are fond of insisting that it's all a matter of processing power, but that's only true if there's an algorithm for everything. That blithe assumption seems to me an article of faith. It reminds me of G.K. Chesterton's line, "Give us one free miracle and we'll explain everything."

rms 19y ago
Why is consciousness special? What do you think about IBM's project to simulate a rat brain neuron by neuron?
- gruseom 19y ago
  I'm not sure consciousness is special (or what "special" means). I brought it up as an example. But it doesn't really matter. "What if consciousness is not an algorithm" is just a special case of "What if not everything about humans is computable". That's the real point. Any grandiose claim about this seems to me laughably unsubstantiated. Yet there it is, giggling underneath the solemnity of the Singularians. Edit: don't know about the rat project. Curious to know the results.
bumbledraven 19y ago
You are suggesting that there may be some aspect of humans which (a) can be observed by another un-augmented human over a low-bandwidth TTY and (b) can never -- at any point in the future -- be simulated by a computer, no matter how complicated the algorithm or how powerful the computer. While I admit that this is possible, it strikes me as implausible for the following reason: the capabilities of computers are increasing as time goes by, while those of humans are not (the Flynn effect notwithstanding). I could understand if you were to say that we won't have the technology to make computers that pass the Turing Test in the next x years, for a sufficiently large x. But you are suggesting that it is plausible that we will never do it, in the same sense that a physical object will never move faster than the speed of light. In the absence of a well-accepted theory supported by evidence (as we have for the limit of the speed of light), this strikes me as a very strong claim that is difficult to defend given the existence of technological evolution in the world.
- gruseom 19y ago
  At this point I can only appeal back to what I already said: it depends on whether or not there's an algorithm for everything. If this is true, then sure: assuming enough processing power (and programming power), anything can be simulated. And if it's not true, well, it follows that there's a hard limit, à la your speed-of-light analogy, to what computers will ever be capable of. Doesn't it? How is that a strong claim? I don't state that the "algorithms for everything" thesis is true or false, because I don't know. Nobody does. My point is that singularianism depends on a belief about this; a belief that is, based on what we currently know, rather miraculous, and therefore not very hard to dispute. Thanks, by the way, for quoting me as saying "may be". I was starting to doubt my ability to get my point across!