4 ms·
I never understood how these side-channel attacks can possibly succeed. So many other factors can dominate checking a single character in RAM. Seriously? How wo
by EGreg 9y ago
I never understood how these side-channel attacks can possibly succeed. So many other factors can dominate checking a single character in RAM. Seriously? How would that even work!
- ryebit 9y agoNot an expert, but from what I understand, many of these attacks rely on being able to make LOTS of attempts (on order of thousands/millions). Any factor which doesn't correlate directly to the username & password inputs should approach a constant as the sample size grows, since it's timing distribution (by definition) isn't affected by changes in the user/password inputs. This is especially true of things like adding a random amount of delay. That said, I'm curious as to how well that plays out in the real world, particularly over a noisy connection. --- But if it is feasible, the best method to defeat it is probably rate-limiting. That then gets tricky. You can rate limit on username alone, IP address alone, or a complex derivative of them (e.g. to detect botnets). But all those approaches introduce their own DDOS and scalability issues.
- davis_m 9y agoRemember that many services are running in a cloud computing environment. Attackers can spin up machines right next to those that they are attacking and bypass much of the network related variables. Timing attacks aren't as simple as often presented. Writers often give a set time for checking each character and ignore all other operations in order to make the issue easy to understand, but most people use this to write off the attack altogether. Surely it can't be that simple. It isn't trivial to take advantage of timing attacks remotely, but researchers have shown that they are definitely exploitable. [1][2] [1] https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf [2] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Morgan-Web-Timing-Attacks-Made-Practical-wp.pdf https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Morgan-W...
- joombaga 9y ago> Attackers can spin up machines right next to those that they are attacking and bypass much of the network related variables. Can they? Do cloud providers typically short circuit routes within their public address space? At least in AWS, this is not the case unless e.g. vpc peering is used. On second thought, even if the attacker egresses via their internet gateway, the next hop will be pretty close to their victim.
- appleflaxen 9y agoby performing the same operation repeatedly and taking the average measurement, you can separate the effect on latency caused by the password length vs. all the other things going on with the system.
- prashnts 9y agoWhile not exactly the same thing, this Browser based timing [1] attack is a pretty good demonstration. [1] https://labs.tom.vg/browser-based-timing-attacks/ https://labs.tom.vg/browser-based-timing-attacks/
- chowells 9y agoWhy not actually try it? Write a timing attack. I've done it before, against a server that deliberately had a vulnerability left on it. A super-naive approach with no statistical rigor managed to produce usable results at a slow-but-practical rate. Improved technique would have made it faster and less noisy. The big realization you quickly make is that partial accuracy is good enough to in a vast majority of cases. Sure, 100% accuracy is hard. But 50% accuracy is both surprisingly easy and surprisingly powerful.
- EGreg 9y agoHow were you able to make the timing attack work? Each letter takes like a nanosecond to test! And the rest of the time is dominated by random noise.