> The hacks at Defcon all took a long time to do 90 minutes or less, from unprepared attendees, some of which didn't even know they would be seeing a voting ma

> The hacks at Defcon all took a long time to do 90 minutes or less, from unprepared attendees, some of which didn't even know they would be seeing a voting machine that day [1]. > Also voting machines generally have paper copies that print off the back of the machine This wasn't always the case, and a few bad elections happens from 2004-2006 as a result. There is also not a guarantee the voter has checked/understood the paper receipt. Overall the concept helps quite a bit. > The only plausible hack would be an inside job Polling station staffers are volunteers, and there are lots of them. Not particularly difficult. Voting machines themselves are known to store results in unencrypted, easily editable MS Access databases. This allows editing/suppression of votes en masse with no trail. If said attacker can find a way to also tamper with the paper receipts (print a different result that the voter doesn't notice, or don't print at all, or make the printout unreadable), mass shenanigans could ensue. All this just to say, "hey, it uses paper for verification on the backend, so it's fine." But we're paying companies to develop insecure machines, training voters to trust them, and bringing the integrity of our democracy into question along the way. Just fill out a piece of paper. It's not that hard to count the votes. 1. http://fortune.com/2017/07/31/defcon-hackers-us-voting-machines/ http://fortune.com/2017/07/31/defcon-hackers-us-voting-machi...