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https://www.quaxio.com/simple_auditable_anonymous_voting_scheme/ https://www.quaxio.com/simple_auditable_anonymous_voting_sch... explains how to create a toy vo

https://www.quaxio.com/simple_auditable_anonymous_voting_scheme/ https://www.quaxio.com/simple_auditable_anonymous_voting_sch... explains how to create a toy voting system which both preserves privacy and where everyone can tally the votes. If you were to actually build something like this, you would use blind signature. But having this toy example shows that the two concepts aren't exclusif.

specialist 9y ago
All crypto schemes I studied rely on hash collisions. Meaning your ballot is hidden within a herd of ballots. This works for hypothetical elections where there are lots of voters and simple ballots. Alas. Our actual elections are administered per precinct (say 0 - 1000 voters) and have complicated ballots (dozens of issues, races). Meaning your utterly unique ballot is unlikely to collide with any other cast ballot. The blockchain-based schemes I briefly studied rely on fuzzing timestamps. A different kind of collision. Here's the takeaway: Our elections administration is finely tuned to the Australian Ballot. Any new voting system has to specify the style of ballot, which circumstances are applicable, and how the laws, rules, and procedures will have to be modified to adopt it.
- amenghra 9y ago
  Did you even read the link I posted? It's a voting scheme which is anonymous and auditable. It can be turned into a usable system using blind signatures. Nowhere does it mention hash collisions.
  - deleted 9y ago
    [deleted]
  - specialist 9y ago
    You're right. I didn't bother. I just now went back and parsed it. You're right. No hash collision (shuffle) in that arm waving proposal. So there's no attempt to anonymize the voter's identity. Votes cast and recorded in order deanonymize the ballots. If the order is not recorded then the election cannot be audited. As I hinted (elsewhere), the blockchain proposals fudge the timestamp (when the ballot is cast) in an attempt to anonymize the voter.

specialist 9y ago

All crypto schemes I studied rely on hash collisions. Meaning your ballot is hidden within a herd of ballots. This works for hypothetical elections where there are lots of voters and simple ballots. Alas. Our actual elections are administered per precinct (say 0 - 1000 voters) and have complicated ballots (dozens of issues, races). Meaning your utterly unique ballot is unlikely to collide with any other cast ballot. The blockchain-based schemes I briefly studied rely on fuzzing timestamps. A different kind of collision. Here's the takeaway: Our elections administration is finely tuned to the Australian Ballot. Any new voting system has to specify the style of ballot, which circumstances are applicable, and how the laws, rules, and procedures will have to be modified to adopt it.

amenghra 9y ago
Did you even read the link I posted? It's a voting scheme which is anonymous and auditable. It can be turned into a usable system using blind signatures. Nowhere does it mention hash collisions.
- deleted 9y ago
  [deleted]
- specialist 9y ago
  You're right. I didn't bother. I just now went back and parsed it. You're right. No hash collision (shuffle) in that arm waving proposal. So there's no attempt to anonymize the voter's identity. Votes cast and recorded in order deanonymize the ballots. If the order is not recorded then the election cannot be audited. As I hinted (elsewhere), the blockchain proposals fudge the timestamp (when the ballot is cast) in an attempt to anonymize the voter.