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Electronic voting != internet voting. Remote voting has irresolvable problems in regards to voter secrecy: you can't preserve that with remote voting, and it's
by andrepd 9y ago
Electronic voting != internet voting. Remote voting has irresolvable problems in regards to voter secrecy: you can't preserve that with remote voting, and it's indispensable to ensure you don't sell your vote.
But that is not synonym with electronic voting. You can go into a polling station and vote on machines; a well designed system shares all vital properties of paper systems while adding many useful features, including ways to reliably count votes algorithmically in an independently verifiable way (any citizen can do the math and check the results, and check that each person only voted once, even though they can't tell who voted for whom).
Don't say it's impossible, with a bit of ingenuity and a bit of mathematics it can be done. :P
EDIT: For more info read https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_systems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_sy.... It's fascinating.
- specialist 9y agoIt's impossible to have an electronically mediated voting system that both protects the secret ballot and ensures the public count. Because there is no digital equivalent to the one-way hash of dropping a ballot into a ballot box. Chaum, Rivest, Pret a Whatever... Fine. Prove it. With a real world election (simulated). Burden of proof lies with the technophiles, not with the proud defenders of Democracy.
- DaiPlusPlus 9y agoPeople used to say the same thing about digital currencies (think: Beenz.com https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beenz.com https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beenz.com ) - because digital information can be copied freely, therefore a digital currency would need a central arbiter and a distributed digital currency would be impossible. And then BitCoin and the blockchain happened. To say Internet voting is impossible is to admit a failure of imagination and ingenuity - I'm confident that some novel application of cryptographic and distributed-computing techniques could come up with a secure system. But I'm wary of how complicated it would necessarily be to the average voter, or even someone with an advanced knowledge of computing - concepts like hashing and the blockchain are almost impossible to correctly explain to a layperson, let alone do they have the way to be confident of the results themselves - it would immediately cast doubt on the system because you cannot trust something that you cannot understand.
- specialist 9y agoAh, thank you for the reminder. Moratorium on blockchain-based voting system proposals.
- bo1024 9y agoThere's a big difference between claiming there is no current technology to do this (which I agree with), and claiming it is impossible for there to ever be any in the future.
- DaiPlusPlus 9y ago> Because there is no digital equivalent to the one-way hash of dropping a ballot into a ballot box. This is equivalent to preventing double-spending in the blockchain analogy - a solved problem. There are already companies trying to exploit this to develop electronic-voting systems: https://followmyvote.com/ https://followmyvote.com/. I imagine it working like this: 1. Government announces an election. Registered voters are asked to submit the public addresses of their 'vote wallets'. The public addresses of the wallets are derived from the registered voter's public information (e.g. their name). This information need not be secret. The public blockchain would ensure that everyone who is registered received their votes to cast: the equivalent of receiving an empty ballot paper. 2. A Monero-like system (confession: I don't fully understand it yet) acting as a blackbox or Bitcoin-tumbler system then distributes empty-ballots from the public wallets into new private wallets that each registered-voter will have created in an anonymous fashion. 3. Registered voters then cast their votes by 'spending' their ballots (coins) by sending them to the public wallets of electoral candidates. These transactions may be cryptographically signed by a private key derived from the registered-voter's public wallet. This allows a voter to verify that their vote was correctly cast, without allowing others to see whom they actually voted for. 4. There is a problem in that the results of the election cannot be kept secret until the election is over, as the blockchain must be distributed publicly, so observers will see the votes going towards a particular candidate as-they-happen, which will necessarily change voters' votes in cases of tactical-voting; though possible solutions exist, such as having blockchain network nodes agree to only allow final vote transactions during a tiny time window of only a few seconds - or a Proof-of-Work system that will necessarily take more computation time to verify a vote was for a particular candidate the more in-advance of the polls-closing deadline the vote was made. Because votes cannot be 'mined', and all originate from a single 'government wallet' it means that votes cannot be manufactured - as far as I can tell the only weakness is that false voter-registrations could exist and be used to cast votes, but then we have that situation with postal-voting now any way. If a tumbler approach is used to distribute ballots from public wallets to private wallets it's possible for participants to create more than one private wallet, and claim more ballots for themselves - but this can be detected by: 1. As part of step 1 above, voters create a private secret K. 2. Each voter then creates a hash of K, known as K'. 3. The blockchain would also contain a Bloom-filter, or equivalent implementation of a "Set contains a member" test that does not reveal the actual set contents. Then a strictly sequential process begins, where the Bloom-filter is publicly modified by each registered voter to add their own K' values - this necessarily means that the K' values of the first voters will be publicly known entirely, but as the table becomes more populated it will be impossible to fully know what the entire values of each K' value is. This can be mitigated by having the system create known 'sacrificial' / dummy voters to provide some initial protection for the first actual voters. 4. When the private wallets are created by each voter (in step 2 above) they must be tagged with the K values each voter created as Kp. A private wallet will only be able to participate in the ballot distribution process if the hash of its Kp value (Kp') appears in the Bloom filter populated in the previous step) - thus restricting each voter to only 1 private ballot wallet.
- amenghra 9y agohttps://www.quaxio.com/simple_auditable_anonymous_voting_scheme/ https://www.quaxio.com/simple_auditable_anonymous_voting_sch... explains how to create a toy voting system which both preserves privacy and where everyone can tally the votes. If you were to actually build something like this, you would use blind signature. But having this toy example shows that the two concepts aren't exclusif.
- specialist 9y agoAll crypto schemes I studied rely on hash collisions. Meaning your ballot is hidden within a herd of ballots. This works for hypothetical elections where there are lots of voters and simple ballots. Alas. Our actual elections are administered per precinct (say 0 - 1000 voters) and have complicated ballots (dozens of issues, races). Meaning your utterly unique ballot is unlikely to collide with any other cast ballot. The blockchain-based schemes I briefly studied rely on fuzzing timestamps. A different kind of collision. Here's the takeaway: Our elections administration is finely tuned to the Australian Ballot. Any new voting system has to specify the style of ballot, which circumstances are applicable, and how the laws, rules, and procedures will have to be modified to adopt it.
- amenghra 9y agoDid you even read the link I posted? It's a voting scheme which is anonymous and auditable. It can be turned into a usable system using blind signatures. Nowhere does it mention hash collisions.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- specialist 9y agoYou're right. I didn't bother. I just now went back and parsed it. You're right. No hash collision (shuffle) in that arm waving proposal. So there's no attempt to anonymize the voter's identity. Votes cast and recorded in order deanonymize the ballots. If the order is not recorded then the election cannot be audited. As I hinted (elsewhere), the blockchain proposals fudge the timestamp (when the ballot is cast) in an attempt to anonymize the voter.