3 ms·
The Adventures of AV and the Leaky Sandbox [pdf]
- wepple 9y agoMisleading title, there's no real discussion of how you get to the cloud over an air gap.
- Crontab 9y agoAgreed. A mod should retitle this submission.
- lelandgaunt 9y agoTo call this "Air-gapped" would be a misnomer.
- ech 9y agothat is not what an air gap is. if at any time there is an exchange of data between the air gapped hosts/network and a non air gapped one, there is no air gap anymore. and yes, that includes an analyst taking a sample to an internet-connected host. side channel exfiltration techniques like "fansmitter"[1] and "diskfiltration"[2] or the well known TEMPEST attacks are more interesting challenges in air gapped designs than relying on a very basic security boundary violation. (and solved in very much the same way, by having the secure terminals be as dumb as bricks as possible, with extremely limited known inputs and outputs, preventing the insertion of unclassified electronics in the secure zone through policy, and enforcing it through physical searches, RF hardening the zone with a faraday cage, absence of windows, etc... the "Technical Specifications for Construction and Management of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities"[3] is a great ressource for those interested in such designs) incidentally, there are awfully little true air gapped networks (which are not ICSes and/or assorted single purpose hosts/networks whose absence of network connectivity is not a primary design feature) in the wild. they're operationally heavy precisely because of their nature, and outside of very specific situations, their security is not perceived as cost efficient by management, for good reasons. [1]https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.05915 https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.05915 [2]https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.03431 https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.03431 [3]https://fas.org/irp/dni/icd/ics-705-ts.pdf https://fas.org/irp/dni/icd/ics-705-ts.pdf
- vinceguidry 9y agoThe paper never once uses the term "air gap." It's only in the headline as submitted to HN.
- ech 9y agoit has been submitted as such on both HN and reddit. i think it is reasonable to clear any misunderstanding.
- dang 9y agoOk, we'll revert the title to the original. (Submitted title was "Air-gapped data exfiltration via cloud AV sandboxes".) Submitters: please read the HN guidelines, which ask you to use the original title, unless it is misleading or linkbait.
- GordonS 9y agoMy bad, it was titled like that on Twitter, but I should have checked the title in the PDF.
- Eridrus 9y agoI think looking at operational issue with air gaps is much more interesting than TEMPEST attacks which require physical proximity to execute. If someone has gone to the trouble of air gapping their network, they almost certainly have physical security.
- ech 9y agoyou'd be surprised. when specifications get passed around in the endless maze of defense affiliated sub contractors and sub sub contractors, they may be implemented in all kind of creative ways. and i entirely agree that the operational issues of enforcing the air gap are by far the most challenging cost in this kind of environment. the culture of business environments is by and large ill suited to the kind of strict enforcement these environment require. if RF leaks are part of your threat model, then i would definitely not class them as "proximity attacks". without adequate shielding, antenna black magic and a rented apartment on the other side of the street work perfectly well to capture signals of interest.
- pmorici 9y agoThis is really talking about environments with very restrictive firewalls.
- nickpsecurity 9y agoTitle Suggestion: Leaking Data through Firewalls using Cloud AV. Or original: The Adventures of AV and the Leaky Sandbox Mine is more descriptive.
- hamandcheese 9y agoWhat does AV mean in this context? It isn't defined in the slides.
- phonon 9y agoAnti-virus
- chris_wot 9y agoHmmm... Kapersky's response is quite concerning!