3 ms·
Kinda cool but it depends on you trusting the central mailer since it does decryption and reencryption. I suppose if you know about that then it is ok. The be
by dijit 9y ago
Kinda cool but it depends on you trusting the central mailer since it does decryption and reencryption.
I suppose if you know about that then it is ok.
The benefit of this approach over the alternative (making people encrypt and sign with a lot of keys) is that once received, the content does not give away the key names of the other mailing list members.
- lgierth 9y ago> The benefit of this approach over the alternative (making people encrypt and sign with a lot of keys) is that once received, the content does not give away the key names of the other mailing list members. The other benefit is that membership management is a lot easier. Usually the first time you tell members to add or remove a key, things start falling apart quickly. Schleuder makes that easy.
- dice 9y agoThe other benefit is that users can send to the list without the (possibly huge) administrative burden of getting a full and complete list of public keys for all subscribers. A similar setup is used for e.g. the (linux-)distros lists[0] at openwall for discussing embargoed security issues. 0: http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros
- dsacco 9y ago> once received, the content does not give away the key names of the other mailing list members This doesn't present a problem, because you can construct anonymous group signature schemes.
- cvwright 9y ago> because you can construct anonymous group signature schemes Heh. In practice this is true, but only for sufficiently advanced values of "you". I certainly wouldn't feel comfortable attempting such a thing without consulting a real cryptographer.
- dsacco 9y agoAbsolutely agreed, I was speaking as a matter of theory :)
- o- 9y agoIn theory there are alternatives where you do not need to trust the server. The keyword is proxy re-encryption (e.g. [SELS]). On the other hand schleuder exists today and can be used by normal people (for example without having a custom private key per list, as you need afaik for [SELS]). The other often overlooked fact about schleuder is that it's also a re-mailer. You can use it in a one-to-many setting, where the external party does only know the cryptographic key and email address of the list and a group of people can communicate with this person using schleuder as the proxy. This is a great alternative to shared mailboxes and a feature that is probably impossible with proxy encryption. [SELS] https://slagell.info/Adam_J._Slagell/Past_Projects_files/khurana05a.pdf https://slagell.info/Adam_J._Slagell/Past_Projects_files/khu...