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The best solution is to created a trusted privilege level above the TEE, that can determine whether to trust things in the TEE or not. (Don't laugh: Intel's be
by ktRolster 9y ago
The best solution is to created a trusted privilege level above the TEE, that can determine whether to trust things in the TEE or not.
(Don't laugh: Intel's been adding extra security layers for years)
- anonymousDan 9y agoTo some extent that's how Intel SGX works, since code in an enclave (SGX name for a TEE) only executes with user level privileges and can't e.g. execute system calls.
- pgeorgi 9y ago"Intel did it" is a pretty horrible argument, historically. Especially with things like higher-than-OS trust levels where there are limited ABI guarantees to begin with, it might be better to redo things incompatibly if that provides a better solution than "this newly introduced mechanism of unknown quality asserts that this other mechanism of known-bad quality won't mess things up". Intel TXT is one such "guard" mechanism. It tore larger holes in the security fabric than the mechanisms it was supposed to keep watch over.