6 ms·
> Just so nobody freaks out, this is cracking weak passwords, not broken WPA. I beg to differ. The fact that WPA is subject to a passive attack at all is a de
by amluto 9y ago
> Just so nobody freaks out, this is cracking weak passwords, not broken WPA.
I beg to differ. The fact that WPA is subject to a passive attack at all is a defect. It should use a PAKE, which would entirely avoid this type of attack.
There are simple balanced PAKE protocols that would do the trick. DH-EKE, SPAKE2, J-PAKE, and even the venerable SRP would all work. I believe that several are old enough that no patents are possible, and, even when WPA was standardized, something should have been available.
- throwasehasdwi 9y agoYes, this is still a major problem with WPA. Also the fact that certain control packets aren't authenticated is nearly unforgivable. If correctly designed the only reasonable attack on wifi would be channel jamming, sadly after many years this still is not the case.
- d33 9y agoThis is probably a good occasion for a call for WPA3: https://github.com/d33tah/call-for-wpa3 https://github.com/d33tah/call-for-wpa3
- kees99 9y agoWEP, WPA, WPA2... why keep reinventing the same wheel? Each new iteration inevitable turns out to be less-than-perfect and keep adding more and more complexity and overhead - for one, join/leave times keep increasing, up to a point where we have a separate standard (802.11r) just to get back pre-WPA roaming speeds (at cost of even more protocol complexity overhead). Here's crazy idea: Why not run open network + IPSEC, or heck, even OpenVPN? Obviously, drop all non-VPN traffic right on the AP (or first router after it) to nip freeloaders in the bud.
- djsumdog 9y agoMost captive portal routers don't block DNS (because they use iptables rules to handle authentication). That's why you can use iodine to proxy TCP-over-DNS on such APs. So if you just had an open access point, unless you provided no DNS servers except over VPN, people would still be able to use your AP.
- poizan42 9y agoPresumably you want to reply to DNS requests for a hostname for your captive portal. You might try to just use a raw ip address, but then you can't use https. So then you have the problem that you can't just reply with a fake answer for other domains due to caching. E.g. Windows caches negative responses for 5 minutes, which would be a pretty bad experience for your customers. I guess you might be able to just fail to reply to DNS requests for domains outside you captive portal, I have no idea if anyone has tried that or there might be other complications. Edit: Actually not replying wouldn't work great either because then the user can't be redirected to the captive portal. This might be less of an issue today since most devices have standardized a way to detect captive portals using a small set of hostnames.
- hunter2_ 9y agoAside from custom root certs being installed, https is out either way, not only with IP address, right? HSTS makes that even more of a problem, and pinning makes even the custom root cert a problem. Captive portals seem like an increasingly fragile idea, except that OSes increasingly intervene appropriately.
- kees99 9y agoState-of-art for captive portal handling is: Step 1) For mobile device to make a request to a special URL that is known to respond with short 200/204, something like that: http://clients1.google.com/generate_204 http://captive.apple.com/hotspot-detect.html http://www.msftconnecttest.com/connecttest.txt ...and bring up UI (sandboxed browser) if anything else than expected short 2xx was received. Step 2) Mobile device reuse same cookies for the same portal second time around, so portal can recognize returning user and let them in without annoying with login prompt each time. Assuming mobile device has a separate cookie jar for this, and captive portal is HTTPS with proper certificate, and doesn't try to break other people's SSL, that is pretty secure. Sure, this is not the most efficient protocol, but up-side is - it's open-ended. You can fit here anything from "press here if you agree to behave" to complete walled garden like hotspot on a train that shows you interactive map, schedule and transport connections available on the next stop along with small banner asking $1 for full internet access.
- d33 9y agoIPSec and OpenVPN are complex like hell and not very well supported across OSes (think of the UI too). This is why I'm waiting for Wireguard.io, it looks like a step in a good direction.
- zx2c4 9y agoI've been experimenting with this exact kind of network setup -- open WiFi that only allows packets to and from the WireGuard endpoint. The nice part is that it means I just have WireGuard on all the time, and because it roams, when I connect to a different WiFi networks, I remain on my home network automatically. I've also been putting my actual wlan0 interface in a separate namespace, isolated from real things. This way there's no chance of leaking data: https://www.wireguard.com/netns/#the-new-namespace-solution https://www.wireguard.com/netns/#the-new-namespace-solution
- MadSax 9y agoFor those that don't know, like me, how would PAKE etc protect cracking of weak passwords used during client authentication?
- throwasehasdwi 9y agoIt doesn't give you a hash to crack. It reduces your speed of guessing passwords from "how quick can you hash X", which is millions of times per second, to "how many times can I attempt to get in before the access point blocks me". This major issue with WPA password cracking today is that it can be done "offline". You can pull the handshake out of the air and bang on it as long as you want. It's pretty much the same thing as trying to guess a password from some leaked hashes vs trying to guess a password using the gmail interface.
- MadSax 9y agoThanks. I also hope that deauth frames are encrypted in the next version of WPA.
- throwasehasdwi 9y agoThey are a current feature but not the baseline which means in practice implementations are buggy or non existent. I've had a few nicer routers where I could turn the options on but most clients are not able to connect :( . I need to be in the baseline standard to get qualified or nobody will implement it.
- xori 9y agoI'm not sure how PAKE works, but how would an AP block you? MAC address are forgeable. And any nonce an AP sends down as a one-time salt would be visible to you and you could still just brute force it offline. EDIT: After reading up on SPAKE2, it's basically just a Diffe-Hellman exchange. You can still totally do a brute force because you know what the first encrypted payload should look like and you can listen in for that encrypted message and use that as your "test that you got it right" I think that at the end of the day, no matter what key stretching techniques you use. A bad starting key results in a bad end key.
- throwaway91111 9y agoAgreed. However, WPA has been obviously broken for years; just use WPA2 instead. It's also way easier to set up on your grandmother's random router.