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Compromising the protocol this way on the spec level sounds pretty corrupt. These people should use something else than TLS. TLS has so far had a headline objec
by fulafel 9y ago
Compromising the protocol this way on the spec level sounds pretty corrupt. These people should use something else than TLS. TLS has so far had a headline objective of end to end confidentiality (as stated by the spec) and this is a backdoor mechanism. I think the argument for the "pragmatic" compromise is pretty clearly morally unsustainable.
- nerdponx 9y agoWould it make sense to have two "flavors" of the protocol? One "internal enterprise" flavor supporting this case, and one "external" flavor for everyone else?
- MichaelGG 9y agoThe "internal" flavour needs to be supported on everything. From web servers to databases and so on. And that'd include cases where it needs to be supported on external-facing systems (proxies). It also means pretty much every popular TLS library and tool needs to support the "internal" version. And it also means that any switch to enable the weaker ciphersuites will end up getting turned on most of the time "to make sure it works". The only realistic place you might differentiate between internal and external is popular browsers like Chrome or Firefox. They could only disable PFS in case they're configured to do so via Group Policy or something like it. In the end, this is just a matter of tooling, and hurting the protocol because they want to load keys into monitoring platforms is a bad idea. Instead, they should have host-level hooks that dump out the packets before TLS is applied.
- TazeTSchnitzel 9y agohttps://xkcd.com/927/ https://xkcd.com/927/
- Godel_unicode 9y agoThey address this. Your proposal is virtually identical to the "export grade crypto" proposal which has caused all the recent TLS headache.
- AndyMcConachie 9y agoThere are legitimate reasons to need to snoop on all traffic in an enterprise. Some orgs are required by law to snoop on all traffic. For example, in the USA orgs regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for financial transactions need to track communications related to their employees' work. It's not as simple as snooping == bad.
- MichaelGG 9y agoYou can still track employees' e.g. web traffic by installing a CA and proxying their connections. That is what is done today and PFS does not change it.
- martinald 9y agoNot if the website uses CA pinning though?
- detaro 9y agoAdditionally installed CA certificates override key pinning, for exactly this use case (at least in the major browsers, it's possible some niche ones don't do this)
- cesarb 9y agoThe right question would be "Not if the website uses client certificates though?". As far as I know, TLS connections using client certificates can't be proxied, since the MITM proxy would need to have the client certificate's private key.
- AndyMcConachie 9y agoPeople bring their own devices to work these days. And look, this is not something that I fundamentally agree with or anything. I just want to make sure we understand the arguments of both sides.
- 9y ago
- revelation 9y agoOr use one of the bazillion other ways to log the traffic from machines you own and control. The response here can be nothing but a giant "fuck off".
- MichaelGG 9y agoA lot of times there isn't any other way, out of the box. For instance, you might have some sort of network appliance that lets you load certs and keys, but has no way to export session keys (so you can't decrypt offline) and might not have any way to export pre-TLS packet-level data. Or they might have logging but not in a format their expensive monitoring system works with. It's obviously possible to do on-device logging somehow, but it probably isn't feasible for a lot of companies. Think of a lot of software that just calls OpenSSL to get an encrypted connection - they'll have zero support for logging session keys. Such apps need to implement some sort of logging in a way others can understand. Given that there's tons of app vendors and tons of monitoring vendors, this quickly becomes a mess. That's why PCAP-level monitoring is handy - just capture the raw protocol, then the monitoring app can re-parse it all and figure stuff out. But we'll all be better off if TLS1.3 doesn't allow PFS and forces vendors to start supporting a unified monitoring/debugging protocol/system.
- fulafel 9y agoThose boxes are a screening violation of the stated TLS aims and should not be pandered to.
- MichaelGG 9y ago... That's like the entire discussion. I'm just explaining why some folks want to pander to such devices. They've invested millions into such systems and it's entrenched in how they work. Not that it's any excuse.
- deleted 9y ago[deleted]
- amygdyl 9y agoI agree generally with the reactions of disbelief in reply to this article. Its in a company. I know of no hindrance to company policy or ability to make the most rational decisions about networking security, from the starting point of not compromising security, and forcing users or client applications adapt to the needs of compliance with data retention and discovery rules. Security measures must come first. If security is necessarily compromised by the requirements of compliance systems or protocols (policies not network encoding) THEN THE PROBLEM HAS TO BE RAISED WITH HIGHER MANAGEMENT AND WITHOUT ADEQUATE RESPONSE, WITH THE BOARD AND SHAREHOLDERS FINALLY. sorry for my shouting, but the legal risks to the author of this article are extremely real, and he should be immediately taking the problem seriously out of his hands. Unilateral decisions, EVEN IF YOU IMAGINE THE ABSENCE OF LOGICAL ALTERNATIVES ABSOLVED YOU FROM RESPONSIBILITY I ASSURE YOU THAT IT WILL NOT, so please do not ever place yourself into situations like this where you are exposed to a specific liability for any resulting breach of security or loss of compliance with your employers legal regulations. Just don't take the risk. And certainly don't think that receiving moral support from your blog is any kind of indemnity. Instead it's advertising "don't hire me" as many industries will interpret the course of action. Or INACTION since you are throwing your hands up in the air, very publicly. Edit: a word of autocorrelation, and first line for clarity
- tedunangst 9y agoWhat kind of legal risks do think there are for writing a blog post summarizing people's positions?