I based the prior probability on NIST's past behavior with respect to backdoors. https://google.com/search?q=nist+backdoor https://google.com/search?q=nist+bac

I based the prior probability on NIST's past behavior with respect to backdoors. https://google.com/search?q=nist+backdoor https://google.com/search?q=nist+backdoor Further, I reviewed the architecture in the write-up. If they wanted a random beacon that was not backdoored, they would xor it with samples from a lava lamp or something simple and unpredictable and point a web cam at it that anyone can see. As explained, this cannot reduce the randomness. They would not carefully design an architecture that is possible to backdoor, which is what we are reading about. As for the reason why they say it should not be used in cryptography, I addressed these in my original comment. In my estimation the chances that the government can predict the output of this random beacon are 200:1 in favor. You are free to disagree, that's fine.