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"The anti-use would be in any sort of cryptographic implementation" I'm not ready to disagree with you (yet) but I was thinking about the possibility of turnin
by smoyer 9y ago
"The anti-use would be in any sort of cryptographic implementation"
I'm not ready to disagree with you (yet) but I was thinking about the possibility of turning a pseudo-random number into a truly random number. If you generate a number using a PRNG and use that as a bit offset (via the timestamp), you might get a better string of random bits as an input to your cryptography system. Of course this relies on there being enough previously generated bits available.
- grosscol 9y agoWouldn't the weak point in that system then be the PRNG? If so, doesn't that require the use of a crytographically secure PRNG in the first place?
- smoyer 9y agoYes ... the PRNG is the weak point (just as it always is). And if you're only using enough bits from the PRNG to generate a timestamp, you also have to worry about whether the distribution is flat.
- anonymouz 9y agoThat is pure security by obscurity. If I know the output of the PRNG, and that this method is being used, I also know the random number. So attacking it is no harder than attacking the PRNG itself.