4 ms·

Browsers should have some sort of non-binary 'trust' score that looks at things like: * how many users have been here before * how 'new' is the site

Browsers should have some sort of non-binary 'trust' score that looks at things like: * how many users have been here before * how 'new' is the site * how much does it look like other popular sites or sites the user has visited (perceptual hash) * how close is it's name to a popular site (levenshtein distance) * how did the user get here (clicked a link vs clicked a bookmark) * does it have form fields * does it appear to ask for credentials (OCR rendered page for 'Login', 'Username',or 'Password') This score should be what gets you the pretty green padlock - otherwise you should just get a dull grey "Private Connection" label. I imagine it's possible to evade some or all of these but it increases the difficulty and cost of shenanigans. We often get tripped up where for security application we like some sort of mathematical certainty we're protected when 'pretty good' is still better than nothing.

matt4077 9y ago
I think browser vendors may be hesitant to implement anything but a clearly defined protocol, because almost by definition a probabilistic model will result in them occasionally vouching for the wrong sites. Even if they could probably exclude legal liability, it may create PR headaches. As a small fish in the big pond that is the www, I'm also wary of any solution that may end up giving the handful of established behemoths an advantage that smaller competitors cannot at least in theory also get (except by growing to similar size). Right now, there's a process that establishes a "good enough" level: EV certificates are within the reach of even small websites, and with my identity being known and proven, I'd argue that they actually track pretty closely to the actual "truth" of the respective trust-worthiness.
- siliconc0w 9y ago
  They vouch for bad sites all the time already - that is what the article is arguing. If a site pops into existence maybe it shouldn't be trusted immediately. Trust has to be earned and this is a protocol to 'earn trust'. The goal is to disambiguate 'trust' with 'encrypted connection'.
  - CamperBob2 9y ago
    This is sort of how SmartScreen works in IE. It's debatably useful, but it certainly sells code-signing certs.
rrix2 9y ago
This sort of scoring is why it's nearly impossible to run your own email in 2017, though. Reputation can't be the deciding factor on whether a site can be secure on the internet as it implies centralization.

matt4077 9y ago

I think browser vendors may be hesitant to implement anything but a clearly defined protocol, because almost by definition a probabilistic model will result in them occasionally vouching for the wrong sites. Even if they could probably exclude legal liability, it may create PR headaches. As a small fish in the big pond that is the www, I'm also wary of any solution that may end up giving the handful of established behemoths an advantage that smaller competitors cannot at least in theory also get (except by growing to similar size). Right now, there's a process that establishes a "good enough" level: EV certificates are within the reach of even small websites, and with my identity being known and proven, I'd argue that they actually track pretty closely to the actual "truth" of the respective trust-worthiness.

siliconc0w 9y ago
They vouch for bad sites all the time already - that is what the article is arguing. If a site pops into existence maybe it shouldn't be trusted immediately. Trust has to be earned and this is a protocol to 'earn trust'. The goal is to disambiguate 'trust' with 'encrypted connection'.
- CamperBob2 9y ago
  This is sort of how SmartScreen works in IE. It's debatably useful, but it certainly sells code-signing certs.

rrix2 9y ago

This sort of scoring is why it's nearly impossible to run your own email in 2017, though. Reputation can't be the deciding factor on whether a site can be secure on the internet as it implies centralization.