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Yes the trader can select his arbitrator. The arbitration system got a conceptual change with the upcoming DAO and will be secured by locked up security deposi

Yes the trader can select his arbitrator. The arbitration system got a conceptual change with the upcoming DAO and will be secured by locked up security deposit of the arbitrator as well as an introduction of a mediator who will cover most cases and who has no key to the 2of3 MS. See: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1DXEVEfk4x1qN6QgIcb2PjZwU4m7W6ib49wCdktMMjLw https://docs.google.com/document/d/1DXEVEfk4x1qN6QgIcb2PjZwU... Most arbitration cases are customer care cases and there have been actually no real dispute at all where the traders delivered conflicting statements. We use PageSigner/TLSNotary (https://tlsnotary.org/ https://tlsnotary.org/) for the case that traders have a real dispute. With that we can get a tamper evident proof if the bank transfer took place. WE don't use a DHT but a custom P2P network based on a floodfill algorithm. All traffic is routed over Tor and each node is a hidden service.

Jaepa 9y ago
Huh. I thought I saw in the documentation there are references to securing the master DHT, though I did see references to something called TomP2P. I'm no in a place where I can go back through the documentation for this though. My original question I think still applies how every so I'll try and rephrase it: Is there a way to secure the Peer Discovery service in such a to secure against creating a secondary network of peers, then running a bookkeepers odds scheme. (Using the secondary marketplace as an options market for transactions on the first)
- ManfredKarrer 9y ago
  Which doc are you referring? We used a DHT in early days but that was long before the launch. Maybe I oversaw to update at some place... There are 4 seed nodes to which you connect randomly at startup. They deliver you all known onion addresses in the network. From that list you select randomly peers until u have 8 connections. You also maintain your local peer list which will be used at follow up startups. I don't see a way how to partition the network. You get random incoming connections as well (e.g. if one takes your offer). The floodfill network architecture is very robust against eclipse attacks (dht problems) and partitioning. Thats why a floodfill architecture is used on Bitcoin as well.

Jaepa 9y ago

Huh. I thought I saw in the documentation there are references to securing the master DHT, though I did see references to something called TomP2P. I'm no in a place where I can go back through the documentation for this though. My original question I think still applies how every so I'll try and rephrase it: Is there a way to secure the Peer Discovery service in such a to secure against creating a secondary network of peers, then running a bookkeepers odds scheme. (Using the secondary marketplace as an options market for transactions on the first)

ManfredKarrer 9y ago
Which doc are you referring? We used a DHT in early days but that was long before the launch. Maybe I oversaw to update at some place... There are 4 seed nodes to which you connect randomly at startup. They deliver you all known onion addresses in the network. From that list you select randomly peers until u have 8 connections. You also maintain your local peer list which will be used at follow up startups. I don't see a way how to partition the network. You get random incoming connections as well (e.g. if one takes your offer). The floodfill network architecture is very robust against eclipse attacks (dht problems) and partitioning. Thats why a floodfill architecture is used on Bitcoin as well.