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Surely we shouldn't rush to anthropomorphize neural networks, but we'd ignoring the obvious if we didn't at least note that neural networks do seem to share som
by CountSessine 9y ago
Surely we shouldn't rush to anthropomorphize neural networks, but we'd ignoring the obvious if we didn't at least note that neural networks do seem to share some structural similarities with our own brains, at least at a very low level, and that they seem to do well with a lot of pattern-recognition problems that we've traditionally considered to be co-incident with brains rather than logical systems.
The article notes, "Machine learning models have no access to such experiences and thus cannot "understand" their inputs in any human-relatable way". But this ignores a lot of the subtlety in psychological models of human consciousness. In particular, I'm thinking of Dual Process Theory as typified by Kahneman's "System 1" and "System 2". System 1 is described as a tireless but largely unconscious and heavily biased pattern recognizer - subject to strange fallacies and working on heuristics and cribs, it reacts to it's environment when it believes that it recognizes stimuli, and notifies the more conscious "System 2" when it doesn't.
At the very least it seems like neural networks have a lot in common with Kahneman's "System 1".
- language 9y ago"Machine learning models have no access to such experiences and thus cannot "understand" their inputs in any human-relatable way" It may be that distinctions like the one you're describing here are useful to make, but I don't think this claim refutes the possibility of ML "fitting a particular piece within a larger, yet unarticulated model." I think the assertion is more that our current ways of representing elements of human experience are necessarily very lossy - or that there's some aspect of the situation that you can't describe/implement in terms of models of neural nets.
- visarga 9y agoThe problem with neural nets is that they have a fixed input type - tensors or sequences. For example, imagine the task is to count objects in an image and say if the number of red objects is equal to the number of green objects. You make a net that solves this situation. Then you want to change the colors, or add an extra color, and it will fail. Why - because it learns a fixed input representation. What neural nets need is to change their data format from plain tensors to object-relation graphs. The input of the network is represented as a set of objects that have relations among them, and the network has to be permute invariant to the order of presentation. An implementation is Graph Convolutional Nets. They learn to compose concepts in new ways and once they learned to count, compare, select by color, they can solve any combination of those concepts as well. That way the nets generalize better and transfer knowledge from a problem to the next. Graphs are able to reduce the complexity of learning a neural net that can perform flexible tasks. But in order to get to even better results, it is necessary to add simulation to the mix. By equipping neural nets with simulators, we can simplify the learning problem (because the net doesn't have to learn the dynamics of the environment as well, just the task at hand). Examples of simulators used in DL are AlphaGo, the Reinforcement Learning applications on Atari Games, protein/drug property prediction, generative adversarial networks (in a way). The interesting thing is that graphs are natural for simulation. They can represent objects as vertices and relations as edges, and by signal propagation the graph works like a circuit, a simulator, producing the answer. My bet is on graphs + simulators. That's how we get to the next level (abstraction and reasoning). DeepMind seems to be particularly focused on RL, games and recently, relation networks. There is also work on making dynamic routing in neural nets, in fact applying graphs implicitly inside the net, by multiple attention heads.
- nilkn 9y agoThere is actually work being done on this problem, at least to some extent. A DNC, for instance, can accept variable-structure inputs by storing each piece in its external memory bank. This is illustrated in the original Nature paper by feeding in an arbitrary graph definition piece by piece, then feeding in a query about the graph. This doesn't necessarily address all the nuances of your post, but I do believe it's a step in the right direction. It pushes networks from "learn how to solve this completely statically defined problem via sophisticated pattern matching" to "learn how to interpret a query, drawn from some restricted class of possible queries; accept variable-structure input to the query; strategize about techniques for answering the query; and finally compute the answer, possibly over multiple time-steps"
- eli_gottlieb 9y ago>In particular, I'm thinking of Dual Process Theory Which has been at least partly debunked as psychology's replication crisis went on, and has been called into question on the neuroscientific angle as well.
- CountSessine 9y agoPartly, yes - especially with ego depletion on the ropes. I'm not sure that dual process theory needs to be thrown out along with ego depletion, though.
- eli_gottlieb 9y agoI can see three reasons to "throw it out": 1) Replication failure, plain and simple. 2) Overfitting. There are dozens to hundreds of "cognitive biases" on lists: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases. When you have hundreds of individual points, you really ought to draw some principles, and the principle should not be, "The system generating all this is rigid and inflexible." 3) Imprecision! Again, dozens to hundreds of cognitive biases. What possible behavior or cognitive performance can't be assimilated into the heuristics and biases theory? What can falsify it overall, even after so many of its individual supporting experiments and predictions have fallen down? It looks like a mere taxonomy of observations, not a substantive theory.
- CountSessine 9y ago1) Replication failure, plain and simple. How many meta-analyses have been conducted as of 2017 showing one result or the other? I don't think ego depletion itself has been thoroughly "debunked" yet. If it is a real effect, it's probably quite small - but I don't think that ego depletion has been thrown in the bin just yet. 2) Overfitting. There are dozens to hundreds of "cognitive biases" on lists: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases. When you have hundreds of individual points, you really ought to draw some principles, and the principle should not be, "The system generating all this is rigid and inflexible." 3) Imprecision! Again, dozens to hundreds of cognitive biases. What possible behavior or cognitive performance can't be assimilated into the heuristics and biases theory? What can falsify it overall, even after so many of its individual supporting experiments and predictions have fallen down? Wait a second - has anyone ever tried to explain the "IKEA Effect" using Dual Process Theory? What does a laundry-list of supposed cognitive biases have to do with the theory? Is anyone really trying to explain/predict all this almanac-of-cognitive-failings with Dual Process?