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I appreciate the research of zcash, but trusted-setup is still just a very sophisticated security theater. The least they should have done is have constructed a
by kbody 9y ago
I appreciate the research of zcash, but trusted-setup is still just a very sophisticated security theater. The least they should have done is have constructed an open participation.
- justinjlynn 9y agoIndeed. Secure multiparty computation with large numbers assumed malicious participants to do the initial setup would've been enough. As it was, I just can't trust it - even if all the parties are honest and completely trustworthy. I may be paranoid but, in my opinion, if you have to do the same rigmarole that the CA system does then you're still fundamentally broken.
- ewillbefull 9y agoAt the time, the multi-party computation protocol could not scale to a large number of participants.
- justinjlynn 9y agoDefine large. In any case, I would rather have a protocol in which only one of the participants need successfully discard their local state for total security than n participants.
- kbody 9y agoYou still would need just 1 participant, it's the computation part that would be open to any number participants in order to reduce the possibility of collusion.
- ianmiers 9y agoThat was the case. If one of the 6 people completed the computation and discarded the results, the paramaters are secure. Ideally it would have been more than 6 people, but that protocol really didn't scale to more than a handful of people.
- ianmiers 9y agoThe problem was the existing MPC protocol for generating the paramaters didn't scale that well. 1) It required participants to stay secure during the entire computation. With 6 people we still had problems because it took long enough people had to sleep. 2) If anyone aborted, the protocol had to restart The next version of the protocol will resolve both of these issues.