Is it not sound, in principle, for the government to get access to the cleartext when they have a publicly gotten warrant? I personally think so. However, I do

Is it not sound, in principle, for the government to get access to the cleartext when they have a publicly gotten warrant? I personally think so. However, I do not see a way to achieve this without massive compromise to security. That is, without either giving LE access without warrants and without making it much easier for criminals to get access. > On the other hand if you imagine, "if there was a new algorithm for _stronger encryption_ but it didn't matter because all the cleartext was available for monitoring", it means you're thinking like the government. I would indeed be in favor of giving the government publicly auditable and well secured access to cleartext uppon request. I just don't see a way to do this that works. By auditable here, I mean that every single decryption that occurs should be publicly available. This could e.g. happen by requiring a secret key known only by the judiciary. With homomorphic encryption, you might even be able to do this stuff on a blockchain, but that is quite the pipe-dream.